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DANGEROUS DIAGNOSES, RISKY ASSUMPTIONS,
AND THE FAILED EXPERIMENT OF “SEXUALLY
VIOLENT PREDATOR” COMMITMENT
DEIRDRE M. SMITH*
In its 1997 opinion, Kansas v. Hendricks, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
a law that reflected a new model of civil commitment. The targets of this
new commitment law were dubbed “Sexually Violent Predators” (SVPs),
and the Court upheld indefinite detention of these individuals on the
assumption that there is a psychiatrically distinct class of individuals who,
unlike typical recidivists, have a mental condition that impairs their ability
to refrain from violent sexual behavior. And, more specifically, the Court
assumed that the justice system could reliably identify the true “predators,”
those for whom this unusual and extraordinary deprivation of liberty is
appropriate and legitimate, with the aid of testimony from mental health
professionals.
This Article evaluates those assumptions and concludes that, because
they were seriously flawed, the due process rationale used to uphold the
SVP laws is invalid. The “Sexually Violent Predator” is a political and
moral construct, not a medical classification. The implementation of SVP
laws has resulted in dangerous distortions of both psychiatric expertise and
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for providing summer research support and of the staff of the Donald L. Garbrecht Law
Library for its research assistance.

619

620

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:619

important legal principles, and such distortions reveal an urgent need to reexamine the Supreme Court’s core rationale in upholding the SVP
commitment experiment.
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I. Introduction
In 1990, the state of Washington was consumed by news of a highly
publicized, violent sexual crime committed against a young child by an
offender with prior convictions for violence against children.1 In response
to public outcry, the Washington legislature enacted a statute allowing the
state to continue to detain certain sex offenders after they had completed
their criminal sentences.2 The targets of these new laws were dubbed
“Sexually Violent Predators” (SVPs), a label intended to connote a subclass
of sex offenders who run a high risk of recidivism after their release due to
the presence of a mental abnormality or personality disorder.3 Soon
thereafter, a few other states, including Kansas, enacted their own
commitment laws modeled closely after Washington’s.4 The first person
committed under Kansas’s law, Leroy Hendricks, challenged the
constitutionality of his indefinite detention on due process, ex post facto,
and double jeopardy grounds in a case that reached the U.S. Supreme
Court.5 In its 1997 opinion Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court upheld this new
commitment model.6 In the wake of that case, other states (a total of twenty
to date) and the federal government enacted SVP laws.7 Since 1990, the
1. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
2. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010 to .09.903 (West 2014); see infra notes 78-84
and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 29a24 (West 2008); WIS. STAT. §§
980.01 to .14 (2013).
5. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
6. Id. at 371.
7. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120
Stat. 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2012)). ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to 3717 (2009); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6609.3 (West 2010); D.C. CODE §§ 22-3803
to 3811 (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910-.932 (West 2011); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
207/1 to /99 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229a.1 to .16 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 59-29a01 to -29a24 (West 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123a, §§ 1-16 (West 2003); 2007
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253d.01 to .36 (West & Supp. 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.480-.513
(West 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-1201 to -1226 (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 135-E:1 to :24 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24 to .38 (West 2008); N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01-.17 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 2503.3-01 to -24 (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (2002 & Supp. 2008); VA. CODE
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federal government and the states have committed several thousand people
under SVP laws, the vast majority of whom remain in indefinite detention.8
The core rationale in Hendricks, as well as the follow-up case, Kansas v.
Crane,9 is that indefinite preventive detention is consistent with substantive
due process principles where a mental disorder limits the committed
individual’s ability to control his behavior.10 Although a finding of such
mental disorder is, consequently, a constitutional prerequisite for these
indefinite commitments, the Court also conferred broad discretion on
legislatures regarding how states could satisfy this requirement.11 The Court
based its opinions regarding SVP laws on the assumption that there is a
medically distinct class of individuals who are not “typical recidivists” but
who have mental conditions that impair their ability to refrain from violent
sexual behavior and for whom this unusual and extraordinary deprivation of
liberty is appropriate and legitimate.12 More specifically, the Court assumed
that the justice system could reliably distinguish between the two groups
and, with the aid of mental health professionals, could identify the true
“predators.”13
In this Article, I evaluate the extent to which those assumptions were
correct, both at the time of the SVP laws’ enactment and as they have been
implemented. First, I consider psychiatry’s own views of the relationship
between mental pathology and sexual violence and the field’s ability to
predict such violence.14 Second, I review key features of psychiatric
ANN. §§ 37.2-900 to -920 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010 to .903 (West 2014);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01 to .14 (2013).
8. See infra notes 193-196 and accompanying text.
9. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
10. Crane, 534 U.S. at 412-13; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58.
11. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358-59.
12. Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.
13. See id. at 413-14, 416-17.
14. I will generally use the term "psychiatry" to refer to the professional field concerned
with the identification of mental illness in the Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) context
because it is closely associated with the overall development of mental pathology
classification and nosology, such as through the Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals of
Mental Disorders (DSM) published by the American Psychiatric Association. I refer to
"psychology" in the context of research regarding human behavior. Parties in court
proceedings often present expert evidence through the testimony of forensic or clinical
psychologists. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE
COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 23-24 (3d ed.
2007); Roy B. Lacoursiere, Evaluating Offenders Under a Sexually Violent Predator Law:
The Practical Practice, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS:
LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 75-77 (Bruce J. Winick & John A. La Fond eds., 2003).
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expertise offered by prosecutors to support SVP commitment and analyze
how courts have used this expertise when deciding whom to commit under
SVP laws. Ultimately, these examinations reveal that the assumptions upon
which the Court based the Hendricks-Crane rationale were erroneous.
The Court’s most consequential error was its failure to acknowledge that
the category of the “Sexually Violent Predator” is a political and moral
construct, not a medical classification. Mainstream psychiatry has never
claimed an ability to accurately predict who is at risk of committing acts of
sexual violence and has never conceptualized sexual aggression as the
product of volitional impairment.15 Indeed, the American Psychiatric
Association (APA), the leading professional organization in American
psychiatry, and other voices from within the mental health profession have
vociferously opposed SVP laws since their enactment precisely because of
the role assigned to psychiatric expertise to identify those who should be
committed.16
The controversies regarding admission of expert testimony in individual
SVP cases reveal the troubling consequences of the Supreme Court’s failure
to heed the APA’s warnings. Trial courts permit prosecution experts to
offer diagnoses and predictions of risk in support of these commitments
notwithstanding the fact that such testimony often strays far from current
scientific understanding of the relationship between acts of sexual violence
and psychopathology.17 In so doing, courts distort and disregard key values
in our justice system, such as limiting the admission of expert testimony to
that based on scientifically sound methodology and reliable facts and data.18
Rulings in such cases have become even more dubious in the years since
the SVP laws’ initial development, as the debate regarding the medical
basis of SVP commitment has only intensified. The controversy reveals the
unsteady foundation upon which the medical and, by extension,
constitutional premise of SVP was based.19
The SVP laws generally,20 and the Hendricks opinion specifically,21 have
been the target of extensive criticism from scholars as well as from legal
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra notes 323-336 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 178-201 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 455-489 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 578-605 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 567-597 and accompanying text.
ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE
RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 61-66 (2006); Aman Ahluwalia, Civil Commitment of
Sexually Violent Predators: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y
& ETHICS J. 489, passim (2006); Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational
People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1076-77 (2002).
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and mental health professionals. While some have focused upon specific
problems in the implementation of SVP laws, including experts’ reliance
upon controversial diagnoses or their use of actuarial instruments to assess
risk, many in both groups—scholars and mental health professionals—have
argued that the laws are inherently flawed policy.22 Although critical of the
SVP laws, these commentators generally assume that, in light of the
Hendricks opinion, the question of the laws’ constitutionality is now a
settled matter.23 However, these and related criticisms, combined with a
review of how the laws have actually operated, demonstrate that this
assumption of constitutionality is itself questionable.
This Article analyzes the SVP laws as a legislative experiment in
preventive detention endorsed by the Supreme Court in Hendricks and
Crane through a rationale based upon a set of hypotheses and assumptions
regarding psychiatry and psychiatric testimony. This analysis reveals that
such hypotheses and assumptions are dubious. As an initial matter, the
rationale first developed in Hendricks was strictly theoretical: the Court was
evaluating a new statutory model for indefinite preventive detention and
Leroy Hendricks was among the first people to challenge it.24 The Supreme
Court expected mental health professionals to help courts and fact finders
discriminate between the typical recidivist and the truly ill, thereby
ensuring that the new laws did not reach too far.25 These expectations
stemmed largely from courts’ longstanding reliance on psychiatric expertise
to help answer difficult questions about the mental status of persons
appearing before them. However, the actual use of such expertise in SVP
proceedings reveals that such faith in psychiatry was, in fact, misplaced.
Commentators have noted that the use of certain diagnoses in SVP
proceedings runs counter to the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual

21. Michael L. Perlin, “There's No Success Like Failure/and Failure's No Success at
All”: Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1248-49
(1998).
22. See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Adjudicating Sex Crimes As Mental Disease, 33 PACE
L. REV. 536, passim (2013).
23. See, e.g., John Q. La Fond, Sexually Violent Predator Laws and the Liberal State:
An Ominous Threat to Individual Liberty, 31 INT’L. J. L & PSYCHIATRY 158, 162-63 (2008);
Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Normative Versus Consequential Ethics in Sexually Violent
Predator Laws: An Ethics Conundrum for Psychiatry, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
386, 388 (2010).
24. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
25. See infra notes 175-183 and accompanying text.
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of Mental Disorders (DSM) system of psychiatric classification.26 But the
problems with the psychiatric evidence offered in these cases are far
broader than occasional misclassification and, in fact, stem from limitations
inherent to the field of psychiatry generally. Justifying SVP preventive
detention based on the notion that psychiatric testimony will ensure that
such detention adheres to due process principles reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of psychiatric evaluation and diagnosis.
The problems seen in the use of expert evidence in these proceedings
cannot be avoided through technical fixes. Indeed, they reveal that there are
no means to implement SVP laws consistent with notions of due process
and individual liberty. A sexual predator is a legal classification that
depends on medical line-drawing to be constitutionally sound. But because
there is no concept in psychiatry resembling a “sexual predator,” the
implications of this incongruence go to the essential question of the
constitutionality of the SVP laws. Written opinions reveal that courts base
SVP commitments largely on the respondents’ criminal records27 because
the expert opinions themselves are based on little else.28 As a result, expert
opinions in SVP cases are not in fact “medical” but moral. And because
such conclusions are essentially normative ones, courts are improperly
delegating commitment decisions to psychiatric professionals, which flies
in the face of both legal principles and psychiatric practice. This is not
merely a problem of labels and professional realms; this experiment has
resulted in the indefinite detention of thousands of people at an enormous
monetary cost to governments and an enormous personal cost to those
committed and their families.
II. The Supreme Court Sanctions the “Sexually Violent Predator”
Experiment
The notion of the “sexual predator” originated in the early 1990s amid
intense and widespread public concern about sexual abuse of children.29
Fear and hatred of those who committed such crimes fueled a view of them
26. Hamilton, supra note 22, at 23-29; Robert A. Prentky et al., Sexually Violent
Predators in the Courtroom: Science on Trial, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 357, 367-68
(2006).
27. Court opinions refer to those individuals who are the targets of SVP commitment
petitions primarily as “respondents” and occasionally as “defendants”; I will primarily use
the former term.
28. See infra notes 449-479 and accompanying text.
29. ROGER N. LANCASTER, SEX PANIC AND THE PUNITIVE STATE 78 (2011); Amy Adler,
To Catch a Predator, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 130, 130-31 (2012).
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as “the ultimate other.”30 In the wake of media reports of a spate of highprofile sexual crimes against children, some state legislatures passed
measures in an attempt to control offenders. Legislatures passed the new
laws based on the assumption that these criminals had unusually high
recidivism rates and posed a special risk to the public.31 They were sick, the
laws’ supporters reasoned, with a condition that rendered them resistant to
typical forms of deterrence.32 Policymakers concluded that these unique
attributes—combined with the particularized harm resulting from sexual
abuse—warranted unique measures.33 Legislatures enacted new or
enhanced laws addressing punishments for the possession and viewing of
child pornography.34 They created registries and notification
requirements.35 And, at the extreme end of the spectrum, they established
programs for the indefinite detention via civil commitment of individuals
identified as SVPs.36
30. Perlin, supra note 21, at 1248.
31. Adler, supra note 29, at 130-32.
32. See id.
33. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
34. CHARLES PATRICK EWING, JUSTICE PERVERTED: SEX OFFENDER LAW, PSYCHOLOGY,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 119 (2011); see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-196d (West); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 6312 (West).
35. JANUS, supra note 20, at 66-73.
36. Both the laws and common parlance use a range of terms to describe those who
commit, or are at risk of committing, multiple crimes of sexual violence. I will use the
abbreviation “SVP” throughout the article to describe such category of classification as this
was the one used by Washington in the first such law and it is the most commonly used by
other states. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7) (2009) (“Sexually violent person”);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (West 2010) (“Sexually violent predator”); D.C.
CODE § 22-3803(1) (2013) (“[S]exual psychopath”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(10) (West
2011) (“Sexually violent predator”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/5(f) (West 2006) (“Sexually
violent person”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(12) (West 2014) (“Sexually violent predator”);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (West 2008) (“Sexually violent predator”); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (West 2003) (“Sexually dangerous person”); 2007 MINN. STAT. §
253D.02(16) (West & Supp. 2009) (“[S]exually dangerous persons” or persons with a
“[s]exual psychopathic personality”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(5) (West 2014) (“Sexually
violent predators”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1203(5) (West 2009) (“[D]angerous sex
offender”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2(12) (2015) (“Sexually violent predator”); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (West 2008) (“[S]exually violent predator”); N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAW § 10.03(q)-(r) (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2011) (“Sex offender requiring civil
management” or “strict and intensive” supervision); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(8)
(2014) (“Sexually dangerous individual”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(1) (2002 & Supp.
2008) (“Sexually violent predator”); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2013) (“Sexually violent
predator”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(18) (West 2014) (“Sexually violent
predator”).
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The first SVP commitment law was enacted by the state of Washington
against the backdrop of the mid-twentieth century’s “sexual psychopath”
laws and the heightened attention to the problem of repeated acts of sexual
violence committed by certain individuals, notwithstanding efforts to
control, punish, and deter their behavior through the criminal justice
system.37 But once the U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned Washington’s new
form of commitment in Hendricks, the model spread, and there are now
several well-established SVP commitment programs across the country,
which continue to indefinitely detain thousands of people.38
A. The Origins of SVP Commitment
1. Rise and Fall of Sexual Psychopath Laws
The SVP laws conceived in the early 1990s were not the first laws
targeting sex offenders. States enacted the first generation of laws
permitting the detention of sex offenders between the 1930s and 1960s,
although these laws differed significantly from contemporary SVP laws.39
While these earlier laws were in place, mainstream psychiatry explained
that “sexual psychopaths” were ill, which placed them in the realm of
medicine in terms of both identification and care.40 These earlier laws
assured the administration of treatment, rather than detention alone, and
thus they were open-ended in terms of the length of hospitalization.41
Courts could order the hospitalization and treatment of men charged with
sex crimes, rather than sentencing them to prison, with the hope that
treatment would prevent recidivism.42
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this form of commitment in 1940,43 but
the laws eventually faced widespread criticism.44 A growing number of
37. See infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 205-217 and accompanying text.
39. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS: A TASK FORCE REPORT OF
THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 11-12, 18 (1999) [hereinafter APA, DANGEROUS
SEX OFFENDERS].
40. Id. at 11.
41. EWING, supra note 34, at 7.
42. APA, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS, supra note 39, at 13.
43. Minn. ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey Cnty., 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940).
The Minnesota statute upheld in that case required
proof of a ‘habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters' on the part of the
persons against whom a proceeding under the statute is directed, which has
shown ‘an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses', and hence that
they ‘are likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on
the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire.’
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commentators within psychiatry attacked the “sexual psychopath” legal
classification, as there was no agreed-upon definition or basis to attach this
label to any individual.45 Moreover, it became clear that many of these
hospitalized men were not mentally ill and received little, if any, treatment
in these hospitals.46 The laws were little more than extended detention on a
preventive basis.47
Most of these laws were either repealed or no longer used by the early
1980s,48 but the final nail in the coffin for the remaining laws came from
the psychiatric establishment.49 The Group for the Advancement of
Psychiatry (GAP)50 Committee on Forensic Psychiatry concluded in a 1977
report that there was little real prospect for effective treatment of sexual
offenders and that the “discrepancy between the promises in sex statutes
and performances have rarely been resolved.”51 “In retrospect,” the GAP
Committee reported, “we view the sex psychopath statutes as social
experiments that have failed and that lack redeeming social value. These
experiments have been carried out by the joint participation of the
psychiatric and legal professions with varying degrees of acquiescence by
the general public.”52 The GAP Committee acknowledged the “unjustified
optimism” at the time of the laws’ enactment regarding the “effectiveness
of clinical approaches in identifying and predicting” those who posed a risk
of engaging in sexual violence.53 The profession could not separate out the
Id. at 274 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court reasoned that there was no violation of due
process because such “underlying conditions, calling for evidence of past conduct pointing
to probable consequences are as susceptible of proof as many of the criteria constantly
applied in prosecutions for crime.” Id.
44. See EWING, supra note 34, at 8; Tamara Rice Lave, Only Yesterday: The Rise and
Fall of Twentieth Century Sexual Psychopath Laws, 69 LA. L. REV. 549, 579-89 (2009).
45. EWING, supra note 34, at 8; Lave, supra note 44, at 581-82. See generally GROUP
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION:
THE 30S TO THE 80S 839-44 (1977) [hereinafter GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION].
46. EWING, supra note 34, at 8.
47. Id.
48. APA, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS, supra note 42, at 13-15.
49. EWING, supra note 34, at 9.
50. The GAP identifies itself as the “think tank” for American psychiatry. Psychiatry
Think Tank, GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, http://ourgap.org/think-tank.
aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
51. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH
LEGISLATION, supra note 45, at 935.
52. Id. at 840.
53. Id. at 853-54.
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mentally ill sex offenders from the others, and there was little psychiatry
could provide in the way of treatment once the men were committed. The
report went on to starkly and unambiguously state:
The notion is naive and confusing that a hybrid amalgam of law
and psychiatry can validly label a person a “sex psychopath” or
“sex offender” and then treat him in a manner consistent with a
guarantee of community safety. The mere assumption that such a
heterogeneous legal classification could define treatability and
make people amenable to treatment is not only fallacious; it is
startling.54
Remarkably, however, only a short time after the sexual psychopath laws
were discarded, the states resurrected them in a new, more extreme form of
experiment, one also “carried out by the joint participation of the
psychiatric and legal professions”—this time completely disregarding the
psychiatric profession’s own conclusions.
2. The New Experiment: Washington’s Model SVP Law
Under public pressure following a set of horrific and highly publicized
sexual violence cases committed by previously incarcerated offenders, state
legislatures, led by Washington in 1989, dusted off the early sexual
psychopath laws’ basic concepts but transformed them in several important
respects.55 Most notably, the commitment of convicted offenders would
occur not as an alternative to a prison sentence—as was the case for most
of the earlier sexual psychopath laws—but as an additional period of
indefinite detention after the offender completed his criminal sentence.56
Some commentators have noted that states enacted the current generation
of SVP laws in response to the rise of determinate sentencing, which gave
states less control over release dates for those convicted of crimes,
including sex crimes, and the public perception that sentences for sex
crimes were too short.57 Indeed, the first SVP law’s enactment in
Washington State involved precisely that scenario. Earl Shriner, a man with

54. Id. at 935.
55. EWING, supra note 34, at 9-10.
56. Id. at 10.
57. APA, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS, supra note 42, at 34; La Fond, supra note 23, at
160. “[D]eterminate sentencing” laws, which often included sentencing guidelines, required
courts to fix the period of incarceration for “offenders and removed the flexibility of
incarcerating sex offenders until they were no longer considered dangerous (which, very
often, was never).” Ahluwalia, supra note 20, at 490.
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a record of crimes against young people and who was officially described
as “mildly retarded,” was released from prison in 1998 after completing his
sentence for kidnapping two girls.58 Several months after his release, and
while other charges against him were pending, prosecutors charged Shriner
with raping and mutilating a young boy, apparently at random, in Tacoma.59
The public outrage was immediate, widespread, and intense. An editorial
in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer summed up the belief, shared by many, that
the criminal justice system had failed Shriner’s latest young victim:
This case makes clear that a class of criminal exists that is
beyond reach of rehabilitation because of mental
deficiencies . . . .
....
. . . . The legal system needs to be changed to make it possible
to remove the criminally insane from society, quickly and
permanently. In such obvious cases as this, the law should err, if
it errs at all, on the side of protecting the innocent.60
Within days of Shriner’s arrest, Washington Governor Booth Gardner
called for the development of legislation to prevent people like Shriner
from “‘fall[ing] through the cracks.’”61 Specifically, he asserted: “‘[T]here
should be a way to involuntarily commit people who have a profile of an
individual that is a known risk with a high degree of probability that they
would commit this type of crime.’”62 Less than a week after the crime,
Gardner created a task force to study the Shriner case and draft legislation
to address “‘gaps that exist between civil and criminal commitments,

58. David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word, 15 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 525, 526-27, 542 n.10 (1992). This article is an invaluable glimpse into the
development of the Washington SVP law, which served as the model for all current laws. It
was written soon after the law’s enactment by David Boerner, a former prosecutor and law
professor who was the lead drafter of the law (and who proposed the basic framework), and
it provides a frank and personal account of his thinking during the events leading to the
enactment of the law.
59. Id. at 525-27.
60. Id. at 529.
61. Id. at 530.
62. Id. The arrest of Shriner occurred six months after the murder in Seattle of Diane
Ballasiotes. Id. A convicted sex offender participating in a work-release program was
charged (and eventually convicted) of her murder. Id. at 534.
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particularly regarding predatory offenders’”—gaps that had presumably
permitted Shriner the opportunity to commit his most recent crime.63
The fact that the state had previously been unsuccessful in its attempt to
commit Shriner highlighted the limitations of using the standard
involuntary hospitalization statutes to “quickly and permanently” remove
the dangerous mentally ill from society.64 In terms of their purpose and
outcome, such laws were indeed a poor fit for the goal of detaining
criminally violent men like Shriner for an extended period of time, or at
least until they no longer posed a high risk of committing sexually violent
acts.
The central objective of contemporary involuntary hospitalization laws is
to provide a means of addressing the acute medical needs of a person
suffering from severe mental illness, such as schizophrenia or bipolar
disorder, by administering treatment, usually in the form of psychotropic
medications such as antipsychotics or mood stabilizers.65 A series of U.S.
Supreme Court and lower court opinions in the 1960s and 1970s clarified
the constitutional limitations on such a deprivation of liberty.66 According
to these opinions, involuntary hospitalization must be based upon a
showing that the person posed a danger to himself or others (demonstrated
through a recent overt act) and that the hospitalization would end as soon as
the acute danger had passed.67 Additionally, involuntary hospitalization can
occur only when there is a crisis, as evidenced by either threats to others or,
more commonly, an inability to care for one’s basic needs.68 If this
threshold showing is met, a court will order treatment in a secure
community hospital or state hospital, with a maximum length of

63. Id. at 534-35. Other reasons given for the enactment of the SVP laws include a
rising perspective that government has a critical role to prevent harm to its citizens. Eric S.
Janus, Sexual Predator Commitment Laws: Lessons for Law and the Behavioral Sciences, 18
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 5, 8 (2000). They also reflect the influence of the “victims’ rights”
movement. Michael M. O’Hear, Perpetual Panic, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 69, 74 (2008).
Finally, such laws were seen as an example of the growing success of feminists to reform the
legal responses to sexual violence. LANCASTER, supra note 29, at 14.
64. Boerner, supra note 58, at 533. Washington’s sexual psychopath law, which had
been the subject of controversy regarding its scope and implementation, was repealed in
1984. Id. at 551-52.
65. La Fond, supra note 23, at 160-61.
66. MELTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 327-34.
67. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-77 (1975); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, Schmidt v.
Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
68. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 574-77; Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1093-94.
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hospitalization set by statute.69 As a result of reforms brought about by the
“deinstitutionalization” movement that ended the long-term warehousing of
the mentally ill, the average length of hospitalization is now measured in
days.70
In light of these developments in mental health law, the Washington
legislature noted in its findings that a “small but extremely dangerous group
of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or
defect that renders them appropriate for” involuntary civil commitment
under the “existing involuntary treatment” law.71 As the legislature saw it,
the problem with existing involuntary commitment law was that the state
could not meet the overt act requirement when seeking commitment of a
person already serving a sentence because that person would not “have
access to potential victims.”72 The legislature acknowledged that the target
for the new SVP legislation was not those with “classic mental illness” as
understood and used in traditional commitment laws.73 Instead, the
Washington lawmakers were concerned about a different set of people:
those convicted of a sex crime who, because of some severe mental
disorder, posed a high risk of recidivism.
The social problem posed by these individuals’ existence could not be
addressed by short-term hospitalization and the administration of
medication because such measures would presumably do nothing to prevent
recurring criminal conduct. Only long-term removal from society—and,
thus, separation from potential victims—would reduce the risk of future
69. MELTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 344-45; see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, §
3864(7) (2010) (limiting term of first period of involuntary hospitalization to four months).
70. Indeed, many states are moving in the direction of adopting involuntary outpatient
treatment laws, where the medication is administered without full-time hospitalization.
Nisha C. Wagle et al., Outpatient Civil Commitment Laws: An Overview, 26 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 179, passim (2002). It should be noted that recurring
hospitalizations are not uncommon. See id. at 179.
71. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2014).
72. Id.; see also Black v. Voss, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1109-10 (C.D. Cal. 2008)
(rejecting habeas corpus petition of person committed under California SVP law and noting
that the statute has no overt act requirement to establish dangerousness under SVP
commitment).
73. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010. The reference to “classic mental illness” arose
in the public testimony of Professor Boerner, the lead drafter of the law. Young v. Weston,
898 F. Supp. 744, 750 n.3 (W.D. Wash. 1995). One scholar has argued that this “new
generation” of SVP laws is the product of a confluence of two criminal justice trends: (1) a
blurring of the civil-criminal distinction; and (2) increased use of “risk assessment,”
particularly through actuarial instruments and conclusions based upon what groups of
individuals do (what he dubbed “actuarial justice”). Ahluwalia, supra note 20, at 491.
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acts of sexual violence. In contrast to the targets of typical involuntary
commitment proceedings, those to be detained under the SVP laws were not
the severely mentally ill struggling to live in society, such as those who
were homeless or dependent on family members for care. Instead, the SVP
laws targeted people who were incarcerated or otherwise detained because
they had committed or been charged with a sexual offense and were about
to be released.74 Rather than seeking to detain someone at large, lawmakers
wanted to prevent a return of such persons to society. Perhaps for these
reasons, the SVP measures might have seemed less extreme than those
entitling a police officer to pick someone off of the street and bring him to
an emergency room against his will.75
Another distinguishing feature of the new SVPs laws is that the
commitment is indefinite, and the committed person must petition for
review of his commitment.76 The Washington legislature reasoned that the
statute could not include any set time frame for detention because “the
prognosis for curing sexually violent offenders is poor, the treatment needs
of this population are very long term, and the treatment modalities for this
population are very different" from those appropriate for individuals
confined under the general commitment laws.77 With no clear treatment
protocol for persons classified as “predators,”78 the treatment-oriented laws
for standard commitment of the mentally ill were a poor fit for SVP
commitment for this reason as well.
Their legislative history reveals that SVP laws were based upon two
critical and commonly-held assumptions about those who commit sex
crimes: first, they are criminals who “specialize” in a particular type of
crime; and, second, they have a particularly high rate of recidivism because
of a mental pathology—a compulsion of some sort—that leads to repeated
acts of sexual violence.79 Such specialization and compulsion rendered
these men “predators” and, the reasoning went, because their sexually
violent conduct resulted from a mental disorder, mental health professionals
74. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030(1).
75. See, e.g., MELTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 344 (explaining typical emergency
involuntary commitment procedure).
76. La Fond, supra note 23, at 161, 164.
77. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010.
78. The state of Washington conceded in one of the first legal challenges to these
statutes that the treatment prospects for detainees was “poor” and therefore “prolonged
incarceration is to be expected.” Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 749 (W.D. Wash.
1995).
79. Leonore M. J. Simon, An Examination of the Assumptions of Specialization, Mental
Disorder, and Dangerousness in Sex Offenders, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 275, 275-76 (2000).
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could identify those offenders likely to engage in such conduct in the
future.80
It follows, then, that SVP laws were also based on a third crucial, though
less obvious, assumption: the role that psychiatric diagnosis could play in
ensuring such laws would not have an overbroad reach. The significance of
this assumption is apparent from the following statement by the California
legislature, made when it enacted its SVP law in 1995:
The Legislature finds and declares that a small but extremely
dangerous group of sexually violent predators that have
diagnosable mental disorders can be identified while they are
incarcerated. These persons are not safe to be at large and if
released represent a danger to the health and safety of others in
that they are likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.81
However, none of the crucial assumptions about so-called sexually
violent predators has a footing in scientific or clinical findings, as discussed
further in Part III.A below.82 At the time the rise of SVP laws occurred, data
already indicated that the significant majority of sex crimes were in fact
committed not by stereotypical “predators” who stalked, lured, and pounced
on random hapless victims, but, rather, and particularly in the case of the
sexual assault of children, by family members and acquaintances of the
victims.83 Similarly, studies indicated that, contrary to popular belief,84
sexual offenders did not have unusually high levels of recidivism85 or
specialization with regard to victims.86 Rare as they were, however, crimes
such as Earl Shriner’s were so compelling that many members of the public

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 280.
S.B. 1143, 1995 Leg. (Cal. 1995) (emphasis added).
See infra notes 265-398 and accompanying text.
HOWARD N. SNYDER, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 10-11 (2000), available
at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf. For a general discussion on these
statistics, see EWING, supra note 34, at xvi-xvii.
84. Tamara Rice Lave, Inevitable Recidivism—The Origin and Centrality of an Urban
Legend, 34 INTL. J. OF L. & PSYCH. 186, 187-89 (2011); Paul Good & Jules Burstein, A
Modern Day Witch Hunt: The Troubling Role of Psychologists in Sexual Predator Laws, 28
AM. J. FORENSIC. PSYCH. 23, 40 (2010) (noting significant number of erroneous statements
about rates of sex offender recidivism in the media, including statements to the effect that
such rates more than 75% or near 100%).
85. PATRICK A. LANGAN, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN
1994, at 1-2 (2003), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
86. Simon, supra note 79, at 281-84.
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were persuaded that children were at a high risk of random victimization
unless the state acted quickly to protect them.
Washington’s “Community Protection Act of 1990” provided the model
for the new incarnation of sexual psychopath laws, not least in giving legal
status to a new term, “sexually violent predator,” which spread quickly
through common parlance. Governor Gardner’s use of the phrase
“predatory acts” in a press statement soon after Earl Shriner’s arrest struck
a chord with former prosecutor and law professor David Boerner, the new
law’s lead drafter. Boerner saw it as a way to specify the class of
individuals to be reached by this unique form of indefinite detention.87 He
defined the term “predatory acts” as those “‘directed towards strangers or
individuals with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for
the primary purpose of victimization,’” and he recommended that only
those who engaged in such acts would be eligible for commitment.88
Because one who commits such “predatory acts” is a “predator,” that
category of persons, along with a putative medical diagnosis and rationale
for detention, was built directly into the statute. A “sexually violent
predator” was, therefore, defined by Washington’s new law as: “any person
who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and
who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes
the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not
confined in a secure facility.”89
Thus, Washington’s SVP law set out four prerequisites to civil
commitment: (1) a history of criminal sexual conduct, resulting in either a
conviction or a charge (i.e. a predicate offense); (2) the presence of a
mental disorder, personality disorder, or mental abnormality of some kind
at the time the commitment was under consideration; (3) a likelihood of
engaging in sexual criminal behavior in the future; and (4) a causal link
between the disorder or abnormality and the risk.90 These essential
requirements, although often phrased somewhat differently, can be found in
all SVP laws.91
87. Boerner, supra note 58, at 569.
88. Id. at 569 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(3) (Supp. 1990)).
89. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(18) (West 2014) (emphasis added).
90. Id.; Janus, supra note 63, at 9.
91. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 358; EWING, supra note 34, at 21; see, e.g., CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (West 2010) (“‘Sexually violent predator’ means a person
who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims and who
has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of
others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.”);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(10) (West 2010) (“‘Sexually violent predator’ means any person
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The procedure established under the Washington SVP statute provides
that proceedings for indefinite detention can be initiated at the conclusion
of a period of incarceration for a sex crime committed as an adult or
juvenile.92 They can also be initiated after a person charged with such a
crime has been found not competent to stand trial or is acquitted on the
basis of a finding of insanity.93 Or they can be initiated after a person
previously convicted of a sexual offense commits a “recent overt act.”94
After a probable cause hearing, the court may order the individual to be
held in state custody and to be evaluated by “experts” hired by the state.95
The commitment trial must occur within forty-five days of the filing of
the petition, and either side may request a jury.96 At the trial, the person is
entitled to counsel and court-appointed experts to assist with his defense.97
If the fact finder concludes that the state has demonstrated beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person is “a sexually violent predator,” the person
is committed to a “secure facility . . . for control, care, and treatment” until
the mental abnormality or personality disorder “has so changed that the
person no longer meets the definition of a sexually violent predator.”98
B. Legal Challenges to the New SVP Laws
Preventive detention is very limited in American law because it is seen
as antithetical to fundamental liberty interests and the presumption of
innocence. In each instance of preventive detention—even where an
individual apparently poses a threat to public safety—there are generally
who: (a) Has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and (b) Suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual
violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.”);
2007 MINN. STAT. § 253D.02(16) (West & Supp. 2009) (“Sexually dangerous person. (a) A
‘sexually dangerous person’ means a person who: (1) has engaged in a course of harmful
sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 8; (2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other
mental disorder or dysfunction; and (3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful
sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 8. (b) For purposes of this provision, it is not
necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the person's sexual impulses.”).
92. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030(1).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. §§ 71.09.040 to .050.
96. Id. § 71.09.050.
97. Id. § 71.09.040.
98. Id. § 71.09.060(1). The statute now provides that a person may also be conditionally
released to a less restrictive alternative so long as conditions are imposed to protect the
community. Id.; see also Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 747 (W.D. Wash. 1995)
(summarizing key requirements of SVP law).
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strict limitations on when detention can be imposed and when it must end.
For example, courts permit pretrial detention of criminal defendants only
where there is probable cause to believe they committed a crime and only to
the extent necessary to secure their appearance at trial (thus, defendants are
usually given the opportunity to post bail and be released).99 The only
exceptions to our reluctance to impose long-term preventive detention
target individuals belonging to two of the American public’s most feared
and despised groups: enemy combatants seized on the battlefield in foreign
countries and sex offenders.100
1. Background of the Hendricks-Crane Litigation
As Washington’s SVP law, and those modeled after it, presented a new
and extreme form of preventive detention, critics immediately challenged
the laws’ constitutionality on a range of grounds, including the violation of
the right to substantive due process, the prohibitions against ex post facto
laws, and double jeopardy. Andre Young, one of the first men committed
under the Washington’s SVP law, challenged the constitutionality of the
law in both state101 and federal102 courts. The Washington Supreme Court
upheld the law while the federal district court held it was
unconstitutional.103 These differing outcomes were among the first in a
series of sharply divided judicial responses to the new law and to the
similar SVP laws enacted by the Kansas104 and Wisconsin105 legislatures
soon thereafter.
The focus of the substantive due process challenges stemmed from the
same theories used to limit the reach of other forms of involuntary
commitment and preventive detention: that using state power to deprive a
person of liberty outside of the realm of criminal punishment runs afoul of
99. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987).
100. See Daniel M. Filler, Terrorism, Panic, and Pedophilia, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
345 (2003) (noting the “surprising prevalence of rhetorical links between terrorism and
pedophilia” and the risk to civil liberties posed by detention policies resulting from the
associated “panic”); Norman J. Finkel, Moral Monsters and Patriot Acts: Rights and Duties
in the Worst of Times, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 242, 243 (2006); Good & Burstein,
supra note 84, at 42; Christopher Slobogin, Preventive Detention in Europe, the United
States, and Australia passim (Vanderbilt Pub. Law Research, Working Paper No. 12-27,
June 27, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2094358.
101. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993).
102. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
103. Id. at 754; In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1018.
104. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 to -29a24 (West 2008).
105. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.1 to .14 (2013).
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core values enshrined in the due process clause. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged: “[T]he Due Process Clause contains a substantive
component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions
‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’” 106
Such guarantee against excessive government interference applies with
particular import in the context of involuntary detention, the Court has
noted, because “[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary
governmental action.”107 Accordingly, a court must subject such detention,
even if sought pursuant to statute, to a rigorous review and invalidate it if it
does not fall under one of the few narrow exceptions to the broad general
prohibition of preventive detention.108
When applying these principles to their review of the new SVP laws, the
Washington and Wisconsin Supreme Courts were sharply divided—the
published opinions were fractured and featured vehement dissents.109 Most
of the debates about whether the laws were consistent with the “substantive
component” of due process focused on the states’ open acknowledgment
that the targets of the new laws were people who did not have a mental
illness that could subject them to commitment under standard civil
commitment laws and the fact that, in lieu of serious mental illness, the
laws used terminology such as “mental abnormality” and “personality
disorder.”110 Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
found the nebulous language of “mental abnormality” in the Wisconsin law
to be especially troubling.111 That term, she observed, does not translate to
any well-settled or understood concept in psychiatry.112

106. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
107. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
108. Id. at 81-86; see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (holding
that involuntary commitment of those who “are dangerous to no one and can live safely in
freedom” is a violation of due process principles); cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
749-50 (1987) (upholding pretrial detention under limited circumstances where the
government’s interest was compelling).
109. State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115 (Wis. 1995); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash.
1993), superseded by statute as stated in In re Thorell, 72 P.3d 708 (2003).
110. See, e.g., Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 749-50 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (“The
essential component missing from the Sexually Violent Predator Statute is the requirement
that the detainee be mentally ill.”).
111. Post, 541 N.W.2d at 142-45 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 145; La Fond, supra note 23, at 161.

2015]

DANGEROUS DIAGNOSES, RISKY ASSUMPTIONS

639

For the courts reviewing the constitutionality of the first SVP laws, a key
source of guidance was the then-recent opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Foucha v. Louisiana.113 The Court held that a state could not continue to
detain an “insanity acquitee” who no longer had a mental illness on the
basis of medical opinions that he had an “antisocial personality” and would
be a danger if released.114 The Court rejected Louisiana’s argument that the
state could continue “to hold indefinitely any other insanity acquitee not
mentally ill who could be shown to have a personality disorder that may
lead to criminal conduct.”115 The Court ruled that, in the absence of a
mental illness, Louisiana’s detention of Foucha was contrary to
fundamental notions of due process.116 It noted:
The same would be true of any convicted criminal, even though
he has completed his prison term. It would also be only a step
away from substituting confinements for dangerousness for our
present system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside
from permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcerates
only those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have
violated a criminal law.117
Many concluded from this language that, in Foucha, the Court had made
clear that “dangerousness” alone was not a sufficient basis for preventive
detention and that an indispensable constitutional requirement for such

113. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
114. Id. at 78-80. An “insanity acquitee” is a criminal defendant who has been acquitted
of a charged crime on the basis of a finding that he was “insane” at the time of the crime. See
id. at 73.
115. Id. at 82. The Court’s holding here flowed explicitly from its earlier ruling in
Addington v. Texas that
to commit an individual to a mental institution in a civil proceeding, the State is
required by the Due Process Clause to prove by clear and convincing evidence
the two statutory preconditions to commitment: that the person sought to be
committed is mentally ill and that he requires hospitalization for his own
welfare and protection of others.
Id. at 75-76 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)).
116. Id. at 83.
117. Id. at 82-83 (emphasis added). The Court noted that other forms of preventive
detention were narrowly tailored to a specific legitimate need and a finite duration, such as
pretrial detention in limited circumstances, which was upheld in United States v. Salerno. Id.
at 81, 83.
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detention was a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, of “mental
illness.”118
In 1994, two years after Foucha, Kansas enacted the “Sexually Violent
Predator Act.”119 Modeled closely on the Washington law, it required a
finding of mental abnormality or personality disorder as a prerequisite to
commitment.120 As defined by the Kansas statute, a “[m]ental abnormality”
is “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses
in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of
others.”121 The law did not have a requirement for a finding of “mental
illness.”122
Leroy Hendricks, who was serving a sentence for sexual victimization of
children, was the first person Kansas committed under its new SVP law
pursuant to a jury’s determination.123 If the State selected him for the first
petition under the law on the assumption that his case would be the first
challenge to the new law, and therefore subject to close scrutiny, the State
chose well; Hendricks had a long history of sexual offenses against children
and therefore exemplified the seemingly undeterrable “predator” the law’s
drafters had in mind.124
At trial, the State called as its expert witness Dr. Charles Befort, the chief
psychologist at Larned State Hospital.125 Befort, who had evaluated
Hendricks, testified that he had concluded it was “likely that Hendricks
would engage in predatory acts of sexual violence or sexual activity with
children if permitted to do so.”126 Befort based his opinion, as he stated, on
his view that “‘behavior is a good predictor of future behavior,’ [on] his
118. See, e.g., Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 750-51 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (striking
down Washington’s SVP law on the basis that it violated the holding in Foucha that a state
may not indefinitely detain a person who is not found to be have a mental illness); see also
Ahluwalia, supra note 20, at 500-03.
119. S.B. 525, 1994 Leg., ch. 316 (Kan. 1994) (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01
to 29a24 (West 2008)).
120. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02.
121. Id. § 59-29a02(b).
122. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996), rev’d, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346 (1997).
123. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350.
124. Id. at 353-55.
125. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131. The State also called Hendricks himself as a
witness after the court ruled that, because the proceedings were civil rather than criminal,
Hendricks had no right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 130-31; see
also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1986).
126. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131.
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professional knowledge that pedophiles tend to repeat their behavior, and
[on] Hendricks’s poor understanding of his behavior.”127 Befort concluded
that Hendricks was not mentally ill and did not have “a personality
disorder,” but that “as [Befort] interpreted the Act, pedophilia was a mental
abnormality.”128 The psychiatrist who testified on behalf of Hendricks
challenged Befort’s testimony regarding the tendency of pedophiles to
recidivate, observing that, “based on current knowledge, ‘a psychiatrist or
psychologist cannot predict whether an individual is more likely than not to
engage in a future act of sexual predation.’”129 The jury found that
Hendricks was a “sexually violent predator” and, under the new Kansas
statute, the court committed him to Larned State Hospital.130
In reviewing Hendricks’s appeal, the majority opinion of the Kansas
Supreme Court noted that the Kansas had modeled its law on that of
Washington (including adopting Washington’s legislative “findings”) and
that the latter was already facing constitutional challenges.131 Hendricks’s
attorneys based their substantive due process argument on the key holding
in Foucha that mental illness was an indispensable requirement for
indefinite detention on the basis of dangerousness and that the Kansas law’s
“mental abnormality or personality disorder” standard fell short of that
requirement.132 The Kansas Supreme Court agreed, holding that Kansas’s
SVP law was invalid under both Foucha and an earlier civil commitment
opinion, Addington v. Texas, since the law did not require a showing of an
“illness.”133 In so ruling, the majority found the reasoning of the federal
district court’s decision in Young v. Weston striking down the Washington
SVP law to be more persuasive than the Washington Supreme Court’s
opinion upholding the law.134 The term “mental abnormality,” it concluded,
was not equivalent to “mental illness.”135 The Kansas Supreme Court based
this conclusion in part upon the testimony of the State’s own expert
witness, who had testified that the term was not a diagnosis but rather “a

127. Id.
128. Id. Befort conceded in his testimony that the statute’s definition of “mental
abnormality” was “circular in that certain behavior defines the condition which is used to
predict the behavior.” Id. at 138.
129. Id. at 131.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 131-32.
132. Id. at 133-34.
133. Id. at 138.
134. Id. at 136-38.
135. Id. at 138.
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phrase used by clinicians to discuss abnormality or deviance.”136 The
majority also contrasted that description with the definition of “mental
illness” found in the Kansas standard involuntary commitment statute.137
2. The Supreme Court Upholds the SVP Model of Commitment
Once these questions reached the United States Supreme Court, they
received a quite different reception by the five-justice majority. In Kansas
v. Hendricks, the Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court and upheld the
state’s SVP law.138 On the question of whether Kansas’s definition of SVP
satisfied the “mental illness” element in Foucha, the parties took
significantly different positions. The State noted in its brief that in the line
of cases requiring “mental illness” as a matter of substantive due process
the Supreme Court had never defined the term.139 This was understandable,
the State argued, since there is no universally accepted definition of the
term. What was more important for constitutional purposes, it claimed, was
that “mental health professionals [can] give the definition content by
identifying specific mental disorders that may or may not satisfy the
definition.”140 In Hendricks’s case, the State’s argument continued, the
commitment satisfied constitutional requirements because the respondent
had a mental disorder of “pedophilia,” as defined by the DSM.141
Hendricks’s attorneys countered that the “mental abnormality” language in
the Kansas statute, when examined closely, was nothing more than
“pseudoclinical terminology” useful for “after-invented rationalizations.”142
Indeed, the Kansas legislature used the language specifically to empower
the state to detain people who did not have a “mental illness,” since those
with such illnesses could be committed under the standard commitment
statute.143

136. Id. at 137.
137. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902(h) (repealed 1996)) (defining a person with
“mental illness” as one who: “(1) [i]s suffering from a severe mental disorder to the extent
that such person is in need of treatment; (2) lacks capacity to make an informed decision
concerning treatment; and (3) is likely to cause harm to self or others”).
138. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
139. Brief for Petitioner at 39, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (No. 95-1649),
1996 WL 435941.
140. Id. at 40.
141. Id. at 41.
142. Brief for Respondent at 21-22, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (Nos. 951649, 95-9075), 1996 WL 528985.
143. Id. at 22.
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Justice Clarence Thomas, who had dissented in Foucha five years
earlier,144 wrote the majority opinion reversing the Kansas Supreme Court
and upholding the SVP law under all three constitutional challenges
Hendricks’s attorneys raised: that the law violated his rights under the due
process clause, under prohibitions of ex post facto laws, and under the
double jeopardy clause.145 With respect to the substantive due process
analysis, the focus of this Article, Justice Thomas stated that the Court has
long recognized the importance of the state’s authority to detain, through
civil proceedings, those “who are unable to control their behavior and who
thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety.”146 The Court has
upheld civil commitment of this sub-population, he explained, so long as
states follow proper procedures and standards.147 Prior cases clearly
established that dangerousness alone would not satisfy due process
requirements; it was only when commitment statutes coupled a
dangerousness requirement with “proof of some additional factor, such as a
‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality’” that the laws would not
impermissibly infringe on a person’s liberty interests.148 There must be a
“link,” therefore, between an individual’s potential to commit future
violence and “the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality
disorder’ that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control
his dangerous behavior.”149 Under this framework, Justice Thomas
reasoned, the Kansas SVP law satisfied these essential due process
requirements. The law limited the potential class of individuals subject to
commitment to those with either a “mental abnormality” or “personality
disorder,” which, he wrote, sufficiently “narrow[ed] the class of persons
eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their
dangerousness.”150
Thus, Justice Thomas dispensed with the specific finding of “mental
illness” as a prerequisite to involuntary civil commitment that Foucha and
Addington suggested, opting instead for a broader finding of any form of
“mental abnormality.” The term “mental illness,” he explained, has no
“talismanic significance.”151 Rather, the critical factor to satisfy substantive
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 120-24 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
Id. at 357.
Id. at 358-59.
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 358-59.
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due process is “limit[ing] involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer
from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their
control.”152 He stated that the Court had never required states to adopt
particular medical terms for involuntary commitment statutes.153
Legislatures, he said, are not required to adopt terms that “mirror those
advanced by the medical profession.”154 Since Hendricks’s “pedophilia”
diagnosis met the statute’s mental abnormality requirement, and Hendricks
had conceded in his own testimony that he lacked control over his urges,
Hendricks’s “condition” easily met the constitutional requirements for
commitment.155 Justice Thomas acknowledged that the record on appeal
included evidence of extensive controversy within the psychiatric field
regarding whether pedophilia was a mental illness; nonetheless, he
indicated that the debates in fact support the conclusion that legislatures
should be provided the “widest latitude in drafting” SVP laws.156 Justice
Thomas then considered Hendricks’s remaining constitutional arguments
that the law violated the ex post facto and double jeopardy prohibitions in
the Constitution and—based on the categorization of SVP commitment as a
civil, not criminal, proceeding—rejected them.157
Justice Kennedy joined the majority in Hendricks but wrote separately to
underscore that the Kansas SVP law could not be used for retribution, only
for treatment.158 He noted some concern with the real potential for
Hendricks and others to be detained for life, given that “medical
knowledge” did not hold great promise for treatment of pedophilia.159 He
acknowledged that the Court was permitting states to proceed into
uncharted waters with these laws and noted that, in its implementation, the
SVP model could fall short of constitutional requirements.160 He cautioned:
“[I]f it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to
offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified, our
precedents would not suffice to validate it.”161 As Kennedy’s concurrence
makes clear, the Hendricks opinion endorsed pure preventive detention—
152. Id. at 358 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 359.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 360.
156. Id. at 360 n.3.
157. Id. at 361-71. See generally Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the
Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261 (1998).
158. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 372.
160. Id. at 373.
161. Id.
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with protection of the community from the committed person its sole
benefit—as consistent with substantive due process.
Justice Breyer wrote for the four-justice minority and dissented only with
respect to the majority’s analysis of the ex post facto clause argument. He
largely agreed with the majority’s substantive due process conclusion but
adopted a slightly different analysis. Characterizing pedophilia as a “serious
mental disorder,” Justice Breyer concluded that Hendricks’s condition was
essentially akin to the well-established “irresistible impulse” concept in
criminal and preventive detention law.162 The medical evidence at the
hearing (as well as Hendricks’s own admission), he wrote, clearly
established Hendricks’s inability to control his conduct, which brought him
squarely within the scope of the statute’s limited reach.163 The debate
within psychiatry regarding the limits of mental illness, he observed, can
serve to inform a state legislature’s course of action and does not mean that
the legislature may not act at all.164
Five years later, in Kansas v. Crane, the Court revisited the Kansas
statute and clarified its volition-oriented requirement.165 In an opinion by
Justice Breyer, the Court held that the volitional requirement was a
substantive and meaningful limitation on a state’s power to commit under
the law.166 It also held that a finding that a person may be detained under
the SVP law does not require a determination that the person entirely lacks
any control over his behavior, since it is unlikely that the state could ever
meet such standard.167 A person’s “‘inability to control [his] behavior’” is
not, Justice Breyer wrote, a standard subject to a requirement of
“mathematical precision.”168 Rather, a state must merely provide
proof of [the respondent’s] serious difficulty in controlling
behavior. And this, when viewed in light of . . . the nature of the
psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality
itself, must be sufficient to distinguish [between] the dangerous
sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or
162. Id. at 375-76 (Breyer, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 376.
164. Id. at 375. Justice Breyer’s analysis of the substantive due process issue was joined
by Justices Stevens and Souter. Id. at 373. Justice Ginsberg, who did not author an opinion,
joined only those parts of Breyer’s dissent on the ex post facto analysis, and not his due
process analysis. Id.
165. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
166. Id. at 412-13.
167. Id. at 411-12.
168. Id. at 413.
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disorder subjects him to civil commitment[, and] the dangerous
but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.169
Significantly, the Crane majority commented on the role of courts in
setting standards in cases in which the deprivation of a liberty interest turns
on a finding of a particular mental condition or impairment. The Court
acknowledged that its reading of Hendricks “provides a less precise
constitutional standard than would those more definite rules for which the
parties have argued.”170 The Court concluded, however, that “the
Constitution's safeguards of human liberty in the area of mental illness and
the law are not always best enforced through precise bright-line rules.”171
The Court explained this reasoning as follows:
For one thing, the States retain considerable leeway in defining
the mental abnormalities and personality disorders that make an
individual eligible for commitment. For another, the science of
psychiatry, which informs but does not control ultimate legal
determinations, is an ever-advancing science, whose distinctions
do not seek precisely to mirror those of the law.172
In sharp contrast to the majority’s optimism that the Court’s SVP rulings
provided sufficient clarity to the states, Justice Scalia argued in dissent that
the majority’s interpretation of the “volitional impairment” requirement had
gutted the core holding of Hendricks and created an unworkable framework
for implementing SVP laws.173 Although his critique was based on a view
that states should have more leeway in enforcing civil commitments, he
accurately identified some of key problems with the Court’s analysis that
rendered it a poor foundation for ensuring the limited reach of these laws.
3. The Core Assumptions Underlying the Stated Rationales of Hendricks
and Crane
As the Crane opinion makes clear, the Supreme Court upheld the SVP
experiment based on a number of core assumptions about how courts
determine whether an individual should be subject to indefinite detention.
The Court saw an indispensable role for the psychiatric community in
informing the determinations of courts and fact-finders and in supplying

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 415-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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proof of volitional impairment.174 One federal appeals court later
characterized Crane’s constitutional requirement of separating “inability to
control from unwillingness to control” as a means “to separate the sick
person from the vicious and amoral one,” in order “to prevent fear of
recidivism from leading to indefinite preventive detention.175 In Hendricks
and Crane, the Court rationalized this unusual form of preventive detention
by reframing SVP commitment so that it seems more consonant with other
commitment laws.176 The essential component of all involuntary
commitments is the presence of a pathology that limits the person’s ability
to regulate his or her behavior. By using nebulous terms such as
“impairment,” “abnormality,” or “condition,” and by restricting detention
only to those who presumably already have impaired free will,177 the Court
suggests that we are not truly depriving persons of their “liberty.” Thus in
Hendricks, the Court wrote: “The precommitment requirement of a ‘mental
abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ is consistent with the requirements of
. . . other statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons
eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their
dangerousness.”178
Without this requirement, the indefinite detention permitted under SVP
statutes would amount to no more than punishment, thereby implicating all
of the constitutional protections afforded to those subjected to punishment,
including prohibitions on ex post facto laws and double jeopardy.179 As one
commentator observed, “Hendricks teaches that the role of the mental
disorder element is to limit civil commitment and prevent it from
swallowing the criminal law.”180
Therefore, the constitutionality of SVP laws and their consistency with
core U.S. values hang entirely on the finding of a mental condition so
174. Id. at 414-15.
175. Varner v. Monohan, 460 F.3d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
176. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358-59 (1997); Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 415
(2001).
177. David L. Faigman, Making Moral Judgments Through Behavioural Science: The
'Substantial Lack of Volitional Control' Requirement in Civil Commitments, 2 L.
PROBABILITY & RISK 309, 314 (2003). Faigman criticizes the “volitional impairment”
requirement of Hendricks-Crane on the basis that “there is no empirical/scientific basis for
determining when an act was (or, much less, will be) a product of 'free will'. Free will is a
normative construct that has no corresponding operational definition that can be tested.” Id.
at 319.
178. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 (emphasis added).
179. Faigman, supra note 177, at 314.
180. Janus, supra note 63, at 13.
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severe that it deprives a person of the ability to exercise volition. But how
would this identification—of those who are unable to control their behavior
specifically due to mental impairment—be made? If trial courts could not
make this finding accurately, they would run the risk of detaining
unimpaired citizens based only on a perceived risk. The Court was
evidently confident that trial courts could turn to the expertise of
psychiatrists and other mental health professionals to identify when such
pathology was present and, moreover, that these experts could distinguish
with sufficient precision someone volitionally impaired from the
“dangerous but typical recidivist.”181 Depending on “the nature of the
[respondent’s] psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental
abnormality,” the Court assumed these professionals could identify the key
features to consider in assessing whether someone is a true predator.182
Confidence in the ability of psychiatrists to draw such distinctions grew
at the same time that courts were giving psychiatry an increasingly
prominent role in legal proceedings. An important factor here was the
appearance of the third edition of the DSM, which the APA published in
1980. This edition (DSM-III), which shed most Freudian concepts from its
nosology, or classification of mental disorders, and instead focused on a
biological basis for classifying such conditions, quickly became a
courtroom fixture.183 Its science-and-research orientation, in contrast to the
psychoanalysis-inspired prior editions, suggested a new and more reliable
role for psychiatrists helping courts make scientifically informed findings
and to unlock the minds of litigants.184
Psychiatric evidence, including diagnostic assessment, became
ubiquitous in legal proceedings. Members of the legal community grew
accustomed to seeing mental health professionals offer opinions on a range
of legal questions—from parenting ability to the extent and causes of
psychological injuries to insanity, commitment, and sentencing.185 These
181. Faigman, supra note 177, at 314.
182. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
183. EDWARD SHORTER, A HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE ERA OF THE ASYLUM TO
THE AGE OF PROZAC 301-304 (1998); ALLAN YOUNG, THE HARMONY OF ILLUSIONS:
INVENTING POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 100 (1995).
184. Deirdre M. Smith, Diagnosing Liability: The Legal History of Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 25-26, 34 (2011).
185. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW,
SCIENCE, AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 3 (2007);
Ralph SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY IN LAW/LAW IN PSYCHIATRY xi-xii (2002). See generally
MELTON ET AL., supra note 14 (reviewing the role of expert mental health opinions in a wide
range of civil and criminal law settings).
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experts now play a critical role in many cases, informing fact-finders on
some of the most difficult and consequential decisions, including whether a
person should be held criminally responsible or whether a particular parent
is fit to raise a child.186
On the urging of prosecutors, courts have expanded the scope of
psychiatric evidence from assessments of past and present mental states to
testimony predicting future conduct.187 Courts have become protective of
their continued ability to admit and consider such testimony.188
In a crucial decision, Barefoot v. Estelle, the Supreme Court upheld the
admissibility of expert testimony on future dangerousness in the sentencing
phase of a death penalty case.189 The State of Texas offered the testimony of
two psychiatrists who opined, in response to hypotheticals regarding the
defendant, that the defendant “would probably commit further acts of
violence and represent a continuing threat to society.”190 Despite the
dissent’s argument that research had shown that psychiatrists’ predictions
of future violent conduct are accurate in only one out of three cases, the
Court’s majority declined to required exclusion of such predictions at
sentencing hearings.191 Significantly, the APA sided with the defendant in
its amicus brief, noting that psychiatrists have no expertise at predicting
dangerousness and are no better at doing so than anyone else.192
One of the Barefoot majority’s rationales in rejecting this argument was
that excluding prediction testimony in this context would limit use of
psychiatric testimony in other contexts, including that of involuntary
commitment: “Acceptance of petitioner's position that expert testimony
about future dangerousness is far too unreliable to be admissible would
immediately call into question those other contexts in which predictions of
future behavior are constantly made.”193 The majority contended that the
tools of the adversarial process, such as cross-examination and contrary
expert opinion, would be a sufficient check on the reliability of
predictions.194 Thus, the Supreme Court paved the way for psychiatric
186. MELTON ET AL., supra note 14, at vii-viii.
187. SLOBOGIN, supra note 185, at 99-100, 108-09.
188. Id. at 28-29, 32-33.
189. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 906 (1983), superseded in part by statute as
stated in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000).
190. Id. at 884.
191. Id. at 898-903.
192. Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 898.
194. Id. at 898-99. Ten years later, Justice Blackmun authored the majority opinion in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals., Inc., and he noted that limitations of such tools
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predictions of future dangerousness to have a central role in SVP
proceedings.
Perhaps in light of the outcome in Barefoot and the GAP report’s strong
rejection of the sexual psychopath laws,195 the psychiatric establishment
was quick to distance itself from the SVP laws from the initial development
of the model. In 1995, the Washington State Psychiatric Association
submitted an amicus brief in the Young v. Weston litigation, indicating that
nothing in the state’s SVP statute restricted its reach to those whom
psychiatrists identified as mentally ill.196 Rather, in limiting its application
to “sexually violent predators,” the law established nothing more than an
“unacceptable tautology.”197
The APA made similar arguments in the amicus brief it submitted to the
U.S. Supreme Court in support of Hendricks’s position. There, the APA
argued that legislatures should not be free to define “mental illness”;
otherwise, it warned, “the limits on deprivations of liberty to protect the
public safety would quickly disappear.”198 The APA also argued that the
definition of mental illness for involuntary commitment purposes should
not be tied to the diagnoses contained in the DSM.199 As the APA
explained, the DSM’s “classification schemes are developed . . . to serve
diagnostic and statistical functions, forming a common (and always
imperfect) language for gathering clinical data and for communication
among mental health professionals.”200 The APA’s elaboration of this
argument is striking:
[DSM diagnoses are not] designed to identify those subject to
various legal standards, such as those for involuntary
confinement. Thus, the authors of DSM-IV caution that “[i]n
most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-IV mental
disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence for legal
purposes of a ‘mental disorder,’ ‘mental disability,’ ‘mental
on preventing unreliable expert testimony from being given undue weight by a fact finder
and therefore imposing on trial judges the responsibility of being a gatekeeper to exclude
such unreliable testimony from being admitted. 509 U.S. 579, 589-95 (1993).
195. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
196. 898 F. Supp. 744, 750 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
197. Id.
198. Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 21, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075), 1996
WL 469200, at *21.
199. Id. at 22-23.
200. Id. at 22.
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disease,’ or ‘mental defect.’” The authors further caution that “a
DSM-IV diagnosis does not carry any necessary implication
regarding the individual’s degree of control over the behaviors
that may be associated with the disorder.” Not all individuals
who come within a DSM-IV category suffer an impairment that
diminishes their autonomy, much less one justifying involuntary
confinement for the individual's own good.201
The Supreme Court majority implicitly rejected the psychiatric
establishment’s strong words of caution. Instead, it upheld a model law that
drew a line ostensibly based upon the identification of a mental disorder but
couched in language completely alien to the field that oversees such
identifications. To save the law, the Court conferred upon that field a
central role in ensuring the constitutionality of the future application of
such laws, thereby sanctioning an extreme use of preventative detention
based upon an unworkable procedure.
C. The Spread of SVP Laws and Their Impact
The drafters of the original SVP law in the state of Washington
apparently thought the imposition of indefinite commitment would be
limited to exceptional cases like those of Earl Shriner or Leroy Hendricks,
where the risk of recidivism seemed unquestionably high due to seemingly
obvious indications of future violence.202 However, the number of
individuals committed under SVP laws in Washington and elsewhere
suggests that states have applied the laws much more broadly than
anticipated by the drafters.203 At the same time, the laws have not, in fact,
made communities safer.204
After the Court upheld the constitutionality of SVP laws in Hendricks,
several states followed the lead of Washington and Kansas. Today, a total
of twenty states have adopted SVP laws.205 Additionally, Congress adopted
201. Id. at 23 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
202. Boerner, supra note 58, at 566.
203. DEIRDRE D’ORAZIO ET AL., SOCCPN ANNUAL SURVEY OF SEX OFFENDER CIVIL
COMMITMENT PROGRAMS 5-6 (2013), available at http://soccpn.org/images/
SOCCPN_survey_presentation_2013_in_pdf.pdf.
204. Tamara Rice Lave & Justin McCrary, Do Sexually Violent Predator Laws Violate
Double Jeopardy and Substantive Due Process: An Empirical Inquiry?, 78 BROOK. L. REV.
1391, 1392 (2013).
205. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to 3717 (2009); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§
6600-6609.3 (West 2010); D.C. CODE §§ 22-3803 to -3811 (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
394.910-.932 (West 2010); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/1-99 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
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an SVP commitment scheme as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act.206 The federal law applies to those incarcerated by the U.S.
Bureau of Prisons, so it involves a somewhat different set of potential
respondents, since, other than crimes committed in “Indian Country,” most
sexual abuse and assault cases are prosecuted in state courts.207 However,
one class of offender prevalent in federal prisons is those serving sentences
for child pornography convictions.208 In some instances, a pornography
charge serves as a predicate offense,209 or even the sole predicate offense,210
for an SVP commitment under the Adam Walsh Act.211 The law faced
immediate challenge on the grounds that, by enacting a federal civil
commitment program, Congress had acted outside of its ”enumerated
powers”;212 the Supreme Court resolved this question of Congress’s

229a.1 to .16 (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a22 (West 2008); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 123a, §§ 1-16 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); 2007 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253d.01
to .36 (West & Supp. 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.480 to .513 (West 2014); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 71-1201 to -1226 (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-E:1 to :24
(2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24 to .38 (West 2008); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§
10.01-.17 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-01 to -24 (2014);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (2002 & Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-900 to 920 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-.903 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§
980.01-.14 (West 2013).
206. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120
Stat. 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2012)).
207. One commentator has raised concerns about the large number of Native Americans
who have been subject to commitment under the federal law. Karen Franklin, Appellate
Court Rejects "Past As Prelude" Myth, IN THE NEWS (Feb. 12, 2014), http://forensicpsy
chologist.blogspot.com/2014/02/appellate-court-debunks-past-as-prelude.html.
208. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES i-ii (2012),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-rep
orts/sex-offense-topics/201212-federal-child-pornography-offenses/Full-Report_to_Congress.
pdf.
209. See, e.g., United States v. Timms, 664 F.3d 436, passim (4th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Wetmore, 766 F. Supp. 2d 319, passim (D. Mass. 2011), aff'd, 700 F.3d 570 (1st
Cir. 2012).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Volungus, 730 F.3d 40, 43-46 (1st Cir. 2013).
211. The Walsh Act provides that a federal prisoner can be “certified” as an SVP under
the statute without a judicial determination. See United States v. Broncheau, 645 F.3d 676,
690-93 (4th Cir. 2011). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that such
determination must be subject to review “within a reasonable period of time” and failure to
provide access to such determination may constitute a deprivation of due process. Id. at 687.
212. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133-49 (2010), reversing United States v.
Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522 (E.D.N.C. 2007); see also Volungus, 595 F.3d 1, passim (1st
Cir. 2010); United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497, passim (8th Cir. 2009).
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authority when it upheld the Act in the 2010 opinion United States v.
Comstock.213
As New York was about to implement its own SVP law in 2007, the New
York Times published a three-part series examining the SVP commitment
programs already in place across the country.214 The series’ authors made
several findings that suggest the operation of SVP programs falls far short
of their promise. Notably, although nearly 3000 people had been committed
under the nineteen state SVP laws then in effect, (1) the programs were not
committing the most violent and dangerous offenders because they released
rapists while committing exhibitionists; (2) the treatment programs were
largely ineffective in rehabilitating offenders; (3) few of those committed
were ever released, resulting in effectively permanent detention; and (4)
few states have developed adequate programs for monitoring those who are
released.215 In spite of these problematic findings, commitment programs
continue to expand.216 A 2013 survey of eighteen state-based SVP programs
found that 4779 individuals are presently committed, with an additional 861
in detention awaiting the outcome of SVP proceedings.217
The expanding reach of SVP programs originates, in part, in the fact that
states can, and do, base SVP commitment petitions on a wide range of
predicate offenses.218 In many states, such as those following the
Washington model, SVP laws permit indefinite commitment based on
juvenile offenses, on offenses for which the person was acquitted on the
basis of insanity, or on uncharged conduct.219 In Minnesota, for example,
more than 7% of those committed under that state’s SVP program had
never been convicted of an adult crime prior to their commitment.220

213. 560 U.S. at 149-50.
214. Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After
Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/us/04civil.html?
pagewanted=all.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. D’ORAZIO ET AL., supra note 203, at 7.
218. See Melissa Wangenheim, Note, ‘To Catch a Predator,’ Are We Casting Our Nets
Too Far?: Constitutional Concerns Regarding the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 62
RUTGERS L. REV. 559, 580-84 (2010).
219. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030 (West 2009).
220. Chris Serres, Minnesota Sex Offenders: Are They Really the 'Worst of the Worst'?,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis) (Dec. 2, 2013, 10:38 AM), http://www.startribune.com/local/
233945281.html (profiling the case of a developmentally disabled man who was committed
at the age of nineteen for acts of child molestation that he committed before the age of
fourteen). Courts in several other states, by contrast, have held that a sex offense committed
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Moreover, given the broadly worded statutory requirements for prior
convictions or criminal offenses, courts have based indefinite commitments
for sexually violent predators on sexual offenses that do not involve any
physical contact with a victim, such as exhibitionism, indecent conduct, or
possession of pornography.221
The high number of individuals committed under SVP statutes also
suggests that it may be difficult, though not impossible, for a respondent to
prevail in an SVP trial.222 The state enjoys several advantages in the
conduct of such trials. The Supreme Court’s holding in Hendricks that SVP
schemes are civil rather than criminal in nature has had significant
implications for the procedural rights of respondents in SVP proceedings.223
Respondents in SVP proceedings are not afforded the same Fifth and Sixth
Amendment protections required in criminal trials with respect to burdens
of proof,224 competency,225 effective assistance of counsel,226 selfincrimination,227 and confronting witnesses.228
The promise of treatment under SVP statutes is tied to the mentalabnormality rationale of all forms of involuntary commitment. However,
as a juvenile cannot be a predicate crime for an SVP commitment. See, e.g., In re Geltz, 840
N.W.2d 273, 279-80 (Iowa 2013) (reviewing case law on question).
221. See, e.g., United States v. Volungus, 730 F.3d 40, 43-44 (1st Cir. 2013) (possession
of child pornography and charges associated with online communication with a law
enforcement agent posing as an underage girl). Commitments have also been based on
attempted sexual abuse or assault, where there was no actual physical contact with a victim.
See, e.g., Reinhardt v. Kopcow, No. 13-cv-2513-WJM-KMT, 2014 WL 4375931, at *3 (D.
Colo. Sept. 4, 2014) (attempted sexual assault); United States v. Perez, 752 F.3d 398, 401
(4th Cir. 2014) (transportation of a minor in foreign commerce with intent to engage in
criminal sexual activity).
222. I have not located any empirical studies of rates of success of SVP commitment
petitions.
223. Tamara Rice Lave, Throwing Away the Key: Has the Adam Walsh Act Lowered the
Threshold for Sexually Violent Predator Commitments Too Far?, 14 U. PA. J. OF CONST. L.
391, 399 (2011).
224. See infra notes 403-411 and accompanying text. Several SVP laws, including
Kansas and Washington’s, require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5929a07 (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060 (West 2009).
225. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 253 P.3d 394, 403 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); In re Luttrell,
2008 WI App 93, ¶ 11, 312 Wis. 2d 695, 754 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
226. See Heather Cucolo & Michael Perlin, “Far from the Turbulent Space”: Considering
the Adequacy of Counsel in the Representation of Individuals Accused of Being Sexually
Violent Predators 20-25 (Jan. 24, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2384899. However, all laws provide for some access to counsel.
227. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1140 (D. Haw. 2008).
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the treatment outcomes from SVP programs have been uneven. Scores of
those committed as SVPs receive little to no treatment whosoever, and
some states have been involved in protracted litigation regarding access to
treatment.229 One such case was brought by Andre Young, who challenged
Washington’s law.230 By the time his case reached the U.S. Supreme Court,
the Court had already decided the Hendricks case.231 In dismissing Young’s
challenge based upon an as-applied theory, the Court noted in dictum that,
if a person is detained for the purpose of incapacitation and treatment, then
“due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under
the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are
committed.”232 Such language has provided no guidance to lower courts
evaluating right-to-treatment claims.233 Most state SVP laws do not offer
immunity for disclosure of criminal conduct, so the threat of selfincrimination during treatment is real.234 Furthermore, social scientists have
yet to reach anything approaching a consensus on whether the various kinds
of inpatient treatment programs administrated to SVPs prevent
recidivism.235
The burden on an SVP respondent, once committed, to obtain release
from detention is considerable. Proving that one’s “condition” has changed
so as to make one no longer fit the definition of “sexually violent
229. See, e.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001); Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d
978, 983 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1256 (2009); Karsjens v.
Jesson, 6 F. Supp. 3d 916, 922 (D. Minn. 2014).
230. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 745 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
231. Young, 531 U.S. at 258.
232. Id. at 265.
233. Even where some form of treatment is offered, many detainees refuse to participate
in the treatment offered because a condition of such treatment is full disclosure (checked by
polygraph tests) of all sexual offenses, including those which the detainee had previously
denied under oath or for which the detainee was never charged or convicted, thus exposing
him to potential further criminal liability or extended commitment. Jeslyn A. Miller, Sex
Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment Paradox, 98 CAL. L. REV. 2093, 2095 (2010);
see also La Fond, supra note 23, at 167-69.
234. EWING, supra note 34, at 56. The Supreme Court has held that conditioning the
constitutionally required treatment on such disclosure (and removing privileges and
increasing the level of detention as a penalty for refusing treatment) does not run afoul of the
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against compelled self-incrimination. McKune v. Lile, 536
U.S. 24, 46-48 (2002). Justice Kennedy concluded that the treatment program did not truly
compel self-incrimination because the penalties imposed for refusing to participate in the
treatment program were not severe and the state had a valid objective in encouraging
rehabilitation and deterring future sexual offenses by leaving the possibility of future
prosecution. Id. at 33-36.
235. EWING, supra note 34, at 52-55.
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predator”236 is difficult, particularly when one lacks opportunities either to
demonstrate self-restraint or to receive effective treatment.237 The
respondent’s burden on a petition for release requires evidence that both
predicts the future and proves a negative—a nearly insurmountable task. As
a result, thousands of people detained for lengthy periods have little
likelihood of ever being released.238 Surveys of release rates suggest that
most individuals are committed for extended periods.239 The New York
Times’ 2007 study revealed that, of the nearly 3000 individuals who had
been committed nationwide under SVP laws, only fifty had been released
on an assessment by a clinician and state-appointed evaluator that they were
“ready” for release.240 This means that individuals who were among the
first committed in the 1990s have been held in detention for twenty years or
more. Because release is nearly impossible, there is now a growing and
aging group of people living out their lives in detention.241 The Times
authors noted that Leroy Hendricks, who was seventy-two years old in
236. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060 (West 2009); In re Lieberman, 955
N.E.2d 118, 139 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (denying SVP respondent’s petition for release because
he had not provided expert evidence that he “is no longer a sexually violent person or that it
is not substantially probable that respondent will engage in future acts of sexual violence”);
cf. In re West, 2011 WI 83, ¶ 96-102, 800 N.W.2d 929, 950-51 (Wis. 2011) (rejecting
constitutional challenge to Wisconsin SVP statute’s assignment of burden of proof for
release to respondent).
237. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 380-81 (noting that many programs are grossly
inadequate, while at the same time, a person’s lack of improvement in treatment is often
used as a basis to extend their detention); see, e.g., In re West, 800 N.W.2d at 947-48
(holding that placing burden on committed person to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he is no longer a “sexual violent person” in order to be released from commitment does
not violate due process).
238. La Fond, supra note 23, at 166-70; see also EWING, supra note 34, at 22.
239. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 380. (“Those discharged or released range from 0 in
North Dakota, New Jersey, and Iowa to 1 in Minnesota, 4 in Massachusetts, 6 in Missouri,
and fewer than 20 in Washington, Kansas, Illinois, and Florida. The only states that have
released a sufficient number of committed offenders to permit a follow-up are Arizona
(221), California (67), and Wisconsin (56).”); cf. WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY,
COMPARISON OF STATE LAWS AUTHORIZING INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY
VIOLENT PREDATORS: 2006 UPDATE, REVISED
3
(2007),
available
at
www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/07-08-1101.pdf.
240. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 214. Another 115 people had been released
because of “legal technicalities, court rulings, terminal illness or old age.” Id.
241. Several studies have noted that the risk of recidivism for sexual violence decreases
significantly for those over the age of sixty. United States v. Wilkinson, 646 F. Supp. 2d
194, 208 (2009) (citing R. Karl Hanson, Recidivism and Age: Follow-Up Data From 4,673
Sexual Offenders, 17 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1046, 1059 (2002)).
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2007, “spen[t] most days in a wheelchair or leaning on a cane, because of
diabetes, circulation ailments[,] and the effects of a stroke” and that those
who remained in detention included a 102-year-old man with poor
hearing.242
Minnesota’s SVP program, established in 1993, provides perhaps the
most extreme example of the challenges of obtaining release. Between the
program’s enactment in 1993 and 2012, 635 people (nearly all men) were
committed under that state’s SVP law.243 Not one was released until
2012.244 That state’s program has come under criticism for its failure to
provide adequate treatment for detained offenders, as well as for its
stringent release requirements.245 In 2012, the British High Court refused to
extradite to Minnesota a sex offender who faced possible SVP commitment
on the basis that such commitment would constitute a “flagrant denial” of
his human rights.246 More recently, the U.S. District Court for the District
of Minnesota held that the state’s “[SVP] statutes and sex offender program
do not pass constitutional scrutiny.”247 In its decision, the court stated: “The
overwhelming evidence at trial established that Minnesota's civil
commitment scheme is a punitive system that segregates and indefinitely
detains a class of potentially dangerous individuals without the safeguards
of the criminal justice system.”248 In short, as one commentator wrote in
reference to the realities of SVP laws: “Involuntary commitment is both
incarceration and exile.”249
Since so many who are committed under SVP laws remain in detention,
these programs are becoming a significant fiscal burden on the states that
have adopted them. Estimates of the cost to house each detainee range from
242. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 214.
243. Rupa Shenoy, Families of Sex Offenders Find Hope in Clarence Opheim's Release,
MPRNEWS (Mar. 5, 2012), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2012/03/05/minne
sota-sex-offender-program.
244. Mary Lynn Smith & Dave Hage, Minnesota Sex-Offender Lawsuit Takes Step
Forward, STAR TRIB. (July 25, 2012, 6:35 AM), http://www.startribune.com/local/163607
246.html.
245. Id.
246. John Aston, Court Blocks Shawn Sullivan’s U.S. Extradition, INDEPENDENT, June
28, 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/court-blocks-shawn-sullivans-us-ex
tradition-7896133.html.
247. Karsjens v. Jesson, No. 11–3659, 2015 WL 3755870, at *2 (D. Minn. June 17,
2015).
248. Id.
249. Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences
of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually Violent Predators", 93
MINN. L. REV. 670, 708 (2008).

658

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:619

$94,000 to $175,000 annually.250 These figures do not include capital
expenditures to build new facilities for SVP programs or the litigation costs
associated with a state’s petitions for commitment or a respondent’s petition
for release.251 One study suggests that the cost of detaining a sex offender
under an SVP law is four times more expensive than that of incarcerating a
prisoner.252
Notwithstanding the failure of SVP programs to achieve their ostensible
purposes and the extreme financial burden they impose on states
prosecuting them, states continue to identify individuals for SVP
commitment at the conclusion of their prison sentences.253 Since the public
has become accustomed to SVP detention as the standard course for those
convicted of sex crimes, legislatures appear to have boxed themselves in.
The likelihood of public outrage at the idea of releasing “sexual predators”
or not permitting their further detention makes such options appear
politically unfeasible. Indeed, a Florida newspaper criticized that state for
not detaining enough people under its SVP program, and the legislature
responded by loosening the commitment criteria even further.254
250. EWING, supra note 34, at 57. The Times study noted that wheelchairs, walkers, and
high blood pressure medication are among the growing costs for an increasing aging
population of people in SVP detention. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 214. Florida’s SVP
detention center filled 229 prescriptions for arthritis medication one month, and 300 for
blood pressure and other heart problems. Id.
251. EWING, supra note 34, at 57-59. The latter include costs of court-appointed counsel
and expert witnesses, which are estimated to double those costs. Media reports have
documented that the use of expert testimony for such proceedings constitutes a significant
portion of expense for such programs. For example, one 2010 report found that the State of
New York had spent $3 million paying for experts for both the State and respondents since that
state’s SVP program was launched in 2007. Gary Craig, Expert Opinion Among Civil
Commitment's High Costs, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Rochester, N.Y.), Dec. 29, 2010,
http://www.democratandchronicle.com/article/20101229/NEWS01/12290345?nclick_check=1;
Sally Kestin & Dana Williams, Experts Cash in on Predator Law, SUN SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 22, 2013, http://interactive.sun-sentinel.com/jimmy-ryce/witness.html;
Christine Willmsen, State Wastes Millions Helping Sex Predators Avoid Lockup, SEATTLE
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2013, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/state-wastes-millions-helpingsex-predators-avoid-lockup/.
252. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 214.
253. Id.
254. In 2013, the Sun Sentinel released a series of articles, collectively titled “Sex
Predators Unleashed,” that was highly critical of how many convicted sex offenders were
not being committed under that state’s SVP law and calling on state lawmakers to make it
easier to detain such offenders. Sally Keston & Dana Williams, Florida Sets Rapists and
Child Molesters Free to Strike Again, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Aug. 18, 2013,
http://interactive.sun-sentinel.com/jimmy-ryce/investigation.html. A follow-up article in late
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Despite their central objective of increasing public safety, SVP laws do
not appear to have decreased the overall incidence of sexual violence in
those states that have enacted such laws. It is difficult to empirically assess
whether there are broad public safety benefits to SVP programs—that is,
beyond ensuring that specific individuals have no access to anyone outside
of the SVP detention facility—but some researchers have attempted to do
so. In one recent study, researchers concluded: “SVP laws have had no
discernible impact on the incidence of sex crimes.”255 Further, by enacting
SVP laws and implementing these expensive programs, policymakers are
often shifting resources away from other, arguably more relevant and
effective, programs, including those aimed at enhancing probation and
community monitoring programs, preventing domestic violence and child
abuse, and providing treatment to sex offenders during their
incarceration.256
III. Distortions of Science and Law in SVP Commitment Proceedings
As discussed in the prior section, the language in the Hendricks and
Crane decisions confirming the constitutionality of SVP laws confers broad
discretion on courts in their application of statutory terms to meet the due
process requirement of mental abnormality. The Supreme Court reasoned in
Crane that the science of psychiatry is “ever-advancing” and its
“distinctions do not seek precisely to mirror those of the law.”257 The Court
also made clear that it was not going to establish specific principles to guide
lower courts and legislatures, reasoning that “bright-line rules” are not
always the best way to ensure “the Constitution's safeguards of human
liberty in the area of mental illness and the law."258 In effect, it invited
policymakers and courts to experiment with their approaches to establishing
eligibility for SVP commitment.
The Hendricks-Crane rationale assumes that however legislatures choose
to precisely define the contours of each state’s SVP commitment laws,
mental health professionals would reliably identify those whose medical
December described the Florida Legislature’s response to the paper’s investigation as
crafting a “comprehensive overhaul” of the state’s SVP law. Sally Keston & Dana Williams,
Investigation Spurs Reform of Sex Offender Laws, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.),
Dec. 29, 2013, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-12-28/news/fl-sex-predator-changes20131228_1-florida-senate-north-florida-sexually-violent-predator-program.
255. Lave & McCrary, supra note 204, at 1392 (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 1426-27; Good & Burstein, supra note 84, at 38.
257. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
258. Id.
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conditions put them at higher risk of committing sexual violence due to
volitional impairment, thus ensuring that SVP commitment laws would not
sweep too broadly.259 By framing the standard for commitment in terms of
mental disorder and making findings of volitional impairment from such
disorders a constitutional requirement, legislatures and courts have assigned
psychiatry a central role in the implementation of SVP laws by providing
expert opinion on the likelihood of future sexual violence stemming from
mental conditions in specific individuals.
In effect, the constitutionality of SVP laws was saved by the promise of
psychiatry. The Court’s rationale is valid, however, only if it is based on
accurate assumptions about the contributions psychiatry can make to ensure
SVP laws do not overreach. Justice Kennedy explicitly made that point in
his Hendricks concurrence when he noted that if it turns out “mental
abnormality is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for concluding
that civil detention is justified,” then the constitutionality of the SVP
scheme would again be called into question.260 It follows that, if the very
concept of a mental health predicate is highly imprecise, then the entire
model of SVP laws similarly falls short of meeting due process
requirements.
Using psychiatric evidence to determine who qualifies as an SVP raises
two major problems. One is that sexual deviance has an uncertain place in
the classification of psychopathology.261 The other is that psychiatry does
not operate in terms of predicting behavior.262 It is a profession whose
orientation is to identify the disordered primarily for the purposes of
treating them—to relieve suffering and improve functioning. As noted
earlier, the psychiatric profession never claimed that it had the knowledge
or instruments to identify those at an especially high risk of committing acts
of sexual violence,263 and the past twenty-five years of SVP proceedings
indicate that the Court’s evident assumption that it could make that crucial
identification was misplaced. The years since those opinions have, in fact,
borne out the warnings of the APA in its Hendricks amicus brief.264 It has
become clear that the Supreme Court based its ruling regarding the class of
“sexually violent predators” on a legal, rather than psychiatric, construct,
and its assignment of the role of determining such classification to the field
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See supra notes 176-182 and accompanying text.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See infra notes 282-338 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 339-370 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 192-201 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
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of psychiatry involved a distorted view of that field with dire consequences
for those targeted by the statutes.
This section first reviews the historical and current approaches within
psychiatry to identifying disorders involving sexual arousal. Next it
examines how such approaches became significantly distorted in SVP
proceedings under the framework set forth in Hendricks-Crane. This
section gives particular attention to the problem of relying on psychiatry to
predict sexual violence. Finally, this section reviews some of the attempts
to address these problems, primarily through proposed revisions to
psychiatric diagnoses and use of alternative methods of prediction.
A. Psychiatry’s View of Diagnosing and Predicting Sexual Violence
The holdings in Hendricks and Crane assigned psychiatric experts a
central, indispensable role in the prosecution of SVP commitments. The
State cannot obtain an order for detention without proving dangerousness,
and such dangerousness must be couched in terms of abnormality, or a
“mental disorder that has some medical legitimacy.”265 When experts speak
of mental pathology, particularly in courtrooms, they tend to do so in terms
of diagnoses.266 However, the diagnoses that, on their face, appear to
identify those individuals who present the greatest threat of sexual
dangerousness are not consistent with the conceptualization of mental
abnormality or mental disorder evidently contemplated by the Court and the
SVP statutes it has upheld.
1. Role of Diagnosis and the DSM Generally in Psychiatric Assessment
As an initial matter, even the broad concept of “mental disorder” does
not enjoy a consensus definition within psychiatry. Beginning with the third
edition, the DSM, the APA’s standardized nosology, has offered a
definition for mental disorder, although the definition has varied over the
years.267 In one recent edition, the editors acknowledged that, in making a
diagnosis, the line between disordered and non-disordered is elusive and
variable: “The concept of mental disorder, like many other concepts in
medicine and science, lacks a consistent operational definition that covers

265. Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Sexual Predator Laws: A Two-Decade
Retrospective, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 90, 93 (2008).
266. Hamilton, supra note 22, at 2-4; Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 364.
267. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 5-6 (3rd ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III].
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all situations.”268 Recent editions of the DSM also feature cautionary
language about using the manual’s diagnostic classifications in legal
situations, where such line drawing has far greater implications than in
clinical settings. The “Cautionary Statement for Forensic Use” in the most
recent edition, published in 2013, advises: “When DSM-5 categories,
criteria, and textual descriptions are employed for forensic purposes, there
is a risk that diagnostic information will be misused or misunderstood.”269
However, the Supreme Court clearly anticipated that experts testifying in
SVP cases would frame their opinions, at least in part, in terms of a
diagnosis. Crane referenced diagnosis specifically by noting that the
sufficiency of the evidence offered by a state in support of an SVP
commitment will take into account “the nature of the psychiatric
diagnosis[] and the severity of the mental abnormality itself.”270 And the
Hendricks majority noted that the State had satisfied the “mental
abnormality” requirement in Hendricks’s case because the respondent had a
“disorder” listed in the DSM.271 However, in neither opinion did the Court
indicate the specific diagnoses that would be sufficient for purposes of a
constitutionally permissible preventive detention. In the absence of any
clear direction, uncertainties abound for those in both law and psychiatry.
Indeed, it appears that virtually any diagnosis by a mental health
professional could suffice to justify the indefinite commitment of someone
as a sexually violent predator if a testifying expert links such condition to a
risk of committing sexual violence.272
Criminal defendants often present psychiatric diagnoses in support of an
insanity defense, but there are important differences between this setting
and the civil commitment of SVPs. In the context of determining criminal
responsibility, the diagnosis helps the factfinder reconstruct the defendant’s
past frame of mind at a given moment in time.273 This reconstruction is less
dependent upon a specific label (e.g. schizophrenia) than on an overall
268. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS xxx (4th ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
269. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 25 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. The DSM-IV-TR’s “cautionary
statement” was quoted in the APA’s amicus brief to the Court in Hendricks. See supra note
201 and accompanying text.
270. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002) (emphasis added).
271. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997).
272. Allan Frances et al., Defining Mental Disorder When It Really Counts: DSM-IV-TR
and SVP/SDP Statutes, 36 J. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 375, 379 (2008).
273. Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 561-64 (1978).
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assessment of how the person’s mind functioned at that particular
moment.274 More importantly, in insanity defense cases, it is usually the
defendant himself who puts a diagnosis in evidence through his own expert
testimony as part of a defense he raised.275 Absent a defendant’s choice to
assert an insanity defense, there is no role for psychiatric testimony,
including diagnoses, at trial. By contrast, in SVP proceedings, because a
diagnosis of mental abnormality is required for due process reasons, it is the
linchpin for the deprivation of liberty. It is how we rationalize preventive
detention for a subset of the population. And if that is the case, then the
specific diagnosis offered to meet that requirement must align with due
process principles by, at a minimum, having a basis in medical
knowledge.276
In Hendricks, the Court noted the lack of consensus among psychiatrists
regarding where to draw the line between ill and not ill and also how to
identify and characterize specific mental disorders.277 This led the majority
to conclude that legislatures, in drafting the laws, and judges, in reviewing
the evidence and applying the laws in individual cases, should do the linedrawing.278 But the lack of consensus279 here should have instead signaled
that the deciding factor in SVP commitments cannot be so variable and
subjective. This is particularly true given the massive deprivation of
liberty—indefinite preventive detention for terms far longer than in the
standard involuntary hospitalization context—and because the respondent
bears the burden to prove that he has sufficiently recovered from such
“condition” to be released.280 This reasoning also fails to account for the
high degree of deference courts generally grant to mental health experts and
the limited ability of courts and juries to assess the reliability of such
experts’ opinions.281 The Court’s rulings, when implemented in the context
of the on-the-ground realities of trials, paved the way for scores of SVP

274. In fact, Stephen Morse has argued that insanity opinions could be based entirely on
the defendant’s capacity at the moment of the crime using descriptive rather than diagnostic
terms. Id. at 604-13.
275. JOHN PARRY, CRIMINAL MENTAL HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY 131 (2009).
276. See McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 577 (7th Cir. 2010).
277. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-60 (1997).
278. Id. at 359-60.
279. The Hendricks Court was divided 5-4, with Justice Kennedy concurring. Id. at 350,
371, 373.
280. See supra notes 236-242 and accompanying text.
281. See infra notes 572-605 and accompanying text.
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commitments to be based upon expert opinions with highly dubious
scientific foundation.
2. Origins of Lack of Consensus Regarding Relation of Pathology to
Sexual Deviance
In the case of SVP laws, mental health professionals are asked to make a
very specific finding of dangerousness: the person must be at risk for
committing sexual violence, not any kind of violence. Most civil
commitment statutes have a blanket “harm to self or others” requirement,282
which provides for a range of prognostication. The requirement of the
specific risk in SVP laws leads many to assume there must be a specific
diagnosis tied to that specific risk. Given this central role assigned to
psychiatric diagnosis in SVP proceedings, we must consider carefully what
psychiatry has to say about the underlying pathology of those who engage
in sexual violence.
The history of pathologizing sexual attitudes and conduct is long,
complicated, and inextricably caught up with cultural and ethical views—
often tacit—that construct deviance and perversion in contrast with a
presumed normality. As other scholars have set out this history in some
detail,283 I will only summarize some key developments here, particularly
as they pertain to implications for the SVP statutory schemes. French
philosopher Michel Foucault compellingly argued that much that is labeled
as pathology is in fact nothing more than deviance from social norms
predominant at a given time, including norms regarding sexuality and
proper gender behavior.284 Contemporary historians of psychiatry generally
regard supposed pathological “conditions” as “constructions,” and often
quite problematic ones.285
Although Western societies, particularly through religious and legalpolitical institutions, have long identified and condemned a range of sexual

282. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., Andreas De Block & Pieter R. Adriaens, Pathologizing Sexual Deviance:
A History, 50 J. OF SEX RES., 276, 277 (2013). See generally JESSE BERING, PERV: THE
SEXUAL DEVIANT IN ALL OF US (2013).
284. De Block & Adriaens, supra note 283, at 277. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, A
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION (1990); MICHEL FOUCAULT, A
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 2: THE USE OF PLEASURE (1990).
285. De Block & Adriaens, supra note 283, at 277. (“[P]sychiatrists’ and sexologists’
descriptions of new pathologies or types of persons should not be considered as discoveries
but rather as inventions or constructions.”).
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behaviors as deviant,286 the notion of such conduct as evidence of mental
illness did not arise until the mid-nineteenth century with the increasing
authority of psychiatry.287 As new works about sexual deviance and
perversion appeared in the European medical literature, the criminalization
of specific sexual acts also became more widespread.288 In time, some
psychiatrists criticized the punishment of these behaviors and recommended
treatment instead of punishment to eliminate these behaviors.289
The publication in 1886 of Austrian psychiatrist Richard von KrafftEbing’s Psychopathia Sexualis, which set forth a medically detailed
account of specific pathologies, is considered a watershed moment in the
medicalization of sexual deviance.290 The Psychopathia Sexualis differed
from prior accounts because it argued that such conduct originated in an
individual’s personality, not anatomy.291 Although the original work
included extensive classification of pathological sexual feelings and
behavior, it was only in later versions that Kraft-Ebbing discussed
pedophilia and other forms of “paraphilia”;292 that is, sexual arousal not
from heterosexual intercourse with adults but from non-standard sources,
such as objects, animals, settings, and children.293 Krafft-Ebing, himself a
forensic psychiatrist, noted the implications of his research for criminal law,
but he observed that classifying conduct as normal, perverted, or criminal
was not a simple matter.294
Sigmund Freud, though clearly influenced by Krafft-Ebing’s approach,
took a somewhat different tack regarding sexual deviance versus normality.
Most individuals, Freud maintained, are “polymorphously perverse” during
childhood, and a range of sexual interest remains quite common among the
population.295 He wrote: “However infamous they may be, however sharply
they may be contrasted with normal sexual activity, quiet consideration will
show that some perverse trait or other is seldom absent from the sexual life

286. Id. at 277-78. The word “perversion” originates from a broader term “used to denote
an aberration or a deviation from a divine norm: any act that violated the laws of God was
considered a perversion.” Id. at 278.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 279.
289. Id.
290. See id. at 280.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 281.
293. See id. at 280-81.
294. Id. at 281.
295. Id. at 282.
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of normal people.”296 Accordingly, these desires signal dysfunction only
when they are the source of compulsion, fixation, and exclusiveness such
that they interfere with normative functioning.297 While this psychoanalytic
approach further blurred the lines between normal and pathological
sexuality, Freud, like Krafft-Ebing, assumed that a precise distinction in
fact existed,298 and, in his later work, he maintained that most perversions
originated from an unresolved castration anxiety and early sexual trauma. 299
As reviewed below, many elements of these early debates have resurfaced
in contemporary American psychiatry, with significant implications for
controversies regarding the extent to which psychopathology can be linked
to sexual violence.
3. The DSM and Paraphilias
In the second half of the twentieth century, the DSM became the leading
source of psychiatric classification. The APA published the first two
editions, based primarily on psychoanalytic approaches, in 1952 and
1968.300 They did refer to sexual disorders (the early editions lacked the
diagnostic criteria seen in more recent editions), but these were placed
within the personality disorders category, and the focus was on the
relationship between the individual’s desires and predominant social
norms.301 The texts did not place sexual perversions clearly within the
realm of mental illness but, rather, treated them as types of social
deviance.302
296. SIGMUND FREUD, THE COMPLETE INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS
322 (James Strachey trans., 1966); see also SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON SEXUALITY
26-27 (James Strachey trans., 1962) (noting that some “perversions” “are constituents which
are rarely absent from the sexual life of healthy people” and this presents “insoluble
difficulties as soon as we try to draw a sharp line to distinguish mere variations within the
range of what is physiological from pathological symptoms”).
297. Jerome C. Wakefield, DSM-5 Proposed Diagnostic Criteria for Sexual Paraphilias:
Tensions Between Diagnostic Validity and Forensic Utility, 34 INT’L. J.L. AND PSYCHIATRY
195, 199 (2011).
298. Id.
299. De Block & Adriaens, supra note 283, at 282; David P. Bryden & Maren M. Grier,
The Search For Rapists' “Real” Motives, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 171, 174-76
(2011).
300. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (1952) [hereinafter DSM-I]; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter DSM-II].
301. DSM-I, supra note 300, at 38-39; DSM-II, supra note 300, at 44-45; see also De
Block & Adrieans, supra note 283, at 285-86.
302. De Block & Adriaens, supra note 283, at 286.
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As remarked above, the DSM-III, published in 1980, was a significant
departure from the earlier editions. This edition is most notable for its
presentation of specific diagnostic criteria for each disorder.303 The
definitions and criteria it offered for disorders associated with sexual
deviance, particularly for “pedophilia,” became increasingly embroiled in
controversy and politics in subsequent editions. Starting with the DSM-III,
the manual included a category called “paraphilias,” (or, as they are
referred to in the current edition, DSM-5, “paraphilic disorders”) which are
specific disorders associated with sexual attraction to people, things, or
situations that are considered deviant or non-normal.304 Under the category,
the manual lists disorders such as pedophilia, exhibitionism, and
sadomasochism. Each edition presented a slightly different list of disorders
and a slightly different set of diagnostic criteria for each.305 The central
debate or tension pervading the development of these classifications was
this: at what point does sexual attraction or desire signal or implicate
psychopathology?306
Since the field of psychiatry is centrally concerned with identifying and
treating those whose mental disorders cause personal distress and impair
functioning, many (including Freud, as indicated above) have taken the
position that only when a persistent form of sexual attraction leads to such
distress or impairment is it appropriate to label it as a disorder.307 Thus, the
extent to which a subject’s sexual feelings deviated from social norms was
less important for making the diagnosis of the presence of a “disorder” than
the existence of distress or impairment of function for the subject himself or
herself. This view stems in part from psychiatry’s wariness of classifying
certain types of sexual attraction as disordered in light of the enormous
controversy regarding the previous inclusion of homosexuality in the
DSM’s list of sexual disorders.308 The elimination of homosexuality from
the list in 1973 led to a debate about whether and which other forms of
303. SHORTER, supra note 183, at 300-02.
304. The DSM-III-R list of paraphilias included: Fetishism, Transvestism, Zoophilia,
Pedophilia, Exhibitionism, Voyeurism, Sexual Masochism, and Sexual Sadism. DSM-III,
supra note 267, at 268-75. For an excellent, detailed analysis and critique of the paraphilias
and their use and implications in forensic settings, including SVP proceedings, see generally
Hamilton, supra note 22.
305. Compare DSM-III, supra note 267, at 266-75, with AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 522-32 (4th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter DSM-IV].
306. De Block & Adriaens, supra note 283, at 284-92.
307. Id. at 288-89; Wakefield, supra note 297, at 197, 200.
308. De Block & Adriaens, supra note 283, at 287-89.
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sexual deviation should be included in the manual, particularly where such
deviation did not cause any distress to the individual (the key rationale used
for removing homosexuality).309 The DSM-III included language in the
forward noting a distinction between deviance and disorder310 and the lead
editor of the manual, Robert Spitzer, acknowledged that the term “disorder .
. . always involves a value judgment. ”311
This emphasis on personal distress and impaired functioning became
more apparent with the publication of the DSM-IV in 1994. Under the
diagnostic criteria for the paraphilias, conduct based upon these urges could
be criminal, but not pathological, in the absence of distress or limited
functioning.312 With this revision, that edition further clarified that
clinicians could not consider child sex offenders to be mentally ill unless
their deviant behavior caused such distress or impairment.313 This
modification, however, which moved the notion of paraphilia away from
the problematic normal-abnormal dichotomy,314 elicited outrage among
certain conservative groups who claimed that this would de-pathologize
nondistressed pedophiles315 and give an “ego-syntonic well-functioning

309. Id. at 288-89.
310. DSM-III, supra note 304, at 6 (“When the disturbance is limited to a conflict
between an individual and society, this may represent social deviance, which may or may
not be commendable, but is not by itself a mental disorder.”).
311. De Block & Adriaens, supra note 283, at 288 (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
312. Id. at 291. This change was part of a “system-wide effort” to incorporate “clinical
significance criterion” to diagnoses throughout the DSM-IV. Michael B. First, DSM-5
Proposals for Paraphilias: Suggestions for Reducing False Positives Related to Use of
Behavioral Manifestations, 39 ARCH. SEX. BEHAV. 1239, 1240 (2010).
313. DSM-IV, supra note 305, at 528. This modification was also consistent with
revisions made throughout DSM-IV to ensure that only conditions that caused harm, one of
the essential components for a clinically-significant medical “disorder,” were included.
Wakefield, supra note 297, at 201-02.
314. Michael B. First & Robert L. Halon, Use of DSM Paraphilia Diagnoses in Sexually
Violent Predator Commitment Cases, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 443, 445 (2008).
The edition retained the list of paraphilias, however, which now included: exhibitionism,
fetishism, frotteurism, pedophilia, sexual sadism, sexual masochism, transvestic fetishism,
and voyeurism. DSM-IV, supra note 313, at 569-75. Each paraphilia had its own diagnostic
criteria.
315. Michael B. First & Allen Frances, Issues for DSM-V: Unintended Consequences of
Small Changes: The Case of Paraphilias, 165 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1240, 1240 (2008). The
specific protest cited by the authors apparently came from “Exodus International,” an antigay Christian organization. Exodus International Shuts Down: Christian Ministry Apologizes
to LGBT Community and Halts Operations, HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2013, 8:19 AM),
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paraphilic a free pass as far as disorder goes.”316 Robert Spitzer later
referred to the blowback as a “public relations disaster,”317 and the APA
reversed the amendment (referred to as a “misinterpretation” by the editors)
for those paraphilias “involving nonconsenting victims” to allow a
diagnosis of paraphilia based upon either the individual’s acting on
paraphilic urges with said victims or experiencing distress caused by such
urges.318 In the “text revision” of DSM-IV six years later, the editors
modified the criteria to make clear that acting on paraphilic urges could
itself satisfy the “harm” requirement for the diagnosis of pathology, even if
such activity was unaccompanied by “distress or interpersonal difficulty”
for the person so diagnosed.319
Another significant change in the DSM-IV was to the “A Criterion” part
of each paraphilia diagnosis to allow clinicians to base a diagnosis on
“recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or
behaviors.”320 This revision was a technical adjustment required by changes
in wording made in the other part of the diagnostic criteria for each
paraphilia.321 It was only in hindsight that the editors and other
commentators noted that the use of “or behaviors” as a disjunctive, in
combination with the amendment regarding the “harm” requirement, could
allow prosecution experts in SVP cases to assign a diagnosis of mental
abnormality to sexual offenders “based only on their having committed
sexual offenses (e.g., rape).”322 The DSM editors have asserted repeatedly
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/20/exodus-international-shutsdown_n_3470911.html.
316. Wakefield, supra note 297, at 202.
317. Robert Spitzer, Sexual and Gender Disorders: Discussions of Questions for DSM-V,
in SEXUAL AND GENDER DIAGNOSES OF THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL (DSM):
A REEVALUATION 111, 115 (Dan Karasic & Jack Drescher eds., 2005).
318. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 268, at 566; First & Frances, supra note 315, at 1240.
319. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 268, at 566 (“The person has acted on these sexual urges,
or the sexual urges or fantasies cause marked distress or interpersonal difficulty.”).
320. DSM-IV, supra note 305, at 566 (emphasis added). The criteria for each paraphilias
are divided into “A” and “B” sections, both of which must be satisfied in order to apply the
diagnosis to an individual.
321. First, supra note 312, at 1240.
322. First & Frances, supra note 315, at 1240; Frances et al., supra note 272, at 380;
Wakefield, supra note 297, at 201-02. As the DSM-IV’s lead editor, Allen Frances, noted
recently: “This one stupid slip contributed to the unconstitutional preventive detention of
thousands of sex offenders. I have no pity for criminals, but do have great concern when
their constitutional rights are violated just because I made a dumb wording mistake.” Allen
Frances, DSM-5 Writing Mistakes Will Cause Great Confusion, HUFFINGTON POST (June 11,
2013, 5:12 AM EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/allen-frances/dsm5-writing-mistakes-
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that this broad reading of the A Criterion is inconsistent with the basic
conceptualization of paraphilias in the DSM: criminal conduct alone, even
if it appears to be based on an underlying paraphilia, cannot establish a
diagnosis for such a paraphilia.323 Given that the “core construct” of a
paraphilia is the presence of “deviant arousal,” a clinical diagnosis must be
based upon information beyond an instance of criminal conduct alone.324 As
Michael First, one of the DSM-IV editors, explained in a 2010 editorial: “A
paraphilia is . . . fundamentally a disturbed internal mental process (i.e., a
deviant focus of sexual arousal) which is conceptually distinguishable from
its various clinical manifestations . . . .”325 Since the best indicators of a
sexual arousal pattern are a patient’s “self-reports” of fantasies, urges, and
actions, obtained through a diagnostic interview, the criteria should not be
interpreted in a way that would permit a clinician to “skip this crucial step”
in the diagnostic process.326 To base a diagnosis on a person’s acts alone,
therefore, “conflate[s] the underlying phenomenology of a paraphilia with
its clinical manifestations.”327
The paraphilias are not, strictly speaking, limited to the specific
diagnostic labels, such as “pedophilia” and “exhibitionism,” set forth in the
DSM. Beginning with the DSM-III the “paraphilias” category also included
a catchall label: initially it was “Atypical Paraphilia,”328 and then,
beginning with the DSM-III-R, it was “Paraphilia Not Otherwise
Specified.”329 The purpose of this label was to acknowledge that the
wil_b_3419747.html [hereinafter Frances, DSM-5 Writing Mistakes Will Cause Great
Confusion].
323. First & Halon, supra note 314, at 446-47 (“It had never been anticipated that any
clinician would interpret the addition of ‘or behaviors’ in Criterion A as indicating that the
deviant behavior, in the absence of evidence of the presence of fantasies and urges causing
the behavior, would justify a diagnosis of a paraphilia.”).
324. Id. at 447-48. The authors indicate that such other information can be gleaned from
interviews, questionnaires, a detailed history of the individual’s sexual behavior, use of
pornography, and testing of physiological responses. Id.; see also Wakefield, supra note
297, at 198 (“[P]araphilias are disorders of sexual arousal and desire, not matters of behavior
and action undertaken for other reasons . . . .”).
325. First, supra note 312, at 1240.
326. See id.
327. Id.; see also Fred S. Berlin, Pedophilia and DSM-5: The Importance of Clearly
Defining the Nature of a Pedophilic Disorder, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 404, 404
(2014) (“Many in society are likely to equate Pedophilia with child molestation. They are
not the same.”).
328. DSM-III, supra note 304, at 275.
329. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 290 (3rd. ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
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disorders specified in the category “paraphilia” did not represent the full
range of nonconforming sexual interests, and it provided clinicians with a
term to use for someone whose particular disorder (e.g. sexual interest in
animals or in rubbing against strangers) did not meet the criteria for any
specific disorder in the category.330 Each edition of the DSM provided a
non-exhaustive list of examples of such other conditions.331 In successive
editions the DSM editors removed some examples from the list, added
others, and provided full criteria for some.332 The historical variability of
the “NOS”—Not Otherwise Specified—category of paraphilias is evident,
and researchers have never studied its diagnostic validity.333
There are strong, conflicting opinions throughout psychiatry about the
validity of the paraphilias and the implications of their use as a basis for
SVP commitment.334 The intersection of psychopathology with social
norms and religious and moral judgments about sexuality and sexual
behavior has rendered the paraphilias among the most controversial
diagnoses in the DSM.335 As noted above, the debate about the removal of
homosexuality from the list of paraphilias had a profound impact on all
later discussions of the inclusion, revision, or removal of diagnoses in that
category. Several psychiatrists have continued to question whether there
should be such a category at all. They have asked what justification there
could be for classifying particular forms of sexual desire as disorders.336
Scholars questioning the validity of the diagnosis of pedophilia as a mental
disorder point to the wide variation, both historically and among states and
countries today, regarding the minimum age of the sexual partner required
to avoid prosecution for child sexual abuse.337 These commentators are

330. Id.; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 268, at 4.
331. The DSM-5 list under “Other Specified Paraphilic Disorders” includes the following
examples: “telephone scatologia (obscene phone calls), necrophilia (corpses), zoophilia
(animals), coprophilia (feces), klismaphilia (enemas), [and] urophilia (urine).” DSM-5,
supra note 269, at 705.
332. For example, frotteurism (rubbing against strangers) was initially listed as an
“atypical paraphilia” and zoophilia (sexual interest in animals) was removed from the list of
specific conditions into the “Not Otherwise Specified” category. Compare DSM-III, supra
note 304, at 270, 275, with DSM-IV-TR, supra note 268, at 570, 576.
333. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 366-67.
334. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentky et al., Commentary: Muddy Diagnostic Waters in the
SVP Courtroom, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 455, 456-58 (2008).
335. See Wakefield, supra note 297, at 195.
336. Id. at 195-96.
337. BERING, supra note 283, at 150-52.
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particularly concerned that indefinite detention of individuals can hinge on
such widely varying considerations.338
4. Research Undermines Presumed Connections Between Mental
Disorders and Sex Crimes
Another controversial question is whether a condition such as pedophilia
can serve as a cause of criminal behavior, in which case the presence of the
condition could serve as a predictor of future criminal conduct including
sexual abuse and rape. Although it might appear that paraphilias are the
category of mental disorder most obviously associated with violent sexual
behavior, they are far from an ideal fit. Several researchers have found that
sexually violent criminal conduct, and specifically child sexual abuse and
rape, does not in fact strongly correlate with the presence of a paraphilia. 339
While most SVP laws take a “one size fits all” approach to offenders,
research indicates that sex offenders are a “markedly heterogeneous group
of criminals.”340 As one scholar notes, this “primary pathology attributed to
sex offenders . . . is beginning to be discredited empirically.”341
These empirical findings were the basis of Dr. First’s foremost concern
about clinicians basing dubious pedophilia diagnoses upon actions alone:
that is, the risk of a significant number of “false positive” diagnoses.342 Dr.
First noted that sexually violent behavior can have a great number of
underlying causes and that the paraphilias are limited to one specific kind of

338. See, e.g., First & Halon, supra note 314, at 444; Frances et al., supra note 272, at
375-76; Wakefield, supra note 297, at 196-97.
339. Alan R. Felthous & Leonore Simon, Introduction to This Issue: Sex Offenders Part
One, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 1, 2 (2000) (noting that the consensus amongst clinicians who
treat sex offenders is that “most sex offenders do not have a paraphilia”); First & Halon,
supra note 314, at 446 (citing Neal W. Dunsieth et al., Psychiatric and Legal Features of
113 Men Convicted of Sexual Offenses, 65 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 293 (2004)); Simon, supra
note 79, at 294 (“[D]eviant sexual fantasies do not exist in the majority of sex offenders . . .
.”); see also Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 367 (noting that studies have shown that “a
substantial proportion of rapists do not meet the criteria for any paraphilia”).
340. Prentky et al., supra note 334, at 456.
341. Simon, supra note 79, at 284.
342. First, supra note 312, at 1240. Dr. First apparently gave a deposition in which he
attempted to explain the DSM’s paraphilias language was being interpreted and used in a
way not intended by the editors, resulting in misdiagnoses of individuals with a paraphilia.
In re Detention of McGary, 231 P.3d 205, 208-09 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). The transcript of
this deposition was offered as evidence in a petition to terminate an SVP commitment based
on a paraphilia diagnosis, but it was rejected by the trial court (which ruling was upheld on
appeal) because Dr. First had not examined the petitioning individual. Id. at 209-10.
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behavior: persistent, deviant sexual arousal.343 Inappropriate sexual
conduct, like exhibitionism or sexual contact with minors, could
alternatively be caused by “a manifestation of disinhibition or poor impulse
control related to substance intoxication, a manic episode, or personality
change due to a dementing illness,” or by “opportunism in a person with
antisocial personality disorder.”344 As one example of such findings, Dr.
First noted a study of child sex offenders in which only one-third had a
pedophilic arousal response pattern.345
Diagnosing individuals with specific mental disorders based on their
sexual offenses against other adults is even more problematic. A diagnosis
of “sexual sadism” could apply to all those who derive specific erotic
pleasure from another person’s suffering,346 but it certainly does not apply
to all rapists, even to those who commit multiple offenses.347 At the time
the DSM-III-R was adopted, the editorial committee debated including a
new diagnosis, “paraphilic coercive disorder,” among the paraphilias.348
This proposal immediately generated controversy. Not only was there “little
systematic research on the usefulness, reliability, validity, or definition of
the proposed disorder,” but also many commentators raised concerns about
turning rape into a mental disorder.349 The concern was not for the potential
use of such a diagnostic category as a basis for preventive detention but
rather to excuse criminal conduct.350 Ultimately, the absence of sufficient

343. First, supra note 312, at 1240.
344. Id.; see also Fabian M. Saleh et al., The Management of Sex Offenders: Perspectives
for Psychiatry, 18 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 359, 361 (2010) (noting the wide range of
motivations and “environmental precipitants” related to sexual violence).
345. First, supra note 312, at 1240 (citing Michael C. Seto & Martin L. Lalumiere, A
Brief Screening Scale to Identify Pedophilic Interests Among Child Molesters, 13 SEXUAL
ABUSE 15 (2001)).
346. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 268, at 573 (“[T]he individual derives sexual excitement
from the psychological or physical suffering (including humiliation) of the victim.”).
347. Simon, supra note 79, at 293.
348. Frances et al., supra note 272, at 380.
349. Id.
350. Id. Similarly, a diagnosis of pedophilia is specifically excluded from the Americans
with Disabilities Act defining of “disability” out of concern that individuals might seek some
kind of “accommodation” for such disorder. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012); Adrienne L.
Hiegel, Note, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with Disabilities Act as a Moral Code, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1473-75 (1994). These are only a few examples of the inconsistent
legal implications of having a mental disorder.
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data to support the existence of a separate disorder led to the rejection of
this proposal entirely.351
5. The Absent Connection Between Psychiatric Assessment of Paraphilia
and Determination of “Volitional Impairment”
Of particular significance for SVP commitments is the fact that a
diagnosis of pedophilia or other paraphilia, in addition to not being strongly
correlated with acts of sexual violence, does not necessarily involve a lack
of “volition” or form of compulsion, as required under the Hendricks-Crane
analysis. As First and Halon write, a “diagnosis of a paraphilia does not
imply that the person also has difficulty controlling his behavior.”352 The
defining feature of the paraphilias is a particular source of “deviant” sexual
arousal (not conduct), and as noted above, many people with such sexual
interests, urges, or fantasies never act on them.353 As a result, some
researchers “liken [a paraphilia] to an addiction, others to sexual
orientation.”354
Indeed, the DSM-IV-TR’s introductory language makes clear that none of
the diagnoses in the manual imply an assessment of volitional control:
[T]he fact that an individual’s presentation meets the criteria for
a DSM-IV diagnosis does not carry any necessary implication
regarding the individual’s degree of control over the behaviors
that may be associated with the disorder. Even when diminished
control over one’s behavior is a feature of the disorder, having
the diagnosis in itself does not demonstrate that a particular
individual is (or was) unable to control his or her behavior at a
particular time.355

351. Frances et al., supra note 272, at 380. It was not even retained as potential diagnosis
for future study, as is done with some rejected diagnoses. Id.
352. First & Halon, supra note 314, at 450.
353. Id.
354. Casey Schwartz, What Science Reveals About Pedophilia, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 7,
2011, 4:45 AM ET), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/06/what-sciencereveals-about-pedophilia.html.
355. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 268, at xxxiii. There is a category of disorders known as
“Disruptive, Impulse-Control, and Conduct Disorders” such as kleptomania and pyromania.
DSM-5, supra note 269, at 476-79. However, these are not associated with acts of sexual
violence and therefore would not be appropriate predicates for an SVP commitment finding
of mental abnormality that results in volitional impairment. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at
365.
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This language reflects psychiatry’s consistent attempts to stay clear of
weighing in on questions of “volition.” As one group of commentators
noted: “Assessing volitionality is perhaps the most hopeless of all
diagnostic quagmires.”356
Psychiatrists have long rejected the notion that they have a special ability
to predict future behavior, particularly dangerous conduct.357 They have
also been ambivalent about their ability to understand and identify
volitional impairment, particularly in the criminal context.358 Such concerns
on the part of the psychiatric profession have led many states to eliminate
volitional impairment (frequently referred to as “irresistible impulse”) as a
basis for the insanity defense.359 As the APA famously cautioned regarding
the limits of psychiatry: “The line between an irresistible impulse and an
impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and
dusk.”360 With respect to SVP laws, the Association for the Treatment of
Sexual Abusers (a group of medical professionals) stated in its amicus brief
to the Supreme Court in Crane that the concept of volitional impairment in
SVP legal standards is “meaningless and unworkable.”361 Like the
problematic “irresistible impulse” test for criminal responsibly, the ATSA
argued, the notion of “volitional impairment,” if it even exists, should
similarly be rejected because of the inability of experts to identify it.362
Psychiatrists base their hesitation to make predictions in the SVP context
in part on research undermining preconceptions about sex offender
recidivism and its connection to psychopathology. Contrary to a common
assumption, the recidivism rate among sex offenders for committing a
future sex offense is actually quite low as compared with their propensity to
relapse into other criminal behavior.363 Sexual offenders often have
356. Prentky et al., supra note 334, at 457.
357. Simon, supra note 79, at 302; see also JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION
OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 6 (1981).
358. First & Halon, supra note 314, at 451; John Monahan, The Scientific Status of
Research on Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Violence, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 300, 308-11 (David L. Faigman et
al. eds., 1997).
359. MELTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 124.
360. Insanity Def. Work Group, American Psychiatric Association Statement on the
Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681-85 (1983).
361. Brief for the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (No. 00-957), 2001 WL
670067, at *2.
362. Id. at *4-7.
363. Lave, supra note 84, at 191; Simon, supra note 79, at 302-06.
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nonsexual criminal histories and may recidivate through other forms of
criminal or antisocial behavior.364 Research findings also call into doubt the
assumption that the source of the behavior of sex offenders is a specific
abnormality or condition.365 As one psychiatrist noted: “The possibility of
forfeiture of liberty based not on current behavior, but rather on prediction
of potential for future offending, imposes a stark obligation on the evaluator
to ‘get it right.’”366 However, the consensus of the field is that such
predictions cannot be done with “any precision.”367
Just as statistical analysis reveals the absence of a strong correlation
between a paraphilia and sexual violence,368 empirical studies also reveal
that pedophilia—that is, the presence of intense sexual attraction to
children—does not in itself indicate that a person is likely to engage in
child sexual abuse.369 Although commitments of several men under SVP
laws (particularly in the federal system) have been based solely upon a prior
conviction for possession of child pornography, it is far from clear that
viewing child pornography is indicative of sexual dangerousness.370
364. See Simon, supra note 79, at 283, 302.
365. See, e.g., CYNTHIA CALKINS MERCADO ET AL., SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT,
TREATMENT, AND CIVIL COMMITMENT: AN EVIDENCE BASED ANALYSIS AIMED AT REDUCING
SEXUAL VIOLENCE 6 (2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/2435
51.pdf (noting that even among the highest risk groups of sex offenders, recidivism rates
were “quite low” and most sex crimes were not committed by “known offenders”); see also
Simon, supra note 79, at 284 (“Although some sex offenders are at high risk to reoffend,
there is no clear empirical basis for assessing which sex offenders present the most
immediate risk for reoffending. Also, there is no evidence that sex offenders are any more
mentally disordered than general criminal offenders.”).
366. Saleh et al., supra note 344, at 366.
367. Id.
368. See supra notes 339-342 and accompanying text. One researcher has argued that
paraphilias are “taxonomically useless” to identify those sex offenders who would qualify as
SVPs. Hamilton, supra note 22, at 28.
369. See Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 366.
370. See Emily Bazelon, Passive Pedophiles: Are Child Porn Viewers Less Dangerous
than We Thought?, SLATE (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/crime/2013/04/child_pornography_viewers_how_dangerous_are_they.html; see also
BERING, supra note 283, at 174-76 (providing an overview of research findings regarding the
lack of strong correlation between viewing child pornography and engaging in child
molestation). A 2013 study released by the U.S. Sentencing Commission found that one in
three people convicted of possessing child pornography had engaged in acts classified as
“criminal sexually dangerous behavior,” a category that includes “non-contact” crimes such as
voyeurism and exhibitionism, and that the post-sentence sexual recidivism rate of the people so
convicted was 7.4% (3.6% for “contact” offenses), which is lower than the rates for those
specifically convicted of state sex crimes. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL CHILD
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6. ASPD as Alternative Basis of Mental Disorder
Given that diagnoses of paraphilias do not appear, at least in the view of
mainstream psychiatry, to be useful tools for identifying a mental disorder
or abnormality that could be a predictor for a sex offender’s future acts of
sexual violence, the question arises as to whether some other diagnoses
might fit that need. As Dr. First noted in the statement quoted above, many
other diagnoses are, in fact, more strongly associated with sexual violence
than the presence of a mental disorder.371
The diagnosis that is most obviously applicable to those who commit
acts of sexual violence is Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD).372
Indeed, ASPD is a diagnosis that, by definition, could apply to most people
incarcerated in the United States.373 ASPD is often characterized by a
pattern of criminal behavior, including committing sex crimes against
children and nonconsenting adults.374 In the case of sexual offenders, then,
a diagnosis of ASPD indicates that the acts of violence are indicative of a
“pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others”375
rather than the presence of a paraphilia.
There is disagreement within psychiatry about whether personality
disorder diagnoses, particularly ASPD, can support SVP commitments,
either standing alone or in conjunction with one or more paraphilias.376

PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES (REPORT TO CONGRESS) ix, xv (2012), available at http://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/sex-offensetopics/201212-federal-child-pornography-offenses/Full_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
371. First, supra note 312, at 1240; see also supra notes 342-345 and accompanying text.
372. First & Halon, supra note 314, at 448.
373. Studies have estimated that anywhere from 40% to 80% of the male prison
population would meet the ASPD diagnostic criteria. EWING, supra note 34, at 25; First &
Halon, supra note 314, at 448-49; Thomas K. Zander, Civil Commitment Without Psychosis:
The Law’s Reliance on the Weakest Links in Psychodiagnosis, 1 J. SEXUAL OFFENDER CIVIL
COMMITMENT: SCI. & L., 17, 53 (2005), available at http://www.soccjournal.org/200506/zander_2005.pdf.
374. Simon, supra note 79, at 294 (noting empirical findings indicate that “clinicians
diagnose more convicted child molesters with antisocial personality disorder than with
pedophilia”).
375. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 268, at 701.
376. See, e.g., Dean R. Cauley, The Diagnostic Issue of Antisocial Personality Disorder
in Civil Commitment Proceedings: A Response to Declue, 35 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 475
(2007); Gregory DeClue, Paraphilia NOS (nonconsenting) and Antisocial Personality
Disorder, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 495 (2006). A diagnosis of ASPD was usually inadequate
for commitment under the old sexual psychopath laws, which focused on treatment of
offenders, since those with ASPD are not generally regarded as being amenable to treatment;
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Nothing in the Supreme Court’s precedent precludes basing an SVP
commitment on such a diagnosis alone; there is no requirement that a
person have a “sexual” disorder of some kind.377 The diagnosis of ASPD
could apply to a great many rapists and child molesters, some of whom may
also have paraphilias. Untangling such comorbidity, however, is not
straightforward. As a result, it is exceedingly difficult for courts to identify
whether the sexually offending behavior is merely criminal or also partly
caused by a sexual pathology.378 Consequently, it is difficult to separate the
typical recidivist sexual offender from one who suffers from “volitional
impairment,” as required by Crane.
The Supreme Court has never had to consider whether an ASPD
diagnosis, standing alone, would be constitutionally adequate for an SVP
commitment, and courts are divided on this question, since many SVP laws
refer to “personality disorder” as well as mental abnormality.379 The Court’s
opinion in Foucha suggests that ASPD would not be enough for postacquittal commitment since, in Foucha, the acquitee had an “antisocial
personality.”380 ASPD, like other personality disorders, has never been
regarded in criminal law as a volitional impairment sufficient to exempt an
offender from criminal responsibility.381 Indeed, to treat it as such would
call into question the conviction and incarceration of most of this country’s
prison population.382 Furthermore, because ASPD is associated with
“typical” recidivism, SVP commitments based solely upon the disorder
would extend this extraordinary deprivation of liberty to a far greater
segment of the population than substantive due process principles permit.383
rather, the ASPD is seen as a fixed personality feature. First & Halon, supra note 314, at
449.
377. Frances et al., supra note 272, at 381-82. And indeed, this means that an SVP
commitment could theoretically be based upon a diagnosis of substance abuse, mood
disorders, or schizophrenia if some causal link to sexually violent behavior could be made.
Id.
378. See id.
379. EWING, supra note 34, at 25; see also United States v. Wilkinson, 646 F. Supp. 2d
194, 196 (D. Mass 2009) (rejecting use of ASPD as sole predicate mental disorder); In re
Barnes, 689 N.W.2d 455, 459-60 (Iowa 2004) (upholding commitment based upon ASPD
diagnosis alone); In re Adams, 588 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1998) (same).
380. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78-79 (1992).
381. Kent A. Kiehl & Morris B. Hoffman, The Criminal Psychopath: History,
Neuroscience, Treatment, and Economics, 51 JURIMETRICS 355, 368-69 (2011).
382. See supra note 373.
383. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). Despite many calls to revise the
rather circular diagnostic criteria to address many of the resulting problems with its use,
diagnostic criteria for ASPD were left unchanged by the editors of the DSM-5. See, e.g.,
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7. Psychiatry’s Response to SVP Laws and Hendricks-Crane Rationale
The Court’s rationale in Hendricks-Crane assumes that there is a unique
and distinctive pathology among dangerous sex offenders. As argued
above, this assumption has no support in current medical thinking about
either the mental condition of such offenders or the extent to which a
mental health professional can identify those at particularly high risk of
reoffending. In light of this unsettled connection between sexual violence
and psychopathology and the absence of a reliable method for clinicians to
predict future violence, the APA has repeatedly attempted to highlight the
divergence between SVP laws and scientific understanding.
The passage of the initial SVP laws in the early 1990s led the APA to
appoint a Task Force on Sexually Dangerous Offenders.384 The report it
released in 1999 (two years after the Hendricks opinion) was highly critical
of such laws.385 Members of the task force noted that that the “question of
whether all or some sexual offenders are mentally ill is complicated and
controversial”386 and, similarly, that there was no consensus on the degree
to which sex offenders have control over their behavior.387 Certainly, some
offenders have paraphilias, the report acknowledged, but it also noted that
paraphilias occur fairly frequently in those who never commit sex
offenses.388 Personality and substance abuse disorders, it continued, are far
more common in sex offenders than are paraphilias, and, significantly,
these do not usually have “explanatory connection” to the offender’s
behavior.389 In short, the task force report stated, “psychiatric nosology does
Morton Hesse, What Should Be Done with Antisocial Personality Disorder in the New
Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V)?, 8 BMC
MEDICINE 1, 2-4 (2010), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/8/66; see
also DSM-5, supra note 269, at 659; Zander, supra note 373, at 50-57 (reviewing criticisms
of ASPD’s validity). However, the field trials leading to the release of DSM-5 revealed that
the diagnosis has one of the lowest inter-rater reliability ratings (in the “questionable”
range). Bret S. Stetka, A Guide to DSM-5, MEDSCAPE (May 21, 2013), http://
www.medscape.com/viewarticle/803884_2. Some commentators argue that such results
should preclude any use of the disorder in forensic settings. Karen Franklin, DSM-5:
Forensic Applications (Part II of II), IN THE NEWS: FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY, CRIMINOLOGY,
AND PSYCHOLOGY-LAW (May 30, 2013), http://forensicpsychologist.blogspot.com/2013/05/
dsm-5-forensic-applications-part-ii-of.html.
384. APA, DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS, supra note 39, at vii.
385. Id. at viii, 172-76.
386. Id. at 4-5.
387. Id. at 5.
388. Id. at 44.
389. Id. at 9.
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not contribute in a systematic way to clinical understanding or treatment of
sex offenders.”390 The language of the report’s conclusion was strong:
[S]exual predator commitment laws represent a serious assault
on the integrity of psychiatry, particularly with regard to
defining mental illness and the clinical conditions for
compulsory treatment. Moreover, by bending civil commitment
to serve essentially nonmedical purposes, sexual predator
commitment statutes threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the
medical model of commitment.
....
. . . . [The SVP laws] establish a nonmedical definition of
what purports to be a clinical condition without regard to
scientific and clinical knowledge. In so doing, legislators have
used psychiatric commitment to effect nonmedical societal ends
that cannot be openly avowed. . . . [T]his represents an
unacceptable misuse of psychiatry.391
The APA asserted the inability of psychiatrists to predict future violence
in its brief in Hendricks, but it was not the first time for the organization to
do so. In the 1983 case Barefoot v. Estelle, in which the Supreme Court
upheld the admissibility of psychiatric evidence on the issue of future
dangerousness in a death penalty case,392 the APA had stated in its amicus
brief that “‘[t]he unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term future
dangerousness is by now an established fact within the profession.’”393 As it
did again years later in Hendricks, the Supreme Court rejected the cautions
of the mental health profession and left in place laws and practices whose
legitimacy hinges on the profession’s ability to predict future conduct.394
Although the APA is the world’s largest organization of professional
psychiatrists and its official statements reflect the opinions of many in the
profession,395 there are dissenting views in psychiatry with respect to the
role of psychopathology in sexual violence. Indeed, there are segments of
390. Id.
391. Id. at 173-74 (emphasis added).
392. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-99 (1983), superseded by statute on other
grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2012).
393. Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 12).
394. Id. at 899.
395. About APA & Psychiatry, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.psychiatry.org/
about-apa--psychiatry (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
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the mental health profession that support the SVP laws and provide the
research and expert testimony supporting the commitment of individuals. I
provide examples of their views and opinions in the two sections that
follow.
Mental health professionals who support the SVP laws are primarily
treatment providers who specialize in treating sex offenders, including
those who work in state SVP programs, outside of the correctional or
criminal setting.396 As one researcher has noted, this context can distort
treatment providers’ views of such offenders, leading the providers to
assume a degree of specialization in offenders’ behavior that those treated
experience “deviant sexual arousal, which, if not treated, will result in
future sex crimes.”397 Because these treatment providers lack expertise in
criminological research, the mental health policies they promote continue to
be based on misplaced assumptions about those who commit sex crimes—
in particular, the notion that such offenders are “mentally disordered,
treatable, dangerous (if not treated), and at high risk to reoffend with
another sex crime.”398
It is not surprising that mental health professionals have differing views
on SVP laws because of differences in their training, experience, and
employment positions. The concern raised here, however, is with the
existence of the debate itself, with its sharply divergent positions among
those within the mental health field. Specifically, there is a vast discrepancy
between, on the one hand, the standard nosology of the psychiatric
profession and steadfast position of its primary organizations and, on the
other hand, the role assumed for and assigned to psychiatry in the SVP
laws. The SVP laws set up a complex relationship between mental health
professionals and the legal system. And, as we will see in the section that
follows, although courts have increasingly relied on psychiatric expertise in
396. Simon, supra note 79, at 277. While three of five of the amicus briefs submitted in
Hendricks on behalf of mental health associations supported striking down the law (the
American Psychiatric Association, the Washington Psychiatric Association, and the National
Mental Health Association), the two who supported the law were directly involved with the
treatment of sex offenders, including the Menninger Foundation, which operated a
psychiatric hospital in Kansas at the time, and which was joined on the brief by a series of
“victims’ rights” and law-and-order organizations such as the New York Chapter of Parents
of Murdered Children, Protecting Our Children, People Against Violent Crime, and Victims
Outreach, Inc. Felhouse & Simon, supra note 339, at 2. Apparently, significant portions of
the majority opinion in Hendricks were drawn from the Menninger Foundation’s amicus
brief. Id.
397. Simon, supra note 79, at 279.
398. Id. at 278.
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SVP proceedings to support individual commitments, much scientific
understanding of the causes and prediction of violent sexual behavior has
become, in the process, highly distorted.
B. Pathologizing Predators in the Courtroom
Both the state legislatures that developed the SVP laws and the Supreme
Court in upholding them have always assumed that mental health
professionals would play a central role in SVP proceedings. Their specific
assumption was that these professionals would offer opinions regarding the
risk of recidivism posed by particular individuals due to the presence of a
mental abnormality or disorder that impaired their ability to refrain from
committing acts of sexual violence. Indeed, courts and lawmakers have
regarded these professional opinions as indispensable because laypersons
are limited in their ability to identify mental conditions and to understand a
condition’s potential relationship to volitional impairment.399 As discussed
in the preceding section, however, there is scant scientific foundation for
such assessments or predictions by mental health professionals, nor is there
anything in psychiatric classification that corresponds to or otherwise
supports the crucial SVP concept of the “sexual predator.” These wellattested difficulties have not prevented state prosecutors from offering
mental health expert testimony in support of SVP petitions; and most courts
readily admit such testimony, even over strenuous objections from defense
counsel, who often cite the controversies discussed above.400 Maintaining
the role of expert evidence to support commitments in SVP proceedings has
required a distortion of psychiatric understanding. It has also required a
severe compromise of core values and practices of our justice systems.401
One significant question in the implementation of SVP laws is what
minimum degree of risk of future dangerousness can serve as a basis for
indefinite detention.402 The Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas held that
a state may involuntarily commit a mentally ill individual using a “clear and

399. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002); Boerner, supra note 58, at 570.
400. See infra notes 413-604 and accompanying text.
401. Finkel, supra note 100, at 243 (explaining how “the worst of times,” including the
occurrence of horrible crimes, operates like a hydraulic pressure which can “distort clear
concepts and bend established principles, as well as foreshorten perspective such that
history's lessons no longer help frame current issues”); see also 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL.,
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 11:23 (2011-2012 ed.).
402. See Jefferson C. Knighton et al., How Likely Is “Likely to Reoffend” in Sex Offender
Civil Commitment Trials?, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 293-98 (2014) (reviewing risk
thresholds in SVP laws and their implementation).
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convincing evidence” standard.403 This is a lower threshold of proof than
the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard usually reserved for the criminal
context.404 One of the rationales of the lower threshold, notwithstanding the
liberty interest at stake, is the relative imprecision of psychiatric evidence,
which generally serves as the primary proof offered in support of such
commitments.405 The Addington Court explained the rationale for this
reduced burden of proof in involuntary commitment cases:
Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either
himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the
meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert
psychiatrists and psychologists. Given the lack of certainty and
the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question
as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.
....
The subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render
certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations. . . .
Psychiatric diagnosis . . . is to a large extent based on medical
‘impressions' drawn from subjective analysis and filtered
through the experience of the diagnostician.406
Understandably, some commentators have argued that the very fact that
psychiatric diagnoses are imprecise and ambiguous suggests that only the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard will adequately ensure fairness and
due process in commitment proceedings.407 However, the Addington Court
held it constitutionally acceptable for states to use a lower standard of proof
because of the limitations and objectives of involuntary hospitalization:
such commitment, the Court maintained, was limited to people with severe
mental illness who pose a danger to themselves or others, and employing a
higher standard of proof could “erect an unreasonable barrier to needed
medical treatment.”408 Such reasoning, of course, has only limited
application in the SVP context, where public safety, not treatment, is the
403. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427-33 (1979). See generally Alexander Tsesis,
Due Process in Civil Commitments, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253 (2011).
404. Addington, 441 U.S. at 422.
405. Id. at 432-33.
406. Id. at 429-30.
407. Tsesis, supra note 403, at 282-300.
408. Addington, 441 U.S. at 432.
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foremost objective. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court recently reiterated that
the intermediate standard of proof in civil involuntary commitment
proceedings meets due process requirements, even for indefinite
commitment of SVPs.409
To date, no Supreme Court decision has clarified precisely how
dangerous to himself or others a person must be to satisfy that standard for
involuntary commitment. The concept of dangerousness is itself quite
vague and subject to a range of conceptualizations and analyses.410 For
example, if a fact-finder is asked to conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt”
that an individual is “likely” to commit future acts of sexual violence (the
typical standard set by legislators in SVP laws), it is not clear whether the
fact finder must have no reasonable doubt that there is at least a 35%, 50%,
or 75% chance the defendant will reoffend.411 The danger of securing
involuntary commitments on such uncertain grounds only compounds the
significant problems presented by evidence admitted to support the central
determination in SVP proceedings: whether the offender is “a sexually
violent predator.”
1. One Example of the Distortions: McGee v. Bartow
The language in the Supreme Court’s opinions in Hendricks and Crane
confers broad discretion on lawmakers to devise the specific terms used to
meet the due process requirement of a mental condition for involuntary
civil commitment.412 The language also encouraged experimentation and
diverse approaches by legislatures and courts in regard to the
implementation of the SVP laws. A 2010 opinion of the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, McGee v. Bartow, demonstrates the troubling
implications of the Supreme Court’s deference to lawmakers.413
Michael McGee was committed in Wisconsin courts under that state’s
SVP statute, which was adopted in 1994 and modeled closely on
409. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 129-30 (2010) (upholding the SVP
provisions of the Adam Walsh Act against a range of constitutional challenges).
410. See generally Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for
Predictions of Dangerousness in Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 33 (1997); Knighton et al., supra note 402, at 293-98; Shoba Sreenivasan et al.,
Expert Testimony in Sexually Violent Predator Commitments: Conceptualizing Legal
Standards of “Mental Disorder” and “Likely to Reoffend”, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 471, 477-78 (2003); Frederick E. Vars, Delineating Sexual Dangerousness, 50 HOUS. L.
REV. 855, 860-72 (2013).
411. See Finkel, supra note 100, at 259.
412. See supra notes 138-173 and accompanying text.
413. McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2010).
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Washington’s.414 Having exhausted his direct appeals for release through
state courts, McGee then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the federal
district court.415 McGee had to meet a particularly high standard to prevail
on his petition, namely, that his continued detention was in violation of
federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, rather than simply in violation
of the applicable state law.416
McGee’s only criminal conviction and sentencing had been in 1987,
when he was convicted of burglary and the sexual assault of a woman
during the course of the burglary.417 He served five years in prison and was
released on parole.418 In 1992, while on parole, he was accused of two more
sexual assaults, had his parole revoked, and served out the remaining three
years of his sentence.419 Neither of the two subsequent allegations of sexual
assault, one by a woman and another involving an adolescent male, led to a
conviction.420 The state then filed a petition to commit McGee under the
Wisconsin SVP law.421 He was committed in 1995 based on a jury verdict
but released in 1999 when the commitment was reversed on a finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel.422 His attorney had failed to discover
important evidence that could have undermined the credibility of the two
accusers from the 1992 allegations.423 A year later, in 2000, he was
rearrested for failing a drug test and having contact with one of the alleged
1992 victims. The state sought to commit him again.424
At the bench trial during this second commitment hearing, the state
based its case largely upon the testimony of two forensic psychologists. 425
One was a Department of Corrections psychologist, Dr. Caton Roberts, who
opined that McGee had a “personality disorder NOS [Not Otherwise
Specified] with antisocial features” and “was substantially probable to
reoffend sexually if not detained and treated.”426 Roberts based his opinion,
not on a clinical examination of McGee, but on “fifteen hours of review of
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. at 571-72.
Id. at 558-59.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 558-59.
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 559-60.
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Mr. McGee’s record.”427 The second expert to testify was Dr. Cynthia
Marsh, who diagnosed McGee with “[P]araphilia NOS-nonconsent” and
Personality Disorder NOS with antisocial features.428 Her diagnosis was
also based only upon a review of records.429 Specifically, Marsh testified
that she based her diagnosis primarily on Mr. McGee’s “history,” including
the contested 1992 allegations, and that she employed three actuarial riskassessment tools.430 From these, she concluded that McGee was “much
more likely than not to reoffend in a sexually violent manner.”431
McGee’s attorneys argued on appeal that the diagnoses that served as the
bases for satisfying the “mental illness” requirement were insufficient as a
matter of due process.432 Specifically, they alleged that the diagnoses used
were not generally accepted as being either valid or reliable within
psychiatry (as noted earlier, the paraphilia category “nonconsent” invoked
by Marsh had in fact been explicitly rejected by the APA) and that the
labels did not have any standardized diagnostic criteria.433
There was little case law upon which the Court of Appeals could
evaluate such arguments. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit panel devised a
specific standard for evaluating the constitutional adequacy of a diagnosis
used to commit an individual. To prove that use of a diagnosis violated due
process principles, the panel held, a petitioner must demonstrate that the
diagnosis was “devoid of content, or . . . near-universal in its rejection by
mental health professionals.”434 The panel later restated the standard as
being a determination of whether the diagnosis was “empty of scientific
pedigree.”435
In explaining the standard, the panel devoted a considerable amount of
the opinion to reviewing the text of the DSM and noted the editors’
cautions about using the manual in the forensic context, particularly by
“untrained individuals” (most likely referring to lawyers and judges), to
answer ultimate questions.436 The panel also noted that, while nothing in
Supreme Court precedent expressly requires a valid DSM diagnosis as a
prerequisite to a SVP commitment, such diagnostic labels could be useful
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

Id. at 559.
Id. at 560, 574.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 578.
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tools when applied with “prudence and caution.”437 However, the court did
not explain what such prudence and caution involved or how its own
application of the DSM’s text demonstrated such qualities. Indeed, the
panel noted the broad discretion the Hendricks Court conferred to states to
develop their own definitions of mental abnormality without referencing
medical terminology.438 The panel then concluded that neither the absence
of a specific diagnosis from the DSM’s text nor the existence of robust
controversy about the diagnosis among mental health professionals was a
basis to disregard such a diagnostic label entirely.439 Rather, the panel held,
such facts bear only on the weight to be assigned to the label as part of the
overall fact finding, not on its admissibility as evidence.440 In short, a
heated debate within the field regarding a diagnostic label’s validity and
reliability is not enough to exclude it from serving as a basis for indefinite
detention.
The McGee opinion illustrates many of the key problems with the role of
psychiatric evidence in SVP proceedings and demonstrates the fundamental
flaw in the Supreme Court’s assumption that such testimony would prevent
SVP laws from sweeping too broadly. McGee’s primary challenge was to
the state’s experts’ reliance on a set of diagnoses that were scientifically
controversial and did not reflect any settled scientific understanding. The
experts’ opinions in McGee reveal a range of additional concerns seen in
other reported SVP cases, including basing opinions on inadmissible facts
and data—such as uncharged alleged criminal conduct, rather than on
clinical examinations—and using actuarial risk assessment tools.
An examination of prosecution experts’ opinions about the likelihood of
future acts of sexual violence in SVP proceedings reveals that they are
based largely upon the respondent’s past behavior (alleged as well as
proven) rather than, as required by the Hendricks-Crane rationale, an
individualized medical assessment.441 This is because mental health
professionals, in attempting to assess whether a person is likely to commit
acts of sexual violence due to a volitional impairment stemming from a
mental disorder, have little else but past behavior to go on in the absence of
scientific guidance for making such an assessment, as explained in Part
III.A. above. But, as a result, they predict future behavior based upon past
behavior the same way we all do, and not upon any particular expertise.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

Id. at 579.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 581.
See infra notes 490-511 and accompanying text.
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The perpetuation of these unreliable and misleading practices is facilitated
by courts’ reluctance to assert their role as “gatekeepers” with regard to
such expert testimony.
2. Misuse of Diagnostic Labels
A core role of the diagnoses in SVP proceedings is to explain the basis
for an expert’s overall assessment that the respondent is likely to commit
future acts of sexual violence. This stems from the statutory requirement,
given central importance in the Supreme Court’s due process analysis in
Hendricks and Crane, that the defendant have an identifiable “mental
disorder”442 or “mental abnormality.”443 Although paraphilia diagnoses
have a limited role in the clinical setting and, as stressed above, are highly
controversial within the field of psychiatry generally, they enjoy broad
acceptance in courts conducting SVP proceedings.444 As other
commentators have noted, there is an established history of presenting
psychiatric evidence of specific forms of psychopathology in support of
involuntary commitment—for example, schizophrenia and other disorders
characterized by psychosis.445 SVP commitment, by contrast, is generally
based upon diagnoses, such as pedophilia and ASPD, that are “among the
most controversial, and that have the most questionable validity, of all the
mental disorders in the DSM.”446 As discussed above, the DSM's language
regarding paraphilias is itself the product of negotiation and public relations
management, and is subject to a range of interpretations.
If used in a manner consistent with the DSM editors’ intentions, the
diagnosis of a “paraphilia” addresses only the (abnormal) circumstances
that occasion sexual arousal; it does not indicate an impaired ability to
refrain from acting on the desires involved. Because existing DSM
diagnoses have limited use for identifying the reference of the forensic term
“sexual predator,” some experts testifying on behalf of states in SVP
proceedings offer alternative presumptively “diagnostic” labels that either
strain the DSM criteria’s language beyond its intended clinical application
or fall outside of the diagnostic scheme entirely.447 In so doing, as in
McGee, the experts essentially pathologize past criminal conduct.
442. McGee, 593 F.3d at 573.
443. Id. at 580-81.
444. See supra notes 282-338 and accompanying text; see infra notes 450-489 and
accompanying text.
445. See, e.g., Zander, supra note 373, at 18-19.
446. Id. at 72.
447. EWING, supra note 34, at 24.
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The questionable nature of invoking such strained diagnoses in
prosecuting SVP cases is compounded when the catchall “NOS” (not
otherwise specified) categories are invoked or when forensic experts
dispense altogether with the DSM’s criteria.448 With regard to NOS
diagnoses in SVP proceedings, one commenter has observed: “Paraphilia
NOS is a ‘proxy’ for the rejected diagnosis of paraphilic coercive disorder,
and has offered legislators and mental health professionals carte blanche to
invent criteria by which to deprive sex offenders of their freedom after they
have completed their sentences.”449
The psychiatric validity of SVP diagnoses is put in further doubt by their
inconsistent use in courts. A survey of the reports of psychiatric experts in
twenty-eight SVP cases conducted by Dr. Allan Frances, one of the editors
of DSM-IV, found that, while government experts usually gave an initial
diagnosis of Paraphilia-NOS, defense experts usually did not.450 Dr.
Frances concludes that the diagnosis was, in his word, “justified” in only
two of those cases whereas, in the other twenty-six cases, the respondents’
“sexual offenses had been opportunistic crimes forming part of a pattern of
generalized criminal behavior, very often facilitated by substance
intoxication.”451 Government evaluators, Dr. Frances observes, seemed to
base the Paraphilia-NOS diagnosis not on an overall pattern of behavior
suggestive of fundamental pathology but only or primarily on the fact of
prior conviction for sexual crimes.452 Several other studies of psychiatric
reports have also noted strong geographic variation in the rates at which
various diagnoses (for example, paraphilia-NOS as compared to pedophilia)
are used to support SVP petitions.453 Variability of this kind casts further
448. Id.; see also Allan Frances & Michael B. First, Paraphilia NOS, Nonconsent: Not
Ready for the Courtroom, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 555, 555-60 (2011). The initial
idea behind the “Paraphilia NOS” label or diagnosis—which is used almost exclusively in
SVP proceedings—has been credited to Dennis Doren, the lead forensic evaluator in
Wisconsin’s SVP program. Good & Burstein, supra note 84, at 27-28.
449. Allan Frances, DSM-5 Rejects Coercive Paraphilia, PSYCH. TODAY (May 26, 2011),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/dsm5-in-distress/201105/dsm-5-rejects-coercive-para
philia.
450. Allan Frances, My Review of 28 Sexually Violent Predator Cases, PSYCH. TODAY
(Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/dsm5-in-distress/201203/my-rev
iew-28-sexually-violent-predator-cases.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. See, e.g., Shan Jumper et al., Diagnostic Profiles of Civilly Committed Sexual
Offenders in Illinois and Other Reporting Jurisdictions: What We Know So Far, 56 INT’L. J.
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 838, 845 (2012) (finding that pedophilia was
diagnosed in persons targeted for commitment under Illinois’s law at a “significantly higher
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doubt on the independent reliability, or scientifically objective validity, of
such diagnoses and has further fueled the significant ethical concerns within
psychiatry about the forensic use of Paraphilia-NOS diagnoses.454
As seen in McGee, even where a court is made aware that an examiner’s
use of a psychiatric diagnosis is patently inconsistent with the DSM’s
language and commentary within the psychiatric field, the court is unlikely
to reject the use of the diagnosis as a basis for satisfying the mental disorder
or abnormality requirement for SVP commitment.455 The McGee court
squarely acknowledged that there was “heated professional debate” about
using the diagnostic label Paraphilia NOS Nonconsent456 and that McGee’s
position that “the consensus professional view that [such] . . . diagnosis is

rate” (59%) than those in proceedings in Minnesota, Texas, Wisconsin, and Florida, that
Paraphilia-NOS was diagnosed in Illinois more frequently (51%) than in Wisconsin (37.5%),
and that fifty-six percent of sex offenders in SVP proceedings in Arizona have been
diagnosed with Paraphilia NOS and nearly two-thirds with Pedophilia). The jurisdictions
included in the study were: Illinois, Texas, Florida, Wisconsin, Washington, California,
Arizona, and Minnesota. The study included all persons targeted for commitment since the
“vast majority” of those detained for commitment under the statute are eventually
committed. Id. at 842; see also Richard W. Elwood et al., Diagnostic and Risk Profiles of
Men Detained Under Wisconsin's Sexually Violent Person Law, 54 INT’L. J. OFFENDER
THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 187, 193 (2010) (concluding that pedophilia was
diagnosed in Wisconsin at a higher rate than in Florida but at a lower rate than in
Washington or Arizona); Julia E. McLawsen et al., Civilly Committed Sex Offenders: A
Description and Interstate Comparison of Populations, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 453,
461 (2012) (analyzing diagnostic trends under Nebraska’s SVP law).
454. See, e.g., Allen Frances, Rape, Psychiatry, and Constitutional Rights: Hard Cases
Make for Very Bad Law, PSYCHOL. TODAY (June 28, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.
com/blog/dsm5-in-distress/201006/rape-psychiatry-and-constitutional-rights (“The most
disturbing turbulence at the boundary between psychiatry and the law is the misuse of a
makeshift psychiatric diagnosis (‘Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified, nonconsent’) to justify
the involuntary, indefinite psychiatric commitment of rapists. This is a disguised form of
preventive detention (often for life), a violation of due process, and an abuse of
psychiatry.”); see also First & Halon, supra note 314, at 444 (“We contend that, during the
process of adjudication of SVP commitment trials, profound and avoidable errors are made
by some mental health professionals who invalidly diagnose paraphilia, assert that there is
volitional impairment based solely on the fact that the offender has a paraphilia diagnosis,
and thus wrongly claim that the statutorily defined SVP commitment criteria are adequately
addressed by the clinical diagnoses.”); Good & Burstein, supra note 84, at 24-28 (criticizing
the use of “fictitious mental disorders” by forensic evaluators testifying in SVP
proceedings); Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 369 (“Force-fitting a diagnosis or creating a
new DSM diagnosis to justify commitment is clearly unethical for psychologists.”).
455. See generally Hamilton, supra note 22, at 40-51.
456. McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 579-81 (7th Cir. 2010).
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invalid” is “not without support in the professional literature.”457 It even
noted that the lack of diagnostic standards for the label “results in poor
diagnostic reliability.”458 Nevertheless, the court denied McGee’s claim that
his commitment, based upon such contested diagnoses, amounted to a
violation of his due process rights.459 In denying his claim, the court
concluded that the fact that the use of the label found some support in the
medical literature took it outside the realm of a diagnosis “empty of
scientific pedigree” or “near-universal” in rejection.460
Several courts have faced similar questions about the admissibility of
opinions that include diagnostic labels attached to the catchall “Paraphilia
NOS.” In addition to the Paraphilia NOS-nonconsent label seen in McGee
and other cases,461 another such label created and used almost exclusively
by prosecution experts in SVP proceedings is “paraphilia NOS, hebephilia,”
a term used to indicate sexual interest in adolescents.462 “Pedophilia,” under
the DSM’s criteria, can only be applied to those who have persistent sexual
interest in children under the age of fourteen.463 Like “nonconsent,” the
term “hebephilia” appears nowhere in the DSM, and there is no disorder
recognized in the manual for sexual interest in teens.464 In United States v.
Carta,465 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed a district
court’s denial of a commitment petition brought under the Adam Walsh
Act. The district court had ruled that “Paraphilia NOS-Hebephilia,” which
was one of the labels for the respondent’s mental abnormality offered in
support of the government’s petition, was not generally recognized as a

457. Id. at 580.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 581.
460. Id.
461. See, e.g., Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2010) (reaching same
conclusion in appeal raising same due process claim as in McGee where state’s testifying
expert admitted that the “clinical indicators” he used to arrive at the paraphilia NOSNonconsent diagnosis did not appear in the DSM and were not accepted by any professional
organization).
462. For critical and detailed examinations of the development and use of this label in
SVP proceedings, see generally Allen Frances & Michael B. First, Hebephilia Is Not a
Mental Disorder in DSM-IV-TR and Should Not Become One in DSM-5, 39 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCH. & L. 78 (2011); Karen Franklin, Hebephilia: Quintessence of Diagnostic
Pretextuality, 28 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 751 (2010).
463. DSM-5, supra note 269, at 697 (the disorder is now referred to as “Pedophilic
Disorder”).
464. Franklin, supra note 462, at 760-61.
465. United States v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 2010).
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serious mental illness that could support an involuntary commitment.466 The
disorder was characterized by the government’s testifying expert as a
“sexual preference for young teens . . . till about age seventeen.”467 In
reversing such ruling, the appeals court acknowledged that the DSM
contains no reference to hebephilia or a sexual interest in teens but reasoned
that the specific diagnosis offered in support of the commitment in that case
was simply “Paraphilia NOS,” which does appear in the DSM, and that the
government’s expert had used the term “hebephilia” as a way to describe
the object of the respondent’s fixation, namely adolescents.468 It also held
that, in any event, the “serious mental illness” requirement of the SVP
statute “is not limited to either the consensus of the medical community or
to maladies identified in the DSM.”469
Most courts, when presented with testimony from a government witness
applying a label that purports to be an expansion on the catchall ParaphiliaNOS as central evidence of the respondent’s “mental illness or
abnormality,” have admitted and based commitments on such evidence.
They have done so even where the respondent’s expert directly challenged
466. United States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210, 217 (D. Mass. 2009), rev’d and
remanded by 592 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2010).
467. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Another judge in the District of
Massachusetts also excluded expert testimony based upon a “hebephilia” diagnosis. See
United States v. Shields, No. 07-12056-PBS, 2008 WL 544940, at *2 (D. Mass. Feb. 26,
2008) (ruling that “hebephilia” could not in itself serve as a serious mental disorder for
purpose of commitment under the Adam Walsh Act and that there was insufficient evidence
of the applicability of Paraphilia-NOS in that case). However, that same judge later admitted
evidence of a hebephilia diagnosis, based upon the appeals court opinion in Carta. See
United States v. Wetmore, 766 F. Supp. 2d 319, 331 (D. Mass. 2011) (basing commitment,
in part, on expert testimony of “paraphilia not otherwise specified, characterized by
hebephilia”).
468. Carta, 592 F.3d at 41. On remand, Carta was committed after a seven-day trial.
United States v. Carta, No. 07-12064-PBS, 2011 WL 2680734, at *25 (D. Mass. July 7,
2011). The district court’s ruling was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Carta, 690 F.3d 1,
8 (1st Cir. 2012).
469. Carta, 690 F.3d at 4; see also United States v. Caporale, 701 F.3d 128, 136-37 (4th
Cir. 2012) (adopting reasoning in the First Circuit’s 2010 Carta opinion). By contrast, while
the court in United States v. Neuhauser admitted testimony that the respondent should be
committed based upon a diagnosis of hebephilia, it later concluded that, in light of the fact
that “a large number of clinical psychologists believe [it] is not a diagnosis at all, at least for
forensic purposes,” it was “inappropriate” to base a commitment upon such diagnosis. No.
5:07-HC-2101-BO, 2012 WL 174363, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 2012). The court also
observed in its opinion: “It is important to note that Mr. Neuhauser's sexual orientation
toward pubescent boys, which he openly admitted in his testimony is, standing alone,
insufficient to justify his civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Act.” Id. at *3.
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the scientific basis for using such a label and testified about the
considerable controversy about it within psychiatry.470 One New Jersey
Superior Court opinion noted that the state’s expert had acknowledged that
the Paraphilia-NOS diagnosis is used by examiners “‘in order to code for
rape or coercive or non-consent sex’”; the commitment was nonetheless
affirmed on appeal.471 Some courts adopt the reasoning in Carta: the fact
that “Paraphilia-NOS” itself is in the DSM (albeit without criteria
established or confirmed by research or field trials) is sufficient to permit a
prosecution expert to claim any form of persistent sexual interest not
described in the DSM as appropriately falling under that catchall label.472
As noted earlier, some prosecutors have attempted to meet the “mental
disorder or abnormality” requirement of an SVP statute with a diagnosis of
Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD),473 and respondents frequently
challenge such use under the holding and analysis in Foucha.474 For
example, in Brown v. Watters, a federal court habeas case brought by a man
committed under Wisconsin’s SVP law, the respondent presented expert
testimony to challenge the ASPD diagnosis used by the state’s expert
witness.475 Specifically, his forensic psychiatrist testified that ASPD is a
“‘circular diagnosis’ that is ‘descriptive of many criminals, but doesn't
really tell [an evaluator] much,’” and that “the psychiatric profession does
not generally view individuals with ASPD ‘as people who have serious
difficulty in controlling their behavior.’”476 The district and appeals courts
concluded that, as with the controversies regarding paraphilias, a fact finder
470. See, e.g., In re Hutchcroft, No. 11-1838, slip op. at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 31,
2012); New York v. Shannon S., 980 N.E.2d 510, 512-15 (N.Y. 2012); In re Lieberman, 955
N.E.2d 118, 134-35 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); In re A.M., 2010 ND 163, ¶¶ 8-14, 787 N.W.2d
752, 756-58; see also Lieberman v. Kirby, No. 10 C 2570, 2011 WL 6131176, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. 2011); cf. United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1159 (D. Haw. 2008)
(concluding that paraphilia NOS-hebephilia is a mental disorder but was not a “serious
mental disorder” in the respondent’s case for purposes of commitment under the Adam
Walsh Act).
471. In re D.X.B., 2006 WL 488641, slip op. at 4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 2,
2006); see also United States v. Graham, 683 F. Supp. 2d 129, 141-46 (D. Mass. 2010)
(noting that, notwithstanding the significant controversy regarding the validity of the
diagnosis “Paraphilia NOS: nonconsent,” it could be an appropriate diagnosis in some
cases).
472. See, e.g., Shannon S., 980 N.E.2d at 514; In re Hutchcroft, No. 11-1838, slip op. at
*3.
473. See supra notes 372-383 and accompanying text.
474. See, e.g., Adams v. Bartow, 330 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2003).
475. Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 614 (7th Cir. 2010).
476. Id. at 607 (alteration in original).
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may consider such differing views when determining the weight to be
assigned to the diagnosis, but the existence of debate within the psychiatric
community does not itself provide a basis to exclude a diagnosis.477
Courts do differ, however, in their treatment of ASPD diagnoses as bases
for SVP commitment. For example, a federal district court judge in
Massachusetts rejected the use of ASPD as the predicate mental disorder in
an SVP case brought under the Adam Walsh Act. In United States v.
Wilkinson, the court denied the Government’s petition (the respondent was
nearing the end of a sixteen-year sentence for being a felon in possession of
a firearm, and two of his sex crimes had occurred twenty-five years prior or
longer) and concluded: “The government has not proven that Antisocial
Personality Disorder alone ever causes a person to have serious difficulty in
controlling his conduct. In essence, the evidence indicates that individuals
with severe forms of that disorder may often make unlawful choices, but
they are able to control their conduct.”478 Significantly here, the court had
conducted a careful review of the literature regarding ASPD and SVP
proceedings and concluded that there was little support for an SVP
commitment on that diagnosis alone, without some additional finding of a
sexual disorder indicating limited volitional control.479 Indeed, given that
studies estimate a large majority of the prison population at any given time
could be diagnosed with ASPD, using ASPD as the sole predicate diagnosis
would violate the limitations required in Crane that the individual subject to
the SVP commitment not be a “typical recidivist” but someone with an
identifiable pathology affecting volitional control of sexual violence.480
Where a government expert in an SVP proceeding bases an opinion on a
DSM paraphilia diagnosis such as pedophilia, notwithstanding the DSM
editors’ clarifying statements to the contrary, he or she often bases such
diagnoses largely upon a respondent’s past criminal behavior or other
477. Id. at 612-14. The Seventh Circuit also concluded that the respondent had misread
the holding on Foucha and that in any event Crane provided the key authority on the
question of the adequacy of a diagnosis in an SVP commitment proceeding. Id. at 613. Mr.
Brown was also unsuccessful on his claim that the state should be judicially estopped from
using ASPD as a basis for commitment where state law precludes a criminal defendant from
using the diagnosis as a basis for an insanity defense. Id. at 615-16.
478. 646 F. Supp. 2d 194, 196 (D. Mass 2009).
479. Id. at 202-08; accord State v. Donald DD., 21 N.E.3d 239, 249-51 (N.Y. 2014)
(holding that an SVP commitment may not be based solely upon a history of sexual crimes
and a diagnosis of ASPD because the diagnosis “establishes only a general tendency toward
criminality, and has no necessary relationship to a difficulty in controlling one's sexual
behavior”).
480. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002); Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 368.
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conduct rather than (or even in the absence of) evidence of persistent,
intense urges or fantasies.481 In these situations, “legal criteria for a crime
and the psychiatric criteria for mental disorder tend to converge,” which
runs counter to the DSM editors’ caution that social deviance in itself
should not be thought to constitute a mental disorder.482 The editors of
DSM-IV attempted to limit the forensic implications of the paraphilias by
stating in an editorial that assigning a diagnosis based solely on a person’s
criminal history was incorrect: “Defining paraphilia based on acts alone
blurs the distinction between mental disorder and ordinary criminality.
Decisions regarding possible lifelong psychiatric commitment should not be
made based on a misreading of a poorly worded DSM-IV criterion item.”483
As discussed below, the editors’ recommendation that this confusion be
alleviated through text revisions in the DSM-5 went unheeded.484
Aside from the DSM editors’ cautionary statements, there is a significant
additional reason to question testifying experts’ diagnostic impressions
using labels such as ASPD or Paraphilia-NOS in SVP proceedings. The
results of studies of “inter-rater reliability” (the likelihood that two experts
will arrive at the same diagnosis when evaluating the same offender) in the
SVP context are unsettling. A study of evaluators applying DSM criteria to
those identified for commitment under Florida’s SVP law revealed a
reliability level in the “poor” range; this result was consistent with earlier
studies of SVP evaluators.485 The author of the Florida study attributes the
481. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 368.
482. Wakefield, supra note 297, at 202. The practice of basing diagnoses of paraphilia
solely on past criminal behavior has met with mixed responses from courts, generally
depending upon the extent to which the defense expert convincingly explains the error in
interpretation and application of the DSM criteria or upon whether or not the court, for
whatever reasons, exercises discretion in following the DSM. See, e.g., United States v.
Springer, 715 F.3d 535, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of SVP petition despite
testimony of government experts that respondent had pedophilia based upon his prior sexual
acts with children).
483. Michael B. First & Allen Frances, Issues for DSM-V: Unintended Consequences of
Small Changes: The Case of Paraphilias, 165 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1240, 1240 (2008), available
at http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/doi/abs/10.1176/appi.ajp.2008.08030361?url_ver=Z39.88-20
03&rfr_id=ori%3Arid%3Acrossref.org&rfr_dat=cr_pub%3Dpubmed; see also Frances, DSM5 Writing Mistakes Will Cause Great Confusion, supra note 322 (noting that the use of “or” in
the DSM-IV-TR B Criterion is his “greatest regret” about that edition because “[t]his one
stupid slip contributed to the unconstitutional preventive detention of thousands of sex
offenders”).
484. See infra notes 610-625 and accompanying text.
485. Jill S. Levenson, Reliability of Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment Criteria
in Florida, 28 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 357, 363-64 (2004).
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findings both to “[e]valuator bias” and, more significantly, to the fact that
“practitioners are faced with diagnostic criteria that contradict both
empirical research and clinical conceptualization.”486 Similarly, the authors
of a 2013 study of 375 SVP evaluations conducted in New Jersey found
low reliability, that is, only “poor to fair agreement” among clinicians as to
the presence of the paraphilias and other disorders on which the
commitments were based.487 The authors remarked that such high levels of
inconsistency are a “widespread issue” across states and diagnostic
categories.488 What one commentator calls the DSM’s “idiosyncrasies and
shortcomings” have a significant impact on the reliability of expert opinion
offered in SVP proceedings and, thereby, on the justification of the
indefinite commitment of respondents.489
3. Basing Opinions on Records and Inadmissible Evidence
The opinions of the prosecution experts who testified in McGee were not
derived from methods and sources of information generally associated with
sound and reliable medical assessments. The experts testified as to their
diagnostic opinions of Mr. McGee and their assessments of his volitional
impairment solely on the basis of information compiled and furnished to
them by government attorneys without ever having examined the
respondent.490 Such practices are common in SVP proceedings, often
because the respondent refuses to be examined.491 Government experts, in
such cases, typically review criminal investigation reports and alleged
victims’ statements492 (including information that would be inadmissible in

486. Id. at 366. Other studies have generally documented the extent to which diagnostic
assessment by mental health professionals exhibits unconscious biases and the operation of
other cognitive mechanisms that can lead to distorted opinions. See generally CAROL TAVRIS
& ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): WHY WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH
BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS 97-126 (2007).
487. Anthony D. Perillo et al., Examining the Scope of Questionable Diagnostic
Reliability in Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Evaluations, 37 INT’L. J. L. & PSYCHIATRY
190, 193-95 (2014).
488. Id. at 196.
489. Levenson, supra note 485, at 366.
490. McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 559-60 (7th Cir. 2010).
491. Colleen D. Duffy, The Admissibility of Expert Opinion and the Bases of Expert
Opinion in Sex Offender Civil Management Trials in New York, 75 ALB. L. REV. 763, 774
(2012).
492. See Rebecca L. Jackson et al., The Adequacy and Accuracy of Sexually Violent
Predator Evaluations: Contextualized Risk Assessment in Clinical Practice, 3 INT’L J.
FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 115, 125 (2004).
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a criminal proceeding493) and utilize these accounts of conduct to identify
“symptoms.”494 Other mental health professionals have condemned such
practice by forensic psychiatrists as a specific violation of professional
ethics.495
The McGee panel placed great stock in the DSM’s recognition of the role
of “clinical judgment” in cases of mental disorder where precise DSM
criteria are not met, such as when clinicians apply an “NOS” (i.e., not
otherwise specified) label. One medical dictionary defines “clinical
judgment” as “the application of information based on actual observation
of a patient combined with subjective and objective data that lead to a
conclusion.”496 What the panel in McGee failed to note was that the two
testifying forensic experts had in fact never had the opportunity to use their
“clinical judgment” when arriving at their conclusions about McGee’s
condition, including what they testified as to his diagnosis and volitional
impairment, since they had never observed the “patient.” Rather, they had
simply reviewed evidence acquired by others, namely, law enforcement
officials, and had drawn their conclusions therefrom. Here again, the
testimony of experts in McGee was hardly unique for SVP proceedings. A
survey of evaluation methods by forensic experts in such proceedings found
that “documentation” of that kind, that is, police reports, treatment records,
and institutional records, were the most important sources they considered
in assessing respondents for SVP commitment.497
Because of evidence rules, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 703, that
permit an expert to base an opinion on inadmissible facts and data where
others in the field reasonably rely on such sources, the use of inadmissible
evidence to arrive at an opinion does not in itself generally lead to the
exclusion of such opinion at trial.498 The evidence rules can also, in some
instances, permit such otherwise inadmissible facts and data themselves to
be admitted to explain or support an opinion.499 However, one appellate

493. See, e.g., State v. Mark S., 87 A.D. 3d 73, 78-79 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); see also
Duffy, supra note 491, at 763.
494. See Hamilton, supra note 22, at 576-77.
495. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 370.
496. MOSBY'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 380 (9th ed. 2013) (emphasis added).
497. Rebecca L. Jackson & Derek T. Hess, Evaluation for Civil Commitment of Sex
Offenders: A Survey of Experts, 19 SEXUAL ABUSE 425, 431 (2007).
498. FED. R. EVID. 703.
499. Id. (“[I]f the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the
opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury
evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”). See generally Duffy,
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court, applying principles of due process because the proceeding “may
result in a serious deprivation of the defendant’s interest in liberty,” has
specifically held that an expert witness for the state in an SVP proceeding
could not base his or her opinion upon inadmissible hearsay even if it
would otherwise be admissible under rules similar to FRE 703.500 Rather,
the court stated, “because hearsay can permeate the evidence used to
commit a sex offender, a victim's hearsay statements in police reports or
presentence reports must have special indicia of reliability to satisfy due
process” before they can serve as the basis for the expert’s opinion.501
In some SVP proceedings, the information about the respondent’s past
criminal activity provided to expert witnesses, and even to the fact finder, is
never tested through the adversarial process in a criminal trial. For example,
in McGee, the predicate conviction on which the SVP petition against the
respondent was based dated from 1987, more than twelve years before the
trial on petition.502 However, at the trial, the state also offered evidence of
alleged conduct that was the basis of his probation violations, even though
McGee had never been convicted for such conduct.503 Other courts have
also permitted evidence of uncharged alleged criminal conduct to be
admitted and considered as part of SVP proceedings.504 For example, a
Washington appeals court affirmed the commitment of a man who had been
convicted of three rapes where the trial court in his commitment hearing
had admitted the testimony of a “criminal justice professor” who had
concluded, based upon an analysis of uncharged crimes bearing the
respondent’s modus operandi in a database, that the man could have
committed an additional seventeen unsolved sexual assaults.505
Ironically, although courts permit experts to base opinions regarding
dangerousness on criminal conduct alone, at least one court noted a lack of
criminal conduct (specifically, violence against persons) is insufficient to
demonstrate that a person does not pose a high risk of committing acts of

supra note 491 (reviewing the application of the “professional reliability” exception to the
hearsay rule in SVP proceedings in several states).
500. In re A.M., Jr., 797 N.W.2d 233, 261 (Neb. 2011).
501. Id.; see also Jenkins v. State, 803 So. 2d 783, 786-87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that SVP commitment cannot be based upon hearsay evidence).
502. McGee v Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 558-59 (7th Cir. 2010).
503. Id. at 559.
504. See, e.g., In re Coe, 250 P.3d 1056, 1067-68 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); In re Williams,
253 P.3d 327, 337 (Kan. 2011); Boyce v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 691 S.E.2d 782, 78586 (Va. 2010); In re Miller, 210 P.3d 625, 633 (Kan. 2009).
505. In re Coe, 250 P.3d at 1060-65.
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violence in the future. In one recent SVP case, United States v. Volungus,506
the primary predicate offense was possession of child pornography; there
was no evidence that the defendant had actually molested any children.507
The respondent acknowledged at his SVP trial that he was attracted to
children, and the evidence showed that he was obsessed with child
pornography.508 At trial and on appeal, he challenged the Government’s
expert’s conclusion that his diagnosis of pedophilia supported a finding that
he posed a high risk for engaging in molestation.509 Specifically, he argued
(and offered expert testimony in support) that, despite his strong sexual
attraction to children, he had in fact exercised control over acting on his
urges by not committing acts of molestation.510 The trial and appeals courts
rejected such arguments and concluded that his pedophilia and pornography
use were evidence of a “trajectory” that “would cause him serious difficulty
in refraining from child molestation in the future.”511 Such inferences run
counter to the research findings discussed earlier regarding the lack of any
clear causal links between attraction to children and engaging in acts of
sexual molestation against them.
The disturbing trends seen in the methods used by experts testifying on
behalf of the government in SVP cases reflect that they have no scientific
foundation on which to assess “volitional impairment,” and therefore
necessarily base their conclusions largely on the respondents’ history of
criminal behavior. Indeed, courts apply little scrutiny to an expert’s
assessment of the respondent’s volitional impairment as such.512 Where
506. United States v. Volungus, 730 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2013).
507. Id. at 42-45. The respondent had been convicted ten years earlier of “attempted
molestation” for having online contact with someone he thought was a fourteen-year old girl,
but was in fact the fictional creation of an undercover FBI agent. Id. at 43.
508. Id. at 45-46.
509. Id.
510. Id. at 48-49.
511. Id. at 48. The appeals court conflated an “inability to control attraction,” which is
not sufficient to support an SVP commitment under Hendricks-Crane, and an inability to
control one’s behavior. See id. at 47-49. Those on a gluten-free diet may have an
uncontrolled attraction to chocolate cake, yet manage to avoid eating it based on concerns
about the adverse consequences of doing so.
512. For example, the New York Appellate Division upheld an SVP commitment against
a challenge based on insufficient evidence where the state’s expert opined that the
respondent had difficulty controlling his behavior because he was aware that he “had a
problem” with exposing himself to people yet continued to do so. State v. Richard VV., 74
A.D.3d 1402, 1403-04 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). Curiously, the forensic expert also considered
the fact that the respondent met most of the diagnostic criteria for ASPD to be further
indication that he was unable to control his behavior. Id. However, there is nothing in that
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experts rely primarily upon law enforcement or prosecution files, such as
witness statements or criminal histories, to render an opinion about
volitional impairment, they engage in essentially the same process and use
the same information as ordinary lay fact finders do when they evaluate
evidence offered by the state at trial. This raises the question of what
“helpful” opinion testimony such experts actually bring to the courtroom
and, conversely, whether they are simply doing the fact finder’s job (albeit
from an arguably biased perspective) under the guise of offering their
“expertise.”513
Given the variability and unreliability of expert testimony in SVP
proceedings, it is not surprising that, overall, mental health professionals’
predictions of recidivism by SVPs appear to be no more accurate than those
made by laypersons on the basis of general knowledge. Empirical studies
confirm what psychiatrists themselves have long stated to be the case: their
predictions of recidivism by SVPs are little better than chance.514 A 2004
study concluded that experts were accurate in predicting future sexual
violence about one-half of the time.515 This study also confirmed many
other concerns about the reliability of expert opinion in SVP cases, such as
the emotional impact of reviewing victims’ statements and other
information in criminal records on the development of an evaluator’s
opinion and the existence of an overall bias favoring “locking up” prior
offenders regardless of the actual risk they pose.516
These findings are consistent with prior studies of clinical judgment that
have long established that, due to the operation of a range of cognitive
biases, such judgment, even by intelligent, ethical, and well-trained

diagnosis that is associated with volitional impairment. See also Eric S. Janus, Sex Offender
Commitments: Debunking the Official Narrative and Revealing the Rules-in-Use, 8 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 71, 83-84 (1997).
513. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if . . .
the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . .”).
514. Jackson et al., supra note 492, at 124; see also Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar
Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert
World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1869-71 (2003).
515. Jackson et al., supra note 492, at 124, 127.
516. Id. at 125. Another factor in the poor results was the fact that most of the terms in
the applicable legal standards were not sufficiently “operationalized,” meaning that the
specific terms are poorly defined (if they are defined at all). Id.
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professionals, is significantly inaccurate.517 For example, where a
professional fails to grasp the complexity of the circumstances that can lead
to various outcomes, the degree of confidence she feels in her conclusion,
rather than being a measure of its accuracy, may indicate just the
opposite.518 Also, it appears that the very act of predicting the likelihood of
a rare event, because it involves visualizing the possibility of that event,
leads to overestimating the risk of its occurrence.519 As psychologist Daniel
Kahneman has observed: “Errors of prediction are inevitable because the
world is unpredictable,” and yet “we resist our limited ability to predict the
future.”520 We are easily misled by both hindsight bias (i.e., we
overestimate the extent to which we can identify causal relationships but
base decisions on the assumption that we have identified them correctly)
and by a “readiness to ascribe propensity to behavior” (i.e., we see
behaviors that may be strongly affected by context as reflections of
underlying inclinations).521 Both of these general cognitive tendencies can
influence the thinking of testifying experts, and both can influence the way
fact finders weigh expert testimony in making SVP commitment
determinations.
4. Using Actuarial Tools
Expert opinion evidence offered by prosecutors in SVP cases is not
always based on diagnostic assessment alone. The appeals court opinion in
McGee notes that both of the State’s experts also used actuarial risk
assessment (ARA) instruments to arrive at their conclusions about the
respondent’s specific degree of risk of recidivism.522 Because McGee did
not challenge such use on appeal, the description of their testimony on the
role of such tools is very limited.523 Dr. Marsh testified regarding the
scores she assigned to McGee under the three tools she used to arrive at her
conclusion, and she indicated that “subjects with scores similar to Mr.
McGee’s in each of these instruments reoffended at rates of between forty-

517. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW, 238-42 (2011); TAVRIS &
ARONSON, supra note 486, at 97-126.
518. KAHNEMAN, supra note 517, at 212.
519. Id. at 333.
520. Id. at 217-20.
521. Id. at 199-201.
522. McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 559-60 (7th Cir. 2010).
523. Id.
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eight and fifty-four percent over a six- to fifteen-year period following
release.”524
The McGee opinion does not specify which ARA tools were used or
described in testimony by the testifying experts, but they were likely among
those commonly used by forensic examiners offering evidence in support of
SVP commitment. The appropriateness of the use of tools such as the
“Static-99,” Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offense Recidivism
(RRASOR), or Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (SORAG) as a basis for
expert opinions in support of SVP commitment is an unsettled question in
the courts.525 Some forensic examiners have advocated greater use of ARA
tools, which they characterize as especially objective, to address the
problems of bias and low inter-rater reliability accompanying clinical
judgment and diagnostic assessment described above.526 A growing number
of experts use risk-prediction actuarial tools to inform their opinions and to
support their testimony about the risk of recidivism, the “final and most
nebulous” part of the SVP analysis,527 posed by a respondent. One study of
evaluation methods found that the vast majority of forensic evaluators used
one or more tools as part of the assessment process.528 The guidelines
issued by the Association for the Treatment of Sex Offenders require use of
such tools, although no single tool has emerged as the preferred.529
These instruments are generally developed from studies of sex offenders
that isolate a number of specific “factors,” including the number of sex
offense convictions and characteristics of the individual’s victims (age,
gender, and relationship to the individual), associated with those who
recidivate.530 Those factors are assembled into what are essentially
checklists. Many of the instruments can be completed without evaluating
the individual but simply from reviewing records, including court records.
The results indicate what percentage of those individuals in the study who
share the offender’s factors went on to commit new crimes (sometimes
identified by arrests rather than convictions). After the factors are entered,
the tool yields a score that places the individual in a risk range, such as
524. Id. at 560.
525. Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science: Future
Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 697, 721-25 (2011)
(explaining how STATIC-99 and RRASOR were developed and are administered).
526. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 372-73.
527. Jackson & Hess, supra note 497, at 428, 434 (noting that 95.1% of respondents used
such instruments and 73.2% listed them as “essential” to the evaluation process).
528. Id. at 434.
529. Id. at 426.
530. EWING, supra note 34, at 36-38.
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“high risk,” and may offer a percentage of likelihood of reoffending.531
Thus, the tools are not psychological tests,532 nor are they predictors of an
individual’s specific likelihood to re-offend.533 The expert witness testifies
that the actuarial analysis of objective factors places the respondent at a
specific level of risk of reoffending,534 although such a conclusion is not
keyed to any legal criteria.535 The tools also shed no light on the questions
of abnormality or volitional impairment.
Some commentators have advocated for the complete replacement of
clinical judgment with the use of actuarial instruments, given results of
studies suggesting this change would yield improved accuracy.536 Noted
behavioral psychologist Paul Meehl argued decades ago that clinical
judgment is inferior to actuarial analysis,537 and other researchers have
replicated and reinforced his findings many times since his initial studies. 538
Empirical studies have shown that ARAs are specifically better predictors
of recidivism than “clinical judgment” alone,539 a standard that does not
seem to be all that difficult given the exceptionally poor ability of forensic
examiners to predict recidivism.540
However, as other commentators have stressed, there are reasons to
approach the use of ARAs in SVP proceedings with considerable caution.
The use of ARAs is highly controversial among legal and mental health
professionals, and critics of ARAs have noted their limited effectiveness. 541
531. Jackson & Hess, supra note 497, at 439.
532. Indeed, one study of evaluation procedures noted how less frequently psychological
testing is used in the SVP context as compared with other forensic evaluations, such as for
insanity and competency. Id. at 437-38.
533. United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 464 (4th Cir. 2012).
534. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Kirby, No. 10 C 2570, 2011 WL 6131176, at *3-6 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 8, 2011).
535. Jackson & Hess, supra note 497, at 439.
536. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 514, at 1871. See generally Eric S. Janus
& Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders:
Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443 (2003).
537. PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL
ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 94-95 (1954).
538. Janus & Prentky, supra note 536, at 1455.
539. Daniel A. Krauss et al., Dangerously Misunderstood: Representative Jurors'
Reactions to Expert Testimony on Future Dangerousness in a Sexually Violent Predator
Trial, 18 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 18, 20 (2012); Janus & Prentky, supra note 536, at
1455-58; Prentky et al, supra note 26, at 372.
540. Such findings are consistent with studies of accuracy of many different kinds of
predication across disciplines. See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 517, at 222.
541. Krauss et al., supra note 539, at 20; Saleh et al., supra note 344, at 366.
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One of the biggest shortcomings of the Static-99 and similar instruments is
that they assess risk based on a series of “static” factors that do not change
(such as the age of first offense, characteristics of the victims etc.) over an
offender’s lifetime.542 They therefore may fail to account for dynamic
factors such as life circumstances and participation in treatment, because
the instruments are based on the assumption that one’s risk never changes,
even if one makes choices to address the underlying propensity.543 As a
result, other than perhaps a decrease due to aging, a person’s score will not
change significantly. A person’s score could be the same the day of release
from incarceration and ten years later, even after leading an entirely lawabiding life during the interim.544 Such an approach to risk assessment fails
to take into account not only the passage of time, but also the events that
occurred (or did not occur) during such time, thus rendering any such
assessment severely liable to inaccuracy.545 Some instruments do not even
consider the mitigating effect of age on risk of recidivism.546 A few scholars
have advocated for a uniform use of “dynamic risk factors” before a final
risk assessment is made using ARAs,547 although research has not yet
suggested how best to integrate such factors.548
The SVP laws and the call for risk assessment as the core question in the
proceedings have spawned a cottage industry of developing new
instruments, each of which promises to be more precise that those
developed (and in use) before it.549 However, no consensus in the field has
emerged regarding which test is most applicable and appropriate in the SVP
commitment setting,550 or for predicting dangerousness generally, 551 and

542. Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling Sexually Violent Predators: Continued
Incarceration at What Cost?, 14 NEW. CRIM. L. REV. 213, 240-45 (2011); see also Hamilton,
supra note 525, at 724-25.
543. Krauss et al., supra note 539, at 20.
544. For an example of how the use of an ARA can have an impact on risk assessment of
a person who commits a crime at a young age, see Nora Hertel, Sex Offender Awaits Second
Chance, WISCONSIN WATCH (Feb. 4, 2014), http://wisconsinwatch.org/2014/02/sexoffender-awaits-second-chance/.
545. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 378.
546. Id. at 375.
547. Id. at 383-85.
548. Good & Bursteiin, supra note 84, at 30.
549. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 371-72; 2 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 401, § 11:28.
550. Black v. Voss, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1105-07 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that
respondent’s expert criticized the government’s experts for using the STATIC-99 test to
assess risk for reoffending because that test addressed criminal activity, not sexual deviancy,
and advocated use of the RRASOR test instead).
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there are some sharp differences in opinion and approach among
psychologists who have developed and used various instruments.552 Many
commonly used ARAs have been criticized for being unreliable. For
example, the SVR-20 (at least as of 2000) used only broad categories of
risk (high, medium, and low), and there were no inter-rater reliability rates
for specific factors.553 There is also no consensus what level of predictive
validity is sufficient for the instruments to be considered a useful tool for
predicting recidivism.554
ARAs, even at their best, can still be used poorly. 555 Although the
instruments are ostensibly objective, the evaluators who administer them
are not immune from common failings of human judgment and bias, and
the concept of “risk” is itself a construct subject to different
understandings.556 A simple difference in how the outcome of a risk is
presented, in terms of a probability versus a frequency, can affect how high
a professional assesses the risk.557 Also, the objective factuality of some of
the individual factors considered in the instruments may not be as clear as
initially assumed. For example, a factor such as participation in or
compliance with treatment can be a complex question where there is limited
access to treatment,558 where the treatment is cursory, or where the
treatment requires disclosure or other actions by the committed person that
could lead to lengthier commitment in the absence of Fifth Amendment
protections. The use of instruments or set “factors” can also lead to “cherry
picking” the factors to be considered in the analysis, which can also lead to
skewed results.559 Some scholars suggest that experts’ practice of making
individualized “adjustments” to scores may be little more than “dressing up

551. M. Neil Browne & Ronda R. Harrison-Spoerl, Putting Expert Testimony in Its
Epistemological Place: What Predictions of Dangerousness in Court Can Teach Us, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1198-1204 (2008).
552. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 373-80.
553. Terence W. Campbell, Sexual Predator Evaluations and Phrenology: Considering
Issues of Evidentiary Reliability, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 111, 120-21 (2000).
554. Good & Burstein, supra note 84, at 34.
555. Janus & Prentky, supra note 536, at 1493-97.
556. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 514, at 1871.
557. Risks phrased in the form of the probable occurrence of specific events are evidently
less “vivid” than ones phrased in the form of a frequency. KAHNEMAN, supra note 517, at
330 (“Experienced forensic psychologists and psychiatrists are not immune to the effects of
the format in which risks are expressed.”).
558. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 379.
559. Id. at 378-79; Good & Burstein, supra note 84, at 30-31 (arguing that ARAs for
SVPs may be “systematically biased”).
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clinical judgment with actuarial science.”560 Given such problems, several
scholars have suggested that the use of ARAs by examiners in SVP
proceedings is unethical.561
Testimony based upon ARA tools has received a mixed reaction in the
courts. Some courts resist admitting opinions based on such tools more than
they resist admitting those based solely upon diagnostic impressions.562 In
at least one case, a court rejected the forensic expert testimony because the
ARA employed failed to take into account events in the respondent’s life
that had transpired since the “factors” used in the assessment.563 Some
courts are uncertain about how much weight is appropriate to give to the
specific scores from such tests. For example, in In re Williams, a Kansas
appeals court reversed an SVP commitment because the government’s
expert had testified that the respondent’s score, which was lower than a
50% chance of reoffending, was too low to sustain such a commitment.564
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed that ruling, however, arguing that
there was other evidence to support a finding that the respondent was likely
to engage in acts of sexual violence.565 Finally, some courts have excluded
testimony based on ARA results altogether because of concerns about
unfair prejudice.566
Despite the shortcomings of ARAs, many courts have embraced the
tools, seeing them as akin to psychological tests or as amounting to an
objective predictor of a particular offender’s individual likelihood of reoffending.567 In United States v. Shields, for example, the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit upheld a commitment order based upon expert
testimony employing ARA tools even though the Government’s experts
conceded such tools were only “moderate” predictors of recidivism and that
there were significant reliability problems with the results of the tools used
in that particular case (including, among other things, that the results were
560. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 380.
561. Campbell, supra note 553, at 128.
562. Krauss et al., supra note 539, at 37; Daniel A. Krauss & Nicholas Scurich, Risk
Assessment in the Law: Legal Admissibility, Scientific Validity, and Some Disparities
Between Research and Practice, 31 BEHAV. SCI & L. 215, 225-27 (2013).
563. Commonwealth of Virginia v. Squire, 685 S.E.2d 631, 632-33 (Va. 2009) (affirming
dismissal of SVP petition despite expert testimony that actuarial tests placed the respondent
in the highest risk category).
564. In re Williams, 214 P.3d 1225, slip op. at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d, 253 P.3d
327 (Kan. 2011).
565. In re Williams, 253 P.3d 327, 338 (Kan. 2011).
566. Janus & Prentky, supra note 536, at 1487-92.
567. EWING, supra note 34, at 40-44.
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based on data obtained entirely outside of the U.S.).568 The appeals court
concluded that it should be left to the fact finder to decide the weight given
to such evidence.569
5. Sparse Use of Daubert-Frye Analysis
As Allan Frances has implored: “SVP courts must insist on good
science.”570 In the 1923 case of Frye v. United States, the U.S. District
Court applied a new admissibility standard for expert testimony, which was
later widely adopted by state courts: judges must consider a theory’s
“general acceptance” in the relevant scientific community before allowing
its admission.571 The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in Daubert v.
Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals572 requires a trial court to act as a
“gatekeeper” with regard to the scientific evidence presented; the court
must make its own determination of reliability of such evidence, based in
part on general acceptance as well as on the presence of other indicators of
“good science.”573 The controversial nature of psychiatric diagnoses
discussed above, combined with the significant liberty interest at stake in
SVP proceedings, suggest that trial courts in such proceedings should
exercise particular vigilance in the “gatekeeping” role. However, the case
law reveals a significant abdication of this responsibility by the courts.574
Legal scholars vary widely in their opinions of the type of gatekeeping
scrutiny that courts should afford to expert testimony by mental health
professionals generally, and this range of legal opinion has implications for
SVP cases. At one extreme, some commentators argue that psychiatry has
little to offer courts in such cases. For example, Samantha Godwin has
labeled psychiatry a “pseudoscience” that lacks sufficient reliability to be

568. United States v. Shields, 649 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2011).
569. Id. at 89-90. In that case, the trial court used an advisory jury, which concluded that
there was insufficient evidence of likelihood of the respondent reoffending. Id. at 84.
However, the court ultimately concluded that the Government had met its burden. Id. at 85.
570. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 386.
571. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by FED. R.
EVID. 702.
572. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
573. Id. at 590-95. One instance in which a court noted that expert testimony fell short of
the Frye test and therefore could not serve as a basis for an SVP commitment is one of the
very few reported opinions involving a female respondent. In re Coffel, 117 S.W.3d 116,
129 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
574. Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The “Fit” of Expert Predictions in Civil
Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2-3 (2003).
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considered at all in involuntary commitment hearings.575 Other scholars
have suggested that, while there may be some utility for mental health
testimony in a range of legal contexts, diagnoses themselves should not
generally be admitted.576 Still other scholars suggest that standards for
admissibility of expert evidence should be relaxed for mental health
testimony and that courts should use an “informed speculation” approach,
particularly for evidence offered by a criminal defendant to excuse criminal
conduct.577
Courts as well are divided on how to apply Daubert and Frye when
deciding whether to admit expert psychiatric opinions as evidence in SVP
proceedings. Indeed, the Daubert opinion was not cited at all by the McGee
court, despite McGee’s direct attack on the scientific basis of the state’s
experts. The Washington Supreme Court addressed the question of the
applicability of Frye to the admissibility of expert testimony shortly after
enactment of its SVP law. In In re Young, the court rejected the
respondent’s argument that the court should not have allowed the state’s
expert to base an opinion on a diagnostic label that did not appear in the
DSM.578 Quoting a law review article by Alexander Brooks, the court
reasoned:
The fact that pathologically driven rape, for example, is not yet
listed in the DSM–III–R does not invalidate such a diagnosis. . . .
What is critical for our purposes is that psychiatric and

575. Samantha Godwin, Bad Science Makes Bad Law: How the Deference Afforded to
Psychiatry Undermines Civil Liberties, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 647, 647 (2012). The most
significant deficiency Godwin identifies is the lack of validity of the “somatic reality” of
psychiatric diagnoses, since they are based entirely on symptomatology, not scientific
testing. Id. at 662.
576. Daniel W. Shuman, Persistent Reexperiences in Psychiatry and Law: Current and
Future Trends for the Role of PTSD in Litigation, in POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER IN
LITIGATION: GUIDELINES FOR FORENSIC ASSESSMENT 1, 7 (Robert I. Simon ed., 2d ed. 2003)
(“Both Daubert and the DSM make clear that it is not appropriate to assume that a
psychiatric diagnosis is relevant to, let alone dispositive of, an issue in a case.”); Daniel W.
Shuman, Softened Science in the Courtroom: Forensic Implications of a Value-Laden
Classification, in DESCRIPTIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS: VALUES, MENTAL DISORDERS, AND THE
DSMS 217, 224-25 (John Z. Sadler ed., 2002); Morse, supra note 274, at 601-04; Smith,
supra note 184, at 69 .
577. See generally Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health
Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 427, 427-50 (1980).
578. 857 P.2d 989, 1016-18 (Wash. 1993), superseded on other grounds as stated in In
re Thorell, 72 P.3d 708 (Wash. 2003).
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psychological clinicians who testify in good faith as to mental
abnormality are able to identify sexual pathologies that are as
real and meaningful as other pathologies already listed in the
DSM.579
Such “good faith” approaches to the admissibility of psychiatric evidence,
however, should raise significant concerns in both the law and medical
fields. One group of commentators noted that courts should be wary of the
use of new or “stretched” diagnoses with “no empirical track record
providing evidence for such a linkage.” 580 “Perhaps worse,” they caution,
“we are conferring on unvalidated diagnoses the presumptive medical
authority of the DSM.”581
On the other hand, and in accord with such recommended caution, some
courts have urged trial courts to apply additional scrutiny to expert opinion
evidence offered in support of SVP commitments. For example, an Illinois
appeals court held that a novel diagnosis such as Paraphilia NOSHebephilia must be subject to a Frye hearing before it can be presented to a
fact finder.582 The analysis in In re Detention of New began with finding
that expert testimony based on a diagnosis “presupposes a mental condition
exists as a matter of scientific evidence.”583 The court noted the
considerable controversy over the “hebephilia” label and concluded that
“[a] Frye hearing is appropriate to determine whether an emerging
diagnosis is an actual illness or disorder.”584 The court observed, strikingly,
that “[j]ustice does not put the fact finder in the position of culling good
science from bad.”585 The court correctly noted that, above all, the
reasoning of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Hendricks mandated a
scrutiny of the science offered in support of an SVP commitment. Since
SVP laws are ostensibly based upon a need for treatment, not retribution,
the court reasoned that “if a respondent in an SVP proceeding does not

579. Id. at 1001 (quoting Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of
Civilly Committing Sexually Violent Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 709, 733
(1992)) (alteration in original). More recently another Washington appeals court, in In re
Berry, noted that many courts have held that the Frye rule has no application to the question
of whether a diagnosis of Paraphilia-NOS may be admitted in an SVP proceeding. 248 P.3d
592, 595-96 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
580. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 370.
581. Id.
582. In re New, 992 N.E.2d 519, 521, 528-31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
583. Id. at 528.
584. Id. at 529.
585. Id.
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suffer from an actual mental disorder, then there is nothing to cure, and
commitment is pointless.”586
On balance, however, there is little question that, even in the era of
Daubert and similar rules designed to ensure that only reliable expert
testimony is admitted, clinical psychiatric testimony is rarely excluded.587
By the time the Court decided Daubert, the role of psychiatric testimony
was so embedded in legal decision-making that it was inconceivable to
courts that they should scrutinize, much less reverse, this practice.588
Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted in Barefoot v. Estelle: “The suggestion
that no psychiatrist's testimony may be presented with respect to a
defendant's future dangerousness is somewhat like asking us to disinvent
the wheel.”589
The analysis in McGee is remarkable for how far it strays from the core
principles set forth in the Daubert opinion. Presumably, the panel did not
apply that standard because of the specific posture of the case. McGee was
not a direct appeal challenging the lower court’s evidentiary rulings on such
testimony.590 Rather, because McGee’s attorneys brought a habeas petition,
the court considered only whether there was a constitutional violation.591
The evidence rules, and cases interpreting them such as Daubert, impose a
more specific and therefore higher standard for admissibility than does the
Constitution.592 But courts routinely follow the lower standard when, as in
the SVP context, they analyze admissibility to determine the
constitutionality of an ongoing deprivation of someone’s liberty. Barefoot
586. Id. at 530.
587. Scherr, supra note 574, at 58-61.
588. Krauss et al., supra note 539, at 38; see also SLOBOGIN, supra note 187, at 28-29.
589. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983), superseded on other grounds by 28
U.S.C. § 2253 (2012).
590. McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2010). In any event there is no
indication that McGee raised Daubert-based challenges in his original proceeding.
591. Id. at 561-62. As one court of appeals panel explained, federal courts’ review of
claims of evidentiary errors is severely limited in the habeas context:
Habeas review does not ordinarily encompass garden-variety evidentiary
rulings. As we have said: “The federal judiciary holds no roving commission to
monitor case-by-case compliance with rules of evidence. . . .” In this case,
petitioner's objections to the trial court's evidentiary rulings do not implicate
errors of constitutional dimension and, therefore, are not “proper grist for the
federal habeas mill.”
Palmariello v. Superintendent of M.C.I. Norfolk, 873 F.2d 491, 494 (1st Cir. 1989) (citations
omitted).
592. Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1071, 1072-76 (2003).
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in particular, which upheld the use of psychiatric evidence about future
dangerousness in the face of research suggesting the low reliability of such
predictions, suggests a very low standard for admissibility of expert
evidence.593 Such lack of scrutiny of expert evidence is highly questionable
where the state is offering the evidence to rationalize indefinite detention.
That most courts distinguish between the admissibility standards
regarding expert testimony in the evidence rules and due process
jurisprudence raise the question of whether the admission of expert
testimony in a manner apparently inconsistent with Daubert can itself
implicate due process. No court has addressed that question squarely, and
that question was not before the Seventh Circuit in McGee. However, in
cases where a person’s constitutional rights to liberty are at stake, there
clearly are due process implications for a court’s role as gatekeeper
regarding expert opinion.594 Courts should take into account in their due
process analyses that these invented or extended diagnoses or ARAs—
employed almost exclusively in the SVP commitment (rather than clinical)
context—would not pass either a Daubert or a Frye gatekeeping standard.
Indeed, these made-for-trial expert opinions appear to be precisely the kind
of testimony that the Ninth Circuit excluded in Daubert.595
As discussed below, the call to include some of these extended diagnoses
in the DSM-5 was inextricably intertwined with arguments about the
usefulness of such diagnoses in SVP proceedings. This fact should signal to
courts that expert opinions in such proceedings do little more than use
medicalized terminology to tell courts and juries what to conclude. Also,
given mainstream psychiatry’s consistent rejection of recidivism prediction
and the lack of peer-reviewed research supporting it, there is a serious

593. Id. at 1091-92. Giannelli also rejects the reasoning that the standard could be lower
because it was an analysis under the constitution, not the rules of evidence; the “death is
different” principle necessarily means that evidence offered in support of the death penalty
should have to meet higher, not lower, standards of reliability. Id. at 1092.
594. The Supreme Court has not considered this issue, or the continuing validity of
Barefoot v. Estelle, in light of Daubert. See Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 616 (7th Cir.
2010) (rejecting argument of SVP respondent based on Daubert-Frye in an appeal of SVP
commitment because “neither . . . purports to set a constitutional floor on the admissibility of
scientific evidence”); Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 514, at 1859; Giannelli,
supra note 592, at 1091-92.
595. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming
exclusion of expert testimony that was based solely upon research conducted for purposes of
litigation).
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question whether any expert prediction of future dangerousness could pass
a strict Daubert test.596
Although courts admit expert testimony regarding future dangerousness
(whether based upon clinical judgment, ARAs, or both), they leave the
determination of the weight to be assigned to such testimony to the fact
finder, which is often a jury or, in some states, an elected judge. 597 There
are two fundamental problems with this practice. First, it ignores the limited
ability of laypersons to critically assess the opinions of expert witnesses,
one of the core rationales for the Daubert “gatekeeping” requirement.598
The ability to uncover and assess problems in reliability can be especially
challenging for laypersons with respect to the often ipse dixit opinions599
offered by mental health professionals.
The second problem concerns the nature of SVP proceedings and the
specific task assigned to fact finders: determining whether a convicted sex
offender should be permitted to be at large in society. It seems unlikely that
a fact finder could render a decision on such a question without fear of
repercussions if its conclusion that a respondent posed a low risk of
committing future acts of sexual violence proved to be wrong.600 SVP
commitment is a decision that puts the fact finder between an offender and
a potential “next victim.” There has been limited research on to what extent
expert testimony about future risk influences jurors’ decision-making.601
596. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 514, at 1857.
597. Minnesota, Washington, and Wisconsin, for example, elect trial court judges. MINN.
CONST. art. 6, § 7; WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 5; WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 6. Even courts that
reject the government expert’s opinion in an SVP proceeding generally do so under weight
or “credibility” principles (after admitting the testimony) rather than excluding the opinion
under either a Daubert (or rule 702) or due process analysis. See, e.g., United States v.
Wilkinson, 646 F. Supp. 2d 194, 201 (D. Mass. 2009).
598. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (“‘Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite
misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in
weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules
exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.’”).
599. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (noting that an expert’s
opinion is not sufficiently reliable to be admitted when it is “connected to existing data only
by the ipse dixit of the expert”).
600. Cf. People v. Shazier, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 224 (Ct. App. 2012), rev’d and
remanded, 298 P.3d 178 (Cal. 2013) (vacating SVP commitment due to prosecutorial
misconduct because, in part, prosecutor’s closing argument included references to the
proximity of schools to where respondent would be living and asking jurors to consider what
their friends’ and family members’ reactions would be if they denied the commitment).
601. Krauss et al., supra note 539, at 21. Florida courts specifically permit use of the
term “sexually violent predator” in SVP commitment proceedings, notwithstanding concerns
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Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine how a jury of laypersons, after
hearing an expert opine that based on an ARA instrument, a child rapist has
a 33% chance of reoffending (i.e., raping another child) would not commit
that person. Indeed, recent research of decision making by jurors in actual
SVP trials reveals that many follow something along the lines of former
Vice President Dick Cheney’s “one percent doctrine” and conclude that, in
such cases, any amount of risk, no matter how small, is too much to
accept.602 Judges are not immune from similar concerns about the
implications of their rulings. One Circuit Judge on the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, dissenting from an opinion affirming a district court’s
denial of an SVP petition, wrote: “though we may never learn the
consequences of a poor predictive judgment on our part, I fear that some
young child somewhere will experience them,” and noted that there are “sad
and scarring consequences of a guess gone awry.” 603 This judge likely
articulated the mental calculations made by many juries and jurists involved
with these cases.604
This review of law and practice in SVP proceedings has demonstrated
that the prevalent use of psychiatric evidence in such proceedings is a
distortion of medical views of pathology of sexual violence—including
appropriate diagnostic methods and prediction of future conduct—and also
legal principles regarding the admissibility of expert opinion. This
distortion includes cases where expert opinion is based on unreliable
methodology or data that runs counter to predominant views of the
raised by the defense bar that the term is “extremely inflammatory, prejudicial, and
misleading” and would deprive respondents of due process. Standard Jury InstructionsCriminal Cases (99-2), 777 So. 2d 366, 367-68 (Fla. 2000). The committee developing the
jury instructions agreed, however, that the term should not be overused to the extent that it
becomes a “feature” of the trial. Id.
602. Knighton et al., supra note 402, at 300-02 (finding that many jurors in SVP
proceedings “viewed even a 1% chance of reoffending as indicating that an offender is likely
to reoffend”). Cheney stated: “If there's a 1% chance that Pakistani scientists are helping alQaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our
response.” Ron Suskind, The Untold Story of al-Qaeda's Plot to Attack the Subway, TIME,
June 26, 2006, at 27.
603. United States v. Springer, 715 F.3d 535, 548, 551 (4th Cir. 2013) (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
604. There have not been empirical studies of the rates of commitment in bench versus
jury trials, but there are anecdotal press reports of jurors rejecting SVP commitment
petitions. See, e.g., Karen Franklin, Another One Bites the Dust: Hollow SVP Prosecution
No Match for Jurors’ Common Sense, IN THE NEWS (Oct 27, 2012), http://forensic
psychologist.blogspot.com/2012/10/another-one-bites-dust-hollow-svp.html (the blog author
was one of the defense experts in that case).
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psychiatric field and risks misuse by, or the misleading of, the fact finder.605
These fundamental and extensive distortions of sound science and justice
are the inevitable and unavoidable result of the courts’ experiment with
SVP laws. These distortions also demonstrate that many in the psychiatric
field accurately predicted the dangers of SVP laws when the SVP
experiment began.
C. Fixing the Science to Fit the Courtroom
The opinions in Hendricks and Crane assumed that there was a “bright
line separating an SVP/SDP mental disorder from ordinary criminal
behavior.”606 Such line-drawing, however, “tests a no-man’s land between
psychiatry and the law.”607 Many scholars and commentators in the fields of
both law and psychiatry believe that the forensic use of psychiatric
evidence, and particularly diagnoses, is unscientific and grossly misleading.
Accordingly, there have been many calls to fix the problem, sometimes by
fixing the science.
Commentators who maintain that science does have something to offer
in SVP proceedings tend to speak of the “disturbing frequency” with which
“bad science” appears in those proceedings.608 This conception of the
problem in SVP cases suggests that there may be a role for “good” (or at
least “better”) science and, indeed, there have been many suggestions and
proposals for ways to improve the forensic science evidence admitted.
Proposed fixes could include changing the way clinical diagnoses are
approached, changing the diagnoses themselves, and either supplementing
or replacing the diagnostic assessments with the use of actuarial tools.
However, none of these modifications would solve the core problem set up
by the Hendricks-Crane rationale: in a highly adversarial context, with very
high stakes for the individual and society, courts are asked to look to the
conclusions of psychiatric examiners to answer a normative moral question.
1. Addressing Problems with Diagnoses
The nature of the problem concerning diagnostic labels in SVP
proceedings differs significantly depending upon one’s perspective. Some
psychiatric commentators, such as Allan Frances, complain that experts
testifying for the state misuse existing diagnoses such as Pedophilia or
605.
456.
606.
607.
608.

See Hamilton, supra note 22, at 556-72; see also Prentky et al., supra note 334, at
Frances et al., supra note 272, at 383.
Id. at 383.
Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 361.
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ASPD, or invent diagnoses such as Paraphilia NOS-Nonconsent, which
have not been set forth in the DSM or otherwise been sanctioned by
psychiatry.609 Due to the “particularly high stakes for respondents,” these
commentators are concerned about the potential for large numbers of “false
positive” diagnoses.610 Accordingly, there have been calls to revise DSM
language to eliminate any potential for such behavior-based approach to
diagnosis.611
Mental health professionals offering testimony for the states in SVP
proceedings, by contrast, see the problem in terms of a failure of the DSM
or the field of psychiatry to provide forensically usable categories.612 Some
of these experts believe the science fails to reflect the reality of mental
conditions underlying acts of sexual violence.613 They are concerned about
ambiguities that lead to court challenges to their testimony or present
potential barriers to fact finders receiving their opinions.614 This group,
therefore, advocated for revisions to the paraphilias in the DSM-5 so that
there would be a clearer basis in the psychiatric nosology for identifying the
mental disorders most commonly seen in SVPs.615
These commentators also noted the practical need for preserving the
potential for an approach to assigning a paraphilia diagnosis based on prior
609. See, e.g., First & Frances, supra note 315; Frances, et al., supra note 272; Frances &
First, supra note 462; Allan Frances & Richard Wollert, Sexual Sadism: Avoiding Its Misuse
in Sexually Violent Predator Evaluations, 40 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 409, 40916 (2012).
610. First, supra note 312, at 1239 (internal citations omitted).
611. Id. at 1242.
612. See, e.g., Ray Blanchard et al., Pedophilia, Hebephilia, and the DSM-V, 38
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 335, 347-49 (2009); John Matthew Fabian, Diagnosing and
Litigating Hebephilia in Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 496, 497-501 (2011); John Matthew Fabian, Paraphilias and
Predators: The Ethical Application of Psychiatric Diagnoses in Partisan Sexually Violent
Predator Civil Commitment Proceedings, 11 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 82, 84-90 (2011);
Raymond Knight & David Thornton, Dialogue on Paraphilic Coercive Disorder: Moving
Toward an Empirically Based Consensus, 12 SEX OFFENDER L. REP. 33, 33-36 (2011);
Robin J. Wilson, Paraphilic Coercive Disorder: A Clinical and Historical Perspective, 12
SEX OFFENDER L. REP. 35, 35-36 (2011).
613. See, e.g., Blanchard et al., supra note 612, at 347-49.
614. See, e.g., Fabian, supra note 612, at 501-04; Paul Stern, Paraphilic Coercive
Disorder in the DSM: The Right Diagnosis for the Right Reason, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 1443, 1444 (2010).
615. See, e.g., Ray Blanchard, The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Pedophilia, 39
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 304, 313-15 (2009); David Thornton, Evidence Regarding the
Need for a Diagnostic Category for a Coercive Paraphilia, 39 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV.
411, 416-17 (2010).
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behavior as essential to those offering testimony in support of
commitments.616 Respondents are often uncooperative with evaluators,617 or
clinical evaluation may not be included in the diagnostic process.618
However, most psychiatrists developing specific DSM diagnostic criteria
assume that they will be used as part of clinical assessment, including
patient interviews, in therapeutic, not forensic, settings.619
The array of views regarding the use and validity of DSM labels reflects
the adversarial setting of SVP proceedings, and it should come as no
surprise that the outcome of the debate over the proposed changes for
DSM-5 resolved nothing and left the paraphilias essentially unchanged.620
The proposals for change did, however, garner fierce debate and prompt a
flood of papers and editorials while they were under consideration.621 The
varied commentaries brought to the surface many of the controversies about
psychiatry’s role in SVP commitments discussed above.
The outcome of the debate was a compromise that resulted in
maintaining essentially the same approach of the DSM-IV-TR.622 DSM-5
616. See, e.g., Blanchard, supra note 615, at 306.
617. First, supra note 312, at 1240-41.
618. See Jackson & Hess, supra note 497, at 426 (noting that there are no standards for
what must be included in a forensic evaluation of an SVP respondent).
619. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 43-44 (noting that, in the therapeutic context,
the most important tool for diagnosis and assessment is “the clinical interview—a dialogue
with the patient exploring present mental state, past experiences, and desires for the future”).
620. Michael B. First, DSM-5 and Paraphilic Disorders, 42 J. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY
& L. 191, 192 (2014).
621. Id. at 192, 199-200; see also Fred S. Berlin, Commentary on Pedophilia Diagnostic
Criteria in DSM-5, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 242 (2011); John Matthew Fabian,
Diagnosing and Litigating Hebephilia in Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment
Proceedings, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 496 (2011); First, supra note 312, at 1239;
First & Halon, supra note 314, at 451-52; Franklin, supra note 462, at 751; Raymond
Knight, Is a Diagnostic Category for Paraphilic Coercive Disorder Defensible?, 39
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 419 (2009); Robert Prentky & Howard Barbaree, Commentary:
Hebephilia—A Would-be Paraphilia Caught in the Twilight Zone Between Prepubescence
and Adulthood, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 506, 506 (2011); Wakefield, supra note
297, at 205-06; Howard Zonana, Sexual Disorders: New and Expanded Proposals for the
DSM-5—Do We Need Them?, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 245, 248-49 (2011).
622. DSM-5, supra note 269, at 697. Pedophilia is now “Pedophilic Disorder” but the
diagnostic criteria themselves are unchanged. The category of “Paraphilia Not Otherwise
Specified” has been replaced with “Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder” and has more
extensive explanatory text than that in DSM-IV-TR. Id. at 705. There is also a new category
for “Unspecified Paraphilic Disorder,” which is used in similar contexts as the “Other
Specified” disorders but the “clinician chooses not to specify the reason that the criteria are
not met for a specific paraphilic disorder,” such as where there is insufficient information for
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simply maintained the tension between deviance and disorder with which
psychiatry has been increasingly aware.623 By making minimal changes to
the paraphilias, the APA rejected many revisions proposed by those who
support the state in SVP commitment proceedings, such as adding the
categories hebephilia or paraphilic coercive disorder.624 Allan Frances
nonetheless remains concerned that the revised paraphilias section is “an
ambiguous hodgepodge [which] will surely be misused in sexually violent
predator hearings where every word is given legal spin.”625 Michael First
has cautioned that the DSM-5’s paraphilias language—in terms of both
what was changed and what was not—may cause continued confusion and
misuse in forensic settings, especially SVP commitment proceedings.626
The DSM-5’s editors evidently shared Frances’s concern to some extent
(he was an editor of an earlier edition himself), but they also did not want to
see the influence of the manual wane in legal settings. The new DSM’s
“Cautionary Statement for Forensic Use” is longer than the previous one,
more explicit in its explanation of the limited purpose for which the manual
was devised (i.e., assisting mental health professionals with assessment and
treatment in clinical settings), and now has a clearer title.627 But the
statement begins with a sales pitch for its use in forensic contexts; it states
that, “[w]hen used appropriately,” the “diagnoses and diagnostic
information” in the manual can “assist legal decision makers” in
involuntary commitment cases where the “presence of a mental disorder is
the predicate.”628 The manual may also, it states, “facilitate legal decision
makers’ understanding of the relevant characteristics of mental
disorders.”629 Especially significantly here, it also suggests “diagnostic
information about longitudinal course may improve decision making when
a more specific diagnosis. Id. For a helpful discussion of all of the changes to the Paraphilias
category in the DSM-5, see generally First, supra note 620.
623. First, supra note 620, at 195-200; see also supra notes 286-338 and accompanying
text.
624. See supra notes 612-615 and accompanying text; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
PARAPHILIC DISORDERS 1-2 (2013), available at http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/Paraphilic
%20Disorders%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (describing what revisions were finally accepted for
publication in DSM-5).
625. Allan Frances, DSM-5 Badly Flunks the Writing Test, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (June 11,
2013), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/blogs/dsm-5/dsm-5-badly-flunks-writing-test?cid= tw.
626. First, supra note 620, at 195-200.
627. DSM-5, supra note 269, at 25. Previously the language was simply titled
“Cautionary Statement.” DSM-IV-TR, supra note 313, at xxxvii.
628. DSM-5, supra note 269, at 25.
629. Id.
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the legal issue concerns an individual’s mental functioning at a past or
future point in time.”630
The new DSM statement also includes cautions about taking forensic use
too far and, in places, the language appears to specifically address experts
and judges involved in SVP proceedings. The statement cautions against
the risk of misunderstanding arising from “the imperfect fit between the
questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in
clinical diagnosis.”631 It also emphasizes that “in most situations” more
information about the individual is “usually required beyond that
contained” in the diagnosis.632 The statement emphasizes that use of the
manual for assessment by “insufficiently trained individuals is not advised,”
and it notes that “a diagnosis does not carry any necessary implications
regarding . . . the individual’s degree of control over behaviors that may be
associated with the disorder.”633 Given, however, that similar cautionary
language has been disregarded with some regularity in SVP proceedings (as
discussed above), such warnings are likely to have little effect on the
widespread use of psychiatric diagnoses in court settings, even in resolving
factual questions regarding volitional impairment associated with mental
abnormality.
2. Using Actuarial Tools as a Check on or to Replace Clinical Judgment
As noted above,634 some legal scholars and some in the mental health
profession have advocated use of ARA instruments either in addition to635
or in place of diagnostic assessment and clinical judgment.636 The appeal of
such tools is obvious: they would permit testifying experts to offer more
accurate predictions while avoiding the unsettled realm of psychiatric
diagnoses. One recent empirical study suggested that jurors may give more
weight to “less scientifically valid unstructured clinical expert testimony
630. Id. (emphasis added).
631. Id.
632. Id.
633. Id.
634. See supra notes 526-540 and accompanying text.
635. Some researchers have proposed used of “Guided Clinical Risk Assessments,”
which use a number of factors that associated with recidivism but are not necessarily static,
such as low self-esteem and “general psychological distress.” Campbell, supra note 553, at
120. However, studies have not demonstrated these to be sufficiently reliable for forensic
use. Id.
636. See, e.g., Robin J. Wilson et al., Pedophilia: An Evaluation of Diagnostic and Risk
Prediction Methods, 23 SEXUAL ABUSE 260, 271 (2010) (advocating exclusive use of ARAs
in SVP prediction).

2015]

DANGEROUS DIAGNOSES, RISKY ASSUMPTIONS

719

over more accurate actuarial assessment.”637 However, in addition to
ARAs’ problems with reliability (discussed in the previous section), there
are fundamental conceptual and moral problems as well. The most
significant problem with the use of ARAs in SVP proceedings is that these
tools are designed only to assess the statistical risk of recidivism, not, as
required by the Hendricks-Crane standard, the existence of volitional
impairment.638 Nor are ARAs designed to assess the presence of “mental
disorder,” another core requirement of the SVP statutes and a component of
their constitutional floor.639 Moreover, because these instruments largely
use information that can be gleaned simply from a review of a respondent’s
records alone—without an interview—the forensic examiners employing
them, like those who misuse paraphilia diagnoses as discussed above, are
constructing a state of underlying volitional impairment based solely on a
selective record of past actions.
Social scientists and others who advocate replacing clinical judgment
with these tools to ensure more accurate assessments invoke studies
showing superior prediction rates for those based on actuarial tools.640
There is also, however, a general wariness about using statistics to predict
individual human behavior and, as noted by many social scientists, a
resistance to doing so. As Daniel Kahneman observes: “The debate about
the virtues of clinical and statistical prediction has always had a moral
dimension. . . . The aversion to algorithms making decisions that affect
humans is rooted in the strong preference that many people have for the
natural over the synthetic or artificial.”641 Significantly, this aversion
appears to be even stronger when the “decisions are consequential.”642
Although these emotional responses to the general use of actuarial tools
to make predictions about human outcomes strike many researchers as
irrational, the “moral dimension” of such reactions bears special
consideration in the context of a legal proceeding such as SVP
commitment. In his short story, The Minority Report, Phillip K. Dick
evoked the specter of using “science” to determine what we will do in the
637. Daniel A. Krauss et al., Dangerously Misunderstood: Representative Jurors’
Reactions to Expert Testimony on
Future Dangerousness in a Sexually Violent Predator Trial, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
18, 33 (2012).
638. See supra notes 151-152 and 165-169 and accompanying text.
639. First & Halon, supra note 314, at 450-51.
640. See, e.g., MEEHL, supra note 537, at 94-95.
641. KAHNEMAN, supra note 517, at 228.
642. Id.
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future and then detaining individual people as a result of such “precrime
predictions” to paint a frightening dystopian picture.643 Using statistically
gathered numbers to assess the likelihood of individual human behavior—
especially as the sole basis for an indefinite commitment—is patently
inconsistent with a justice system that emphasizes individualized treatment
rather than determinations based on group-based behavior, such as “guilt by
association.”644 Indeed, such “moral dimensions” have a central place in our
legal system, and the fact that there is such discomfort at using actuarial
methods to determine whether to remove someone from society indefinitely
is indicative that such methods are out of place in SVP proceedings.
The sharpness of the debates regarding the use of psychiatric diagnostic
assessments and ARA instruments in SVP proceedings, with strong but
conflicting evidence on both sides, encourages a significant third
perspective: the entire SVP commitment model, with the essential role it
assigns to forensic assessment of the likelihood of recidivism, is inherently
unworkable.645 Because findings of mental abnormality and dangerousness
are constitutionally required in such proceedings, the question of whether
we can reliably assess the relevant pathology and risk directly implicates
the committed persons’ liberty interests.646 What these debates reveal is that
643. See generally PHILIP K. DICK, THE MINORITY REPORT AND OTHER CLASSIC STORIES
(Pantheon Books 2002).
644. Janus & Meehl, supra note 410, at 60-61; cf. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 345
(1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Due Process Clause establishes a powerful
presumption against unnecessary official detention that is not based on an individualized
evaluation of its justification.”). David Faigman recently examined the difficulty of offering
expert opinion regarding an individual based upon research findings about a group: “In
terms of scientific inference, reasoning from the group to an individual case presents
considerable challenges and, simply put, is rarely a focus of the basic scientific enterprise. In
the courtroom, it is the enterprise.” David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i)
Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 420 (2014) (emphasis
added).
645. See First, supra note 620, at 200 (“Paraphilic disorders, by virtue of their forensic
import, exemplify the difficulty of integrating psychiatric concepts and concerns with those
of the legal system and society in general.”).
646. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 371; see also Janus & Prentky, supra note 536, at
1458. This is not to suggest that clinical judgment and ARAs are the only methods proposed
for predicting risk of sexual violence. For example, legal scholar Adam Lamparello has
advocated use of neuroscience to predict violent behavior. Adam Lamparello, Using
Cognitive Neuroscience to Predict Future Dangerousness, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
481, 488-92 (2011). However, at this time, there have been no studies of the use evaluating
brain activity through functional MRI imaging to predict such violence. Moreover, it is by
no means clear that such technology will correct any of problems inherent in the SVP
commitment model discussed herein. See generally Steven K. Erickson, The Limits of
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neither approach—clinical judgment or actuarial instruments—is
sufficiently reliable to ensure that SVP laws are not sweeping too broadly.
The making of predictions generally, not the methodology used to make
them, is the problem.
Given that all the proposed fixes to the invocation of psychiatric science
in SVP proceedings fall short of addressing the fundamental problems seen
in the case law, the question for legal scholars and analysts becomes
whether the courtroom can be fixed to fit the existing science instead.647
While some degree of judicial leniency regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony by mental health professionals is arguably appropriate for many
kinds of cases, especially when a personal injury plaintiff or a criminal
defendant raises the issue of mental injury or disorder, there are compelling
reasons to apply far more scrutiny to such evidence in SVP cases. One
reason is certainly the high-stakes outcomes of such cases. Another no less
significant concern is the power assigned by the laws to mental health
professionals in order to meet the due process requirements in the
Hendricks-Crane rationale.
A few rulings by courts suggest that a more assertive role by trial judges
as gatekeepers could prevent due process violations in individual cases, and
several legal scholars have made recommendations along these lines.648 It
remains true, however, that courts overwhelmingly admit suspect science in
SVP trials and leave it to the fact finder to decide how much weight to give
such expert opinion.649 Most courts, like the McGee trial court, leave issues
regarding the validity of the methods used—including use of the diagnostic
labels and ARAs—entirely to the assessment of the fact finder. Lower
courts’ implementation of Hendricks-Crane has made clear that they are
Neurolaw, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 303 (2012); Daniel S. Goldberg, Against
Reductionism in Law and Neuroscience, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 321 (2012).
647. Samuel Jan Brakel, Psychiatrists and Law, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Nov. 19, 2010),
http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/forensic-psychiatry/psychiatrists-and-law.
648. Hamilton, supra note 22, at 52; Prentky et al., supra note 334, at 458; see also Vars,
supra note 410, at 895-97 (arguing that due process requires that courts commit individuals
only upon a finding that there is at least a 75% risk that the person will commit an act of
sexual violence within the next five years).
649. See, e.g., McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 581 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that
controversy over validity of a diagnosis is a “proper consideration for the factfinder in
weighing the evidence that the defendant has the “mental disorder” required by statute”); In
re Det. of Lopez, 166 Wash. App. 1012, 2012 WL 295462, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012)
(“The validity of [the state’s expert’s] diagnosis was a matter for the jury to evaluate.”); In
re Lieberman, 929 N.E.2d 616, 632 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010), vacated by 237 Ill. 2d 557 (Ill.
2010); see also Hamilton, supra note 22, at 594.
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uninterested in playing a more active role in screening out such expert
testimony. As long as courts retain the current legal framework for
evaluating the admissibility of such evidence, we should expect the same
tendencies to prevail.
Indeed, were trial courts to assume the role of aggressive gatekeeper in
SVP proceedings, such practice would fundamentally alter how, and
whether, SVP laws were implemented. The irreconcilable conflict between
the known limits of the science of psychiatry and the statutory requirements
of the SVP laws could result in the exclusion of a significant amount of
evidence offered in support of commitment and thereby reveal the inherent
unworkability of the SVP commitment model. In other words, serious
judicial gatekeeping in the SVP context would effectively nullify the laws.
Trial courts are generally reluctant to undermine the objectives of elected
legislators, especially when such policies have broad public support and, as
here, have been upheld by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, it is unlikely
that trial courts could be convinced to widely and consistently reject
psychiatric evidence in SVP commitment proceedings.650
IV. Revisiting the Hendricks-Crane Rationale
The SVP commitment laws have no shortage of critics from within law,
psychiatry, and other fields.651 Many criticize the ways the laws are
implemented; others argue that they reflect failed, flawed, and misplaced
policies that merely score political points.652 Still others insist that they are
based on myths about sex offenders and unfounded assumptions about the
potential for their treatment and rehabilitation.653 Most of these criticisms,
650. And of course, absent further action from the Supreme Court, Barefoot v. Estelle
remains good law, at least in theory. The Court was recently presented with a petition for
certiorari that could have provided an opportunity to revisit Barefoot v. Estelle and the
standard for admissibility of expert psychiatric evidence on future dangerousness, but it
declined to hear the case. Coble v. Texas, 330 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 3030 (2011). Accordingly, the Court appears uninterested in providing
courts any further guidance on the admissibility of such evidence anytime soon.
651. See, e.g., Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 226, at 5-17; see also JANUS, supra note 20, at
87-92 (arguing that the laws are antifeminist because they perpetuate a number of harmful
myths about rape and child abuse, such as that such acts are largely committed by
“predators” rather than relatives and acquaintances of the victims); LANCASTER, supra note
29, at 233-34 (tracing the “sex panic” underlying many modern sex offender laws to less
overt expressions of homophobia and racism).
652. See Simon, supra note 79, at 281.
653. Id. Simon summed up her assessment of SVP laws as follows:
[T]hese legal policies and mental health practices targeting offenders who
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however, do not directly address the constitutionality of the laws. Instead,
in light of the Hendricks-Crane rulings, critics commonly assume that the
question of their constitutionality has been settled.654
In this Article, my focus has been the validity of the rationale of the
opinions that are thought to have settled that question. As discussed in Part
II, that rationale, as delivered in the Hendricks-Crane holdings, presumes
the integrity of using a mental-illness model for the deprivation of liberty
permitted by SVP laws. By extension, the medical, and therefore legal,
legitimacy of the prosecution of these laws depends on the testimony of
mental health professionals weighing in on the question of respondents’
pathology and volitional control. That testimony, however, is inherently
problematic: it is unreliable at best and, at worst, hollow.
Since the crucial medical opinions offered in SVP proceedings regarding
who is a “predator” with a “volitional impairment”—as distinct from a
“typical recidivist”—are routinely based on conclusions drawn from
reviewing the record of a respondent’s prior acts of sexual violence, those
opinions are, in effect, tautologies.655 The term “sexual predator” has no
psychiatric meaning; it is used simply to name a group of sexual offenders
from whom we want to protect the public. It is like the term “weed,” which
has no botanical meaning but which we use simply to refer to plants of
which we want to rid our gardens. In the absence of a scientific basis for
determining whether or not a person is a “sexual predator,” the task
assigned to forensic experts in SVP proceedings is to make a normative
determination; this delegation of moral decision-making to psychiatry is
inconsistent with core notions of due process. Accordingly, the
constitutionality of such laws is, in fact, far from settled.
Some judges have recognized the dangers and implications of attempting
to align psychiatry with the problematic concept of a “sexually violent

commit sex crimes thrive despite the absence of empirical evidence that sex
offenders are distinguishable from other offenders; that sex offenders are any
more mentally disordered (and treatable) and dangerous than other offenders;
and that mental health professionals are competent to make predictions of
dangerousness.
Id.
654. See, e.g., Janus & Prentky, supra note 536, at 90.
655. See also La Fond, supra note 23, at 162 (“The primary evidence for all of these
elements—mental disorder, volitional impairment, and dangerousness—is the same; an
offender's past history of committing sex crime(s). Simply put, a sex offender who has
committed a qualifying sex crime thereby provides evidence that is legally sufficient to be
committed as a SVP.” (alteration in original)).
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predator.” In a 2010 concurring opinion in an SVP appeal, Justice Richard
Sanders of the Washington Supreme Court wrote:
[I]f the scientific community does not recognize such a condition
[as Paraphilia NOS-Nonconsent], much less possess any
methodology to identify individuals with such a condition, the
statutory test [for SVP commitment] cannot be met.
....
Without a scientifically recognized condition that compels a
person to commit sex offenses, civil confinement also runs afoul
of the constitution . . . .
....
Where a person is deprived of his or her freedom based upon
opinion testimony lacking scientific credibility, reliability, and
accepted methodology, courts must step forward and announce
with the courage of a small child that the Emperor wears no
clothes.656
This is a remarkable acknowledgement—and call to action—regarding
the fundamental problem with these laws. However, the entire opinion,
including this concurrence, was later withdrawn upon a motion for
reconsideration by the State.657
Courts appear to be stuck in a box of their own creation. As captured in
Minority Report, the ability to predict future crime or violence holds
tantalizing appeal for a society.658 Even if we lack the technology available
in the story, we are inclined to think that many instances of horrifying
criminal violence could have been prevented if someone, especially some
scientist, psychiatrist, or other expert, had recognized its likelihood and
taken steps to prevent it. As scientists themselves have repeatedly told us,
however, and as courts cannot fail to acknowledge,659 our general
presumption regarding the ability of scientists, and specifically of those in

656. State v. McCuistion, 238 P.3d 1147, 1155 (Wash. 2010) (Sanders, J., concurring),
overruled by 275 P.3d 1092 (Wash. 2012). The Washington Supreme Court ordered a
hearing on a committed person’s petition for release. Id. at 1153.
657. McCuistion, 275 P.3d at 1097.
658. See generally DICK, supra note 643.
659. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983); United States v. Umana,
707 F. Supp. 2d 621, 634 (W.D.N.C. 2010); United States v. Taveras, 424 F. Supp. 2d 446
(E.D. Tex. 2006); Lamparello, supra note 646, at 488-92.
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the psychiatric profession, to predict future violence far exceeds their actual
ability. However, despite these acknowledged limits—and the
constitutional values at stake when they are disregarded—courts continue to
uphold statutes based on just such mistaken assumptions. The SVP laws are
not the only examples of this problem but perhaps the most stark and farreaching ones. The Supreme Court has never identified a constitutionally
acceptable error rate for predictions of future violence, although its preDaubert opinion in Barefoot suggested that a disturbingly high error rate
would be acceptable.660 Such a low standard for acceptability gives courts
and legislators broad freedom to take significant legal actions based on an
assessment of risk and to use psychiatry as a means to identify such risks.
Courts have permitted legislators to effectively delegate a crucial normative
question to the field of psychiatry and, in so doing, have disregarded the
field’s own disavowal of its ability to fulfill that role competently and
ethically.
These objectionable and harmful patterns of delegation must be changed
from within the law. Nearly forty years ago, the noted circuit court Judge
David Bazelon cautioned courts about delegating “delicate questions of
state intervention” to mental health professionals.661 In comments that bear
particularly on the questions examined in this Article, he explained:
[S]tate intervention involves a serious compromise of individual
rights and hence a difficult balancing of power between the state
and the individual, where the stakes are highest for human and
personal rights. Courts have traditionally been the protector of
individual rights against state power, and there is no reason why
the particularly difficult problems in the area of state
intervention are any different. We cannot delegate this
responsibility to the medical professions. Those disciplines are,
naturally enough, oriented toward helping people by treating
them. Their value system assumes that disturbed or disturbing
individuals need treatment, that medical disciplines can provide
it, and that attempts to resist it are misguided or delusionary. The
medical disciplines can no more judge the legitimacy of state
intervention into the lives of disturbed or disturbing individuals

660. Jackson et al., supra note 492, at 126.
661. David L. Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and the Adversary
Process, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 897, 910 (1975).
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than a prosecutor can judge the guilt of a person he has
accused.662
The Supreme Court, in deciding Kansas v Hendricks, did not heed Judge
Bazelon’s caution or give full consideration to the implications of drawing
the line at mental abnormality. In light of what we have learned from the
enforcement of these laws, it is clear that courts must revisit their validity.
The social implications of SVP laws bear some emphasis. By
pathologizing and not merely condemning the rapist and molester, and by
relying upon a psychiatric and not merely moral construction of sexual
violence, these laws and their implementation fuel a stigmatizing view of
mental illness more generally—the view, that is, that being labeled with a
psychiatric diagnoses signals that one may be dangerously “out of control,”
and therefore a threat to society. Indeed, language in Hendricks directly
supports this view:
A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a
sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary
commitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes when
they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of
some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental
abnormality.’ These added statutory requirements serve to limit
involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a
volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their
control.663
Such reasoning links acts of violence and mental illness in a misleading and
damaging way. Most sexual offenders do not have serious mental disorders,
as discussed above. But the Court’s longstanding pronouncement that
illness can serve as a basis for detention encouraged lawmakers and courts
to pathologize sex offenders to permit their removal from society in a
manner inconsistent with notions of due process.664 In this respect, SVP
laws reflect the dual problematic trends of criminalizing the mentally ill and
pathologizing criminals.
The use of paraphilias, that is, deviant sexual arousal, as the basis for
most SVP commitments is particularly troubling given the controversy
regarding whether the DSM should even list such conditions as disorders
for clinical purposes. Some observers suggest that commitments made on
662. Id.
663. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358-59 (1997) (emphasis added).
664. Janus, supra note 63, at 15.
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this basis carry broad legal implications. Jerome Wakefield, for example,
has flagged what he regards as “a dangerous slippery slope implicit in these
legal developments.”665 He reasoned:
A pluralistic society is based on respect for human difference
and acceptance of the enormous range of normal variation in
tastes and desires. If sexual peculiarities that are labeled
disorders and are offensive to others can be the grounds for civil
commitment on the basis of the harm they do to the public, then
it is not clear why other peculiarities that may be labeled
disorders and may be out of control of the afflicted individual —
such as, say, depression or anxiety that detracts from the
efficiency of others and thus harms them — need remain
constitutionally immune to such provisions in the future.666
SVP commitment laws carry implications for the field of psychiatry as
well. Many within the psychiatric field, conscious of their limited
knowledge of the nature of sexual offenses and offenders, are exceedingly
uncomfortable with the role assigned to them by the laws.667 The task given
to forensic experts in SVP proceedings can be even more challenging than
the typical dangerousness prediction. Not only is the expert being asked to
make an assessment of a person’s long-term risk for sexual violence, such
determination must be made of someone who has been incarcerated,
sometimes for a lengthy period of time, making prediction of his future
behavior in public especially difficult.668 Psychiatrists also note that dangerprediction as a predicate to detention strays far from the central role of
psychiatry, which is to alleviate mental suffering and distress.669 Employing
a host-parasite metaphor, psychiatrist James L. Knoll warns that SVP laws
put psychiatry at risk of becoming “co-opted by a political agenda.”670 The
prosecution of such an agenda through these laws, Knoll observes, would
jeopardize the “autonomous functioning, and thus the reliability, of the

665. Wakefield, supra note 297, at 197.
666. Id.
667. See supra notes 190-201, 342-370, and 384-398 and accompanying text.
668. Prentky et al., supra note 26, at 358.
669. Jerome C. Wakefield, False Positives in Psychiatric Diagnosis: Implications for
Human Freedom, 31 THEORETICAL MED. BIOETHICS 5, 9 (2010) (“Treatment of disorder is
the essential defining mission of psychiatry.”).
670. James L. Knoll, The Political Diagnosis: Psychiatry in the Service of the Law,
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (May 13, 2010), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/sexual-offenses/poli
tical-diagnosis-psychiatry-service-law.
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science,” and transform psychiatry into “a new organism entirely—one that
serves the ends of the criminal justice system.” 671
The constitutional infirmities of the SVP laws revealed in this Article
serve as compelling reasons for their legislative repeal. Moreover, as noted
earlier and certainly of significance to legislators, the laws are expensive
and of questionable safety benefit to the public. States heeded the advice of
the GAP report in the 1970s and repealed the “sexual psychopath” laws.672
They should once again take seriously psychiatry’s disavowal of its ability
to identify predators. At this time, however, there is no indication of any
jurisdiction moving to repeal or significantly reform its SVP commitment
laws.673
If state policymakers hesitate to change SVP laws out of fear of political
backlash, a somewhat “quieter” option for states is to slow the rate of
commitment under such laws and increase the rate of release of those
committed previously. The State of Wisconsin is following this route
presently. The state has committed nearly 500 individuals since enacting its
SVP law in 1994.674 It released only thirty-one individuals between 1994
and 2009, but released 114 in the four years between 2009 and 2013.675 It
took these steps in light of recent research suggesting that recidivism risks
for “certain types of individuals” were lower “than previously thought.” 676
Those who were released received treatment and monitoring in their
communities, and the legislature enacted new laws to expand the
community-monitoring program.677
States could also consider programs that may obviate the need for
commitment altogether, such as sentencing options for sexually violent
crimes that leave questions of mental illness out of the equation.678 For
example, states could follow Maine’s example and adopt supervised release
laws, which provide for an extended period of community supervision in
671. Id.
672. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
673. Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 226, at 9-10.
674. Nora Hertel, Wisconsin Freeing More Sex Offenders from Mental Lockup, WIS.
WATCH (Feb. 2, 2014), http://wisconsinwatch.org/2014/02/wisconsin-freeing-more-sex-off
enders-from-mental-lockup/.
675. Id.
676. Id.
677. Id.
678. See, e.g., John M. Fabian, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond: “Mental
Abnormality,” and “Sexual Dangerousness”: Volitional vs. Emotional Abnormality and the
Debate Between Community Safety and Civil Liberties, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1367,
1418-20 (2003).
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lieu of probation as part of a sentence for a sex offense.679 Although
Maine’s law is aimed at preventing recidivism among sex offenders
specifically, its use does not depend on a determination of a mental disorder
but rather on whether the defendant is a “repeat sex offender” as defined
under the law680 in addition to a series of other factors.681 Currently, few
courts evaluating SVP petitions consider whether existing alternatives may
minimize a risk of recidivism.682 If more such programs were in place, their
availability could provide an argument against commitment in individual
cases.683
Regardless, however, of whether the states decide to follow such
alternatives to SVP commitment proceedings, there is a central role and
responsibility for the Supreme Court with respect to these laws. Given the
demonstrably dubious basis of the Hendricks-Crane rationale in light of
how that reasoning has played out in actual SVP commitments and the
exceedingly serious implications of leaving the holding in place, the Court
must revisit the constitutionality of the SVP laws.
While the Court is appropriately loathe to overrule itself, it can follow
the example it set when it overruled Bowers v. Hardwick684 in Lawrence v.
Texas.685 The justices noted in Lawrence that striking down the Texas
sodomy law at issue in that case would place it squarely in conflict with the
precedent it had set seventeen years earlier in Bowers, when it upheld
Georgia’s law; “[t]he doctrine of stare decisis,” it cautioned, “is essential to
the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the
law.”686 However, the Court also noted that this doctrine “is not an

679. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 1231-1233 (2013); State v. Cook, 2011 ME 94 ¶ 24, 26
A.3d 834, 843-44. In the case at hand, the sentencing court imposed the following conditions
of release: limiting contact with the victim and other children, undergoing evaluation and
treatment, and community monitoring. Id. ¶ 18, 26 A.3d at 841.
680. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A §§ 1231(2)(A), 1252(4-B)(A).
681. Cook, ¶¶ 27-29, 26 A.3d at 844-45.
682. One of the few courts to engage in this analysis is the district court of Massachusetts
in United States v. Wilkinson, which considered the fact that the respondent was facing
charges for a probation violation in state court as well as supervised release through the
federal probation office. 646 F. Supp. 2d 194, 208 (D. Mass. 2009).
683. For a more thorough review of alternatives to current sex offender policy, including
SVP commitment laws, see JANUS, supra note 20, at 113-29.
684. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
685. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
686. Id. at 577.
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inexorable command; rather, it ‘is a principle of policy and not a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.’”687
Significantly here, in applying these judicial principles to the
constitutionality of sodomy laws, the Court noted the publication of several
scholarly “criticisms of the historical premises relied upon by the majority
and concurring opinions in Bowers.”688 Upon reexamination of those
premises, the Court found that it had based the earlier opinion on erroneous,
or at least overstated, historical grounds689 and that “[t]he rationale of
Bowers does not withstand careful analysis.”690 Here, a comparable
examination mandates that the Court acknowledge that its earlier opinions
on SVP laws were based on erroneous medical grounds and that its core
rationale “does not withstand careful analysis.”
V. Conclusion
The responsibility to make rationally informed policy rests, of course,
with lawmakers. In many ways, it is hard to fault the drafters and supporters
of the first SVP laws, particularly those acting in the immediate wake of
almost inconceivably horrifying crimes such as Earl Shriner’s. But once a
policy is enacted, even if it was based largely on immediate public outrage,
fear, and avoidance of risk, it is nearly impossible to undo. The fear and
sense of high risk, even if later understood by lawmakers themselves to be
exaggerated, may still be potent among many segments of the public—
often, as in the case of the “sexually violent predator,” stoked by myths and
exploitative media representations, and reinforced by the existence of the
laws themselves.691 In light of this political reality, the courts have a
significant role to play in the evaluation of the basis for laws enacted in
response to specific outrage-evoking events.
687. Id. (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
688. Id. at 567-68. The Court also noted that the Bowers opinion had not induced any
“individual or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel against overturning
its holding once there are compelling reasons to do so.” Id. at 577.
689. Id. at 571 (“In summary, the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more
complex than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger
indicate. Their historical premises are not without doubt and, at the very least, are
overstated.”).
690. Id. at 577.
691. See John Douard & Eric S. Janus, Beyond Myth: Designing Better Sexual Violence
Prevention, 34 INT’L. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 135, 135 (2011) (“[L]aws [targeting sex offenders]
have defined—or said another way, created—a new ‘kind’ of person—qualitatively different
from normal people, constitutionally and essentially different. This is ‘the sex offender’ or,
more bluntly, ‘the sex predator.’”).
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The Earl Shriner case had particular characteristics that shaped the SVP
laws. Shriner’s prior involvement with the criminal justice system and the
unsuccessful attempt to use the standard involuntary commitment
procedures to keep him away from potential victims persuaded the public
and the policymakers who served them that the state’s laws contained a
gaping omission. Reports of his crimes fed the widespread public
perception that child sexual abuse is rampant and that our criminal justice
system is powerless to control it. There was and remains a general belief
that sex offenders have high rates of recidivism, are mentally ill, cannot
control their impulses, and cannot be successfully treated or supervised in
the community. With a previously convicted offender like Shriner, there
seemed to be clear warning signs right there. Viewed retrospectively after
his subsequent acts of violence, Shriner appeared to many observers clearly
to be a sexual criminal who was all but certain to re-offend after his release.
It also seemed that the state should have a mechanism to act on such signs
to prevent the reoccurrence of such crimes by other convicted offenders—
specifically, a law that would “lock them away” if experts identified signs
indicating that the offenders posed a distinct risk of victimizing children
and others.
Clarity of hindsight, however, is often taken for intrinsic predictability,
and our general intuitions about risk—even the instructed intuitions of
experts—are often grossly inaccurate.
In the public and legislative reactions to the Earl Shriner case, the
mistakes were many and mutually reinforcing. The first mistake was to
generalize improperly from the particular circumstances of Shriner’s acts.
While Shriner’s crime against a random victim led an anxious public to
conceive of the sex offender as a kind of “bogeyman,” always lying in wait,
always ready to strike whatever innocent children were near, research has
shown that sexual violence is generally highly circumstantial and
contingent, that it occurs under a range of contextual and individual
conditions, and that it most often involves victims who have prior family,
social, or institutional relationships to the perpetrator.692

692. LANCASTER, supra note 29, at 76-79. Similarly, the common perception of a sex
offender or predator is one who lurks around schools, playgrounds, and candy stores waiting
to lure trusting children into their cars or residences. Such stereotypes lead to community
notification laws, sex offender registries, and restrictions on offenders’ residence. In fact, the
overwhelming number of cases of sexual abuse are committed by family members or
“trusted” adults such as teachers, clergy, and coaches. See, e.g., Cucolo & Perlin, supra note
226, at 25-27; LANCASTER, supra note 29, at 78.
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The second key mistake was the assumption by the public and legislators
that mental health experts could identify sexually violent individuals and
prevent sexual violence through a process of legal commitment. As
demonstrated in this Article, psychiatry lacks the knowledge and the
instruments to identify who is most likely to commit future acts of sexual
violence or to predict the likelihood of violence by a specific individual.
The implementation of SVP laws has been likened by two forensic
psychiatrists to the Salem Witch trials of the seventeenth century.693 In an
essay making the comparison, they argue that the suggestion that clinicians
can identify the true predators among us creates a dangerous and false sense
of security for the public.694 Commitment of large numbers of sexual
offenders under SVP laws does not enhance public safety. The laws reflect
the public’s fears and groundless beliefs, not the realities of either sexual
violence or the capacities of mental health experts. SVP laws are
dangerous, damaging, and unconstitutional, and the experiment must be
shut down.

693. Good & Burstein, supra note 84, at 24.
694. Id.

